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 ABSTRACT 
 
Three Essays on Corporate Liquidity,  
Financial Distress and Equity Returns 
 
Fang Wang 
 
The three essays in this dissertation study the impact of corporate liquidity on a firm’s 
value, how corporate liquidity affects the probability of financial distress and equity 
returns, and whether corporate liquidity represents an idiosyncratic risk, or serves as a 
priced risk factor.  
The first essay examines the relationship between corporate liquidity and equity 
returns for individual firms. It is found that firms holding more liquid assets have 
significantly higher equity returns. This positive relationship between corporate liquidity 
and equity returns is more pronounced among firms with financial constraints. In addition, 
firms expecting volatile cash flows stock more cash for precautionary purposes and their 
stock returns are higher relative to those generating stable cash flows. These empirical 
evidences indicate that the level of corporate liquidity may signal risks faced by 
companies. Furthermore, more liquid firms tend to have higher market beta, which 
suggests that corporate liquidity may serve as a risk factor. Finally, Fama-MacBeth two 
pass regression results show that corporate liquidity contains different information than 
what is included in other important firm characteristics like size and book-to-market 
equity ratio.   
The second essay further explores the relationship between corporate liquidity and the 
expected return of stocks at the aggregate level. Asset pricing tests are performed to 
examine whether the constructed corporate liquidity factor, LMI (Liquid Minus Illiquid), 
is a risk factor and whether it is systematic and priced. Empirical evidences from 
multifactor asset pricing models suggest that LMI can still serve as an independent factor 
and is priced although it shares some common information with the three popular factors 
MKT, SMB and HML. Moreover, corporate liquidity beta is increased when the 
macroeconomic condition becomes less favorable, and the corporate liquidity beta is 
more sensitive to changes in macroeconomic conditions for firms with more corporate 
liquidity and financial constraints. 
The third essay examines how a company’s market value can be affected by residual 
cash, and whether corporate liquidity and negative residual cash can predict bankruptcy. 
It is shown that deviation from the target or optimal cash is value destructive, which 
provides support for the tradeoff theory. However, the impact of residual cash on market 
value of equity is not symmetric: positive residual cash tends to reduce firm value less 
than negative residual cash. In general, firms with negative residual cash are more likely 
to experience financial distress since they are smaller, less profitable, generate lower cash 
flows, and have higher leverage but weaker payoff ability. Furthermore, logistic 
regression results show that negative residual cash serves as an important predictor 
variable for bankruptcy. The probability of filing bankruptcy is higher for firms with 
negative residual cash.  Finally, negative residual cash contributes to different default 
probabilities (Altman’s Z-score, Vassalou and Xing’s default likelihood indicator and 
Chava and Jarrow’s default probability) estimated in previous literature.  
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1 
Three Essays on Corporate Liquidity, Financial Distress  
and Equity Returns: An Introduction 
 
Corporate liquidity, as every manager knows, is the lifeblood of a business. Keynes (1936) 
provided three motives for individuals to hold cash.1 They hold cash for transaction 
purposes, as a precaution against unexpected future expenditure and for speculation. It is 
natural to extend these motives to firms since firms need liquid assets to maintain daily 
operations, to cover unanticipated expenses and reduce the probability of financial 
distress, and to quickly take advantage of future profitable investment opportunities when 
external financing is expensive. Moreover, the separation of management and ownership 
creates the additional incentives for the managers to hold more cash.  Time series data 
show that the percentage of cash in total assets has been increasing dramatically during 
recent years, especially for those most liquid firms. Some firms hold large sums of liquid 
assets such as cash and marketable financial securities. In 2004, Ford held $32.9 billion 
and Microsoft held $60.6 billion in cash and marketable securities.2 Other firms like Wal-
Mart and DuPont consistently keep a lower level of cash.  
Are “excessively” high cash holdings justified? How does the stock market value the 
cash held by firms? How will corporate liquidity affect the equity returns? Does 
corporate liquidity represent as an idiosyncratic or systematic risk? Is a low-than-optimal 
level of corporate liquidity related to financial distress even default and bankruptcy? 
These are all interesting questions to address. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to empirically analyze the relationship between 
corporate liquidity and expected equity returns, whether corporate liquidity represents an 
idiosyncratic source of risk, or serves as a priced risk factor, the extent to which corporate 
liquidity can impact a firm’s value, and the probability of financial distress even 
bankruptcy.  
Corporate finance literature has extensively studied the motives of holding liquid 
assets (Miller and Orr (1966), Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998), Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz 
and Williamson (1999) and Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2006), etc.), various firm 
                                                 
1 Keynes, J.M., 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Harcourt Brace, London 
2 The figures reported here are reported in the Compustat Industrial Annual Files. 
2 
characteristics as determinants of the cash level (Vogel and Maddala (1967), Kim, Mauer 
and Sherman (1998), etc.), and whether there is an optimal level of liquid assets (Kim, 
Mauer and Sherman (1998), Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999), etc.). 
However, the impact of cash holding on expected equity returns hasn’t gained enough 
attention. This is particularly important because holding corporate liquidity can bring 
both benefits and costs, based on which a firm chooses to keep a certain level of financial 
liquidity. These benefits and costs will be reflected in the firm’s market value and 
therefore its equity returns.  
 
The first chapter examines whether and how cash holdings can affect the equity returns 
for individual firms. It is found that firms that hold a higher proportion of liquid assets 
have significantly higher expected equity returns than firms with low liquidity even after 
controlling for the size and value effect. This can be interpreted as precautionary saving 
signals potential risks and leads to higher expected return, if we can find evidences 
showing relevant risk information associated with corporate liquidity.  
Three types of potential risks are examined. First, firms whose future cash flows are 
more volatile tend to hold more cash and have higher stock returns compared to firms 
with more stable cash flows. This is consistent with Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (1999), where firms with volatile cash flows have more cash. If a company 
accumulates a high level of financial slack out of a precautionary purpose as the 
managers have such information that firm’s cash flow risks will be greater in the future, 
required equity returns will be higher as the high corporate liquidity signals this risk. 
Second, the positive relationship between equity returns and corporate liquidity is more 
pronounced for firms with financial constraints. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson 
(1999) find that firms with easy access to financial market tend to hold less cash while 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) point out that cash holding is more valuable for 
financially constrained companies. Hence a reasonable explanation for the distinct 
positive relation between corporate liquidity and equity returns among financially 
constrained firms is that firms stock liquid assets to lower down financial constraint risk, 
and a high level of cash signals this motive and implies higher a financial constraint risk. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence shows that corporate liquidity is positively related to 
3 
beta, which implies that a higher level of financial slack indicates risks and might serve 
as a risk factor.  
Finally, results of Fama-MacBeth two-pass regression suggest that corporate liquidity 
contains information different from what is contained in important firm characteristics 
such as size and book-to-market equity since the impact of corporate liquidity on equity 
returns remains significant even after these characteristics are controlled for. This extends 
support to the view that corporate liquidity contains certain risk information and its 
observed level therefore signals the potential risks. 
 
The second chapter investigates the relationship between aggregate corporate liquidity 
and the expected return of stocks from an asset pricing point of view. Corporate liquidity 
has been considered and studied as an idiosyncratic firm characteristic in previous 
corporate finance literature, which focus on the motive and determinants of liquid assets. 
However, how corporate liquidity can affect a firm’s value and therefore equity returns 
have not been investigated extensively until recently. Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) 
find that cash is more valuable for firms with financial constraints, better growth 
opportunities, more volatile investment opportunities and a lower probability of financial 
distress. Faulkender and Wang (2006) provide evidence that the market rewards firms 
holding internal cash with higher values, while the marginal market value of cash 
declines as the level of cash increases. They also find that on average, the market value of 
cash is higher for financially constrained firms than for those that are not constrained.  
The asset pricing literature, on the other hand, tries to explain the asset returns with 
risk factors. Most of the asset pricing literature studying liquidity refer to financial 
liquidity, and they find liquidity is not only an idiosyncratic phenomenon, instead, 
aggregate liquidity can be a systematic risk factor ((Amihud and Mendelson (1986), 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005)).  In particular, Holmström and Tirole (2001) make adjustments to asset 
pricing theory using a corporate finance approach. They develop an asset pricing model 
based on firms’ desire to hoard financial slack. Collateralizable assets require a premium 
determined by the covariation between the asset’s return and the marginal value of 
4 
liquidity3 in different states. Risk neutral firms pay a premium on assets that can help 
them through the time when liquidity is in shortage. According to their model, asset 
prices are completely determined by corporate demand for liquidity. 
The second essay examines whether corporate liquidity is a risk factor and whether it is 
systematic and priced. If aggregate corporate liquidity contains information about 
changes in future investment opportunities, it can proxy a state variable and can be used 
as a factor to price equity returns. I construct a corporate liquidity factor LMI (Liquid 
Minus Illiquid), which is a zero-investment portfolio long stocks with the most liquid 
assets and short stocks with the least liquid assets. Asset pricing tests are performed on 
various portfolios including 25 Size-BE/ME portfolios, 27 Size-BE/ME-Corporate 
Liquidity Portfolios and 10 corporate liquidity sorted portfolios.  
Empirical results from estimating multifactor asset pricing models suggest that 
although the three popular factors MKT, SMB and HML share some information 
contained in the corporate liquidity factor, LMI can still captures abundant equity return 
variations across the portfolios and serves as a priced independent factor. Compared to 
CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model, the four-factor regression better explains 
the stock return variations across firms with different cash holding levels.  
More empirical tests are completed to investigate whether the corporate liquidity factor 
is systematic and what kind of risk it may proxy for. It can be found that a negative 
movement in macroeconomic condition increases the corporate liquidity beta, with a 
larger magnitude for liquid firms relative to illiquid ones. Firms with higher corporate 
liquidity are riskier than less liquid firms because their higher sensitivity to the 
macroeconomic changes signals higher risks. Finally, there is evidence showing that the 
corporate liquidity beta of financially constrained companies is more sensitive to changes 
in macroeconomic situations and is greater in absolute value than for firms without 
financial constraints. These findings offer evidence to support the view that firms 
increase asset liquidity because they are financially constrained and therefore more 
exposed to macroeconomic risks.  
 
                                                 
3 Liquidity in Holmström and Tirole (2001)’s paper refers to the aggregate value of financial securities that 
can transport wealth over time and back up future payments. 
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    Tradeoff theory proposes that firms should keep an optimal level of cash in order to 
maximize shareholders’ wealth. A deviation from this level will decrease the firm value. 
However, in the real business world, firms are always observed to maintain a liquid asset 
higher or lower than the optimal level. Motivated by this inconsistence, the third chapter 
looks at the impact of residual cash on a company’s market equity value and the ability of 
corporate liquidity and negative residual cash to predict bankruptcy.  
Previous literature focuses more on the positive deviation of cash from the “optimal” 
or “normal” level and relates the positive residual cash issue to firm control and corporate 
governance since it is generally agreed that excessively high liquidity is associated with 
agency problems4. Faleye (2004) finds that proxy-fight targets keep more cash than non-
target firms. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) show that positive excess cash is more 
valuable for firms with sound corporate governance than poorly governed firms. They 
also find that poorly governed companies dissipate cash quickly and in a value-destroying 
manner. 
 On the other side, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) and Sibilkov (2005) 
show that firms hold negative residual cash because they are financially constrained and 
they do not find evidence to support the agency theory. Moreover, cash holding has been 
long used as an important input variable in financial distress or bankruptcy prediction 
function (Altman (1968), Zmijewski (1984), Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) and 
Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2005)), yet whether residual cash can predict 
bankruptcy remains unclear. 
The third chapter starts with estimating the residual cash using a regression approach 
following Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 
(2007) and a portfolio approach. It is found that on average firms with negative residual 
cash are smaller, less profitable, more heavily leveraged but have weaker ability to pay 
off debt, spend more in research and development, distribute less dividends and lack 
good governance.  
                                                 
4 Myers and Rajan (1998) argue that corporate liquidity can be a source of agency problems. Dittmar, 
Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003) claim that agency problems are an important determinant of corporate 
cash holdings, and find that corporations in countries with poor shareholder protections hold more cash 
than countries where shareholder rights are well protected. Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2005) use 
cross country data to test the agency theory. They find that minority shareholders value cash holdings less 
in countries where investor protection is poor than in other countries, which provides supportive evidence 
for the argument that agency problems play an important role in firm valuation across countries.  
6 
Value regression results show that either a positive or negative deviation from the 
target or normal cash is value destructive, which provides support to the tradeoff theory. 
However, the effect of residual cash on market value of equity is asymmetric such that 
market value of equity declines with a smaller magnitude for a larger positive residual 
cash compared to negative residual cash.  
Furthermore, logistic regression results indicate that negative residual cash is an 
important predictor variable for bankruptcy. Given the corporate liquidity position, 
holding a less-than-normal-level of cash will increase the probability to file bankruptcy. 
 Finally, negative residual cash contributes to various default probabilities (Altman’s 
Z-score, Vassalou and Xing’s default likelihood indicator DLI and Chava and Jarrow’s 
default probability) estimated in previous literature.  
 
     In summary, these essays contribute to the literature of corporate liquidity, multifactor 
asset pricing models and bankruptcy prediction in several important ways. First, 
corporate liquidity is positively related to the expected equity returns and contains 
important risk information other than size and book-to-market equity, and therefore can 
signal potential risks for individual companies. Second, corporate liquidity effect remains 
significant even after market, size and value factor have been controlled for, implying the 
existence of corporate liquidity factor, which contains risk information about changes in 
future investment opportunities. Indeed, corporate liquidity factor LMI has done a great 
job interpreting equity return variations across portfolios created based on corporate 
liquidity holding. Third, a deviation from the optimal or normal cash level is value 
destructive, with a larger magnitude for negative residual cash. Negative residual cash 
serves as an important predictor for firm bankruptcy.  
    The dissertation accordingly consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 studies idiosyncratic 
corporate liquidity and its relationship with expected equity returns. Chapter 2 examines 
whether the aggregate corporate liquidity can serve as a risk factor and be priced in 
multifactor asset pricing models. Chapter 3 investigates the role of residual cash in 
affecting market value of equity and predicting bankruptcy probability.  
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Chapter 1 
Idiosyncratic Corporate Liquidity and Equity Returns 
 
I. Introduction 
Corporate liquidity is an important issue widely studied in corporate finance. If a firm can 
be considered as an asset, then corporate liquidity shares some features in common with 
financial asset liquidity in the sense that they both refer to the ease and speed of 
conversion into cash. Some firms hold large sums of liquid assets such as cash and 
marketable financial securities. In 2004, Ford held $32.9 billion and Microsoft held $60.6 
billion in cash and marketable securities5. Other firms like Wal-Mart and DuPont tend to 
keep a low level of financial slack.     
        Holding liquid asset brings benefits to firms, and these benefits also serve as motives 
for holding cash. (1) The transaction cost motive: Firms need financial slack to maintain 
daily business without having to frequently raise funds from external capital markets, 
saving transaction costs (Miller and Orr (1966), Faulkender (2004)). (2) Precautionary 
motive: Firms stock cash in case they are forced to liquidate assets to make payments 
during hard times, reducing the probability of financial distress. Specifically, firms hold 
financial slack when general economy is volatile (Custodio and Raposo (2004), Baum, 
Caglayan, Ozkan and Talvera (2004)), when their cash flows are unpredictable and 
volatile (Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998), Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson 
(1999)), and when their financial leverage is relatively high given their operating cash 
flow (Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998), Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999), 
Damodaran (2005)). (3) Speculative motive: Firms hold liquidity reserve in order to 
quickly take advantage of future profitable investment opportunities in case they are 
financially constrained (Baskin (1987)). Firms need to set aside cash for speculative 
purpose when future investments are uncertain (Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2006)), 
when alternative internal financial sources are not sufficient while external sources of 
funding are expensive or unavailable (Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001)), and when 
information asymmetry problem makes it difficult to raise capital at a fair price (Myers 
                                                 
5 The figures reported here are obtained from Compustat Industrial Annual Files. 
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and Majluf (1984)). Moreover, according to agency theory, the separation of management 
and ownership creates the additional incentives for the managers to hold more cash since 
liquidity can increase managers’ discretion and shield management from market 
discipline (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999)).  
However, maintaining asset liquidity incurs costs as well: (1) By choosing to hold 
liquid assets, firms receive a lower rate of return and forgo an opportunity to invest in 
illiquid and riskier projects (or more productive assets) that can bring higher future 
returns. (2) Holding cash equivalents brings tax disadvantages. Interest income earned on 
liquid assets is double taxed both at the corporate and individual level as it is paid to 
investors as dividends (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999)).  
Although corporate finance literature has intensively examined cash holding as an 
internal resource, the impact of cash holding on expected equity returns hasn’t gained 
enough attention. This is particularly important because holding corporate liquidity can 
bring both benefits and costs, based on which a firm chooses to keep a certain level of 
financial liquidity. These benefits and costs will be reflected in the firm’s market value 
and therefore its equity returns.  
Corporate finance has developed theories and models of companies’ motives and 
behavior concerning liquid assets and their relationship with the firm’s capital structure. 
According to tradeoff theory, there should be an optimal level of liquid asset holdings on 
a corporate balance sheet that can maximize the stockholder’s value. Kim, Mauer and 
Sherman (1998) model the firm’s decision to invest in liquid assets when external finance 
is costly. They predict that the optimal level of investment in liquidity increases with 
external financing cost, the variance of future cash flows, and the return on future 
investment opportunities; while optimal investment in liquidity decreases with the return 
differential between the firm’s physical assets (ROA) and the liquid assets (Treasury 
securities’ returns). 
Agency theory says that managers prefer holding more cash and other liquid assets 
since asset liquidity can reduce the firm’s risk and increases their discretion, which, as a 
result, leads managers to place much more importance on the precautionary motive for 
holding cash. This theory provides an explanation for why firms do not keep cash at the 
level that could maximize the shareholders’ wealth.  
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On the other hand, asymmetric information theory suggests that a higher degree of 
information asymmetry results in a higher cost of external finance, and hence more cash 
holdings. Myers and Majluf (1984) propose that firms whose values depend more on 
growth opportunities suffer more severe asymmetric information problems and are more 
likely to be financially constrained. In addition, small firms usually suffer more from 
information asymmetry problems, probably because they are not well known and not 
many financial analysts study these firms. This suggests that small firms and growth 
firms tend to keep a higher level of financial slack.  
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) find evidence to support the static 
tradeoff model of cash holdings. Specifically, Firms with stronger growth opportunities 
(a high market-to-book ratio and R&D expenditures) and riskier cash flows hold more 
cash as a proportion of total non-cash assets. Firms with the greatest access to the capital 
markets, such as large firms and those with higher credit ratings, tend to keep a lower 
level of cash. Companies tend to accumulate more cash than the level predicted by 
tradeoff theory at which the shareholders’ wealth is maximized, which provides evidence 
of an agency problem.  
Gertler and Hubbard (1998) and Whited (1992) show that small firms are likely to face 
more stringent constraint for raising funds. If transaction costs of small firms are higher, 
which indicates the illiquidity of these firms, investors will require a higher return on 
equity, then small firms have to accumulate a larger portion of liquid assets and more 
frequently use internal funds to finance investment. Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) use 
size and market-to-book ratios as proxies for external financing costs. Since large firms 
tend to have lower fixed costs of issuing securities due to economies of scale as well as 
fewer borrowing constraints and easier access to capital markets, it is reasonable to 
predict a negative relation between firm size and liquid assets investment. Furthermore, 
Vogel and Maddala (1967) find that cash-to-assets and cash-to-sales ratios are generally 
lower for larger manufacturing firms, and that cash holdings declined over time, which is 
interpreted as evidence of economies of scale in transaction costs of cash holding. We 
would expect that small firms have higher asset liquidity, as well as a lower leverage ratio, 
compared to large firms. On the other hand, pecking order theory says that the primary 
determinant of the corporate financing decision is the information asymmetry of the 
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firm’s quality between insiders and outsiders. In this sense, small firms suffer more from 
the information asymmetry problem and have to keep a higher level of cash for 
precautionary purposes. In general, it is expected that there is a negative relationship 
between firm size and liquid asset holdings. 
It is also interesting to see how the book-to-market equity ratio is related to corporate 
liquidity. Generally, value firms tend to be more mature firms which generate stable 
revenue but do not have substantial growth opportunities in which they may invest their 
revenue. Those firms may pay dividends regularly, but accumulate cash after making all 
the payments. Although they have easier access to the capital market, they could also 
retain a substantial amount of cash because of a lower opportunity cost of holding more 
liquid assets. If a value firm holds little cash, this could be a signal of financial distress, 
which may be because it cannot generate enough revenue to pay back its debt and other 
liabilities.  
On the other hand, if high BE/ME (book-to-market equity ratio) reflects less 
information asymmetry, then value firms should have a lower cost of external finance and 
an easier access to the capital market. These firms are able to raise external funds when 
they need, and need not keep a high proportion of their assets in liquid form.  
Growth firms are young, risky, and have more growth opportunities on average, and 
therefore have limited debt capacities that are easily exhausted. As a result, these firms 
hold less cash because they probably have invested most of their funds. If, however, these 
firms are found not to face credit constraints, while still keeping high cash levels, these 
firms might not have abundant growth opportunities. We can expect that growth firms 
with higher levels of liquid asset holdings may be overvalued, and their future rate of 
return may be lower. It can be argued that a lower average return of a growth firm may be 
due to lower loadings on risk factors, but if there is no such risk factor, the firm is just 
overvalued. 
An opposite view suggests that there is a positive (negative) link between market-to-
book ratio (book-to-market equity) and liquid asset holdings. Due to the existence of 
risky debt financing, managers have the incentive to underinvest in growth options and 
keep excess liquid assets in order to reduce the possibility of financial distress (Myers 
(1977)). Shleifer and Vishny (1992) point out that financial distress is more costly for 
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firms with a large proportion of intangible assets6 or with more growth options. As a 
result these firms tend to keep a relatively large proportion of liquid assets to reduce the 
financial distress cost. John (1993) finds that firms with high market-to-book ratios as 
well as those with relatively low tangible assets tend to hold more cash. All of these 
views support the positive relation between the market-to-book ratio and liquid asset 
holdings. If the financial distress theory is correct, where the market-to-book ratio or 
book-to-market equity serves as a proxy for financial distress costs, then firms with more 
intangible assets hold more cash in case they incur high financial distress costs.  
In summary, value firms with low cash holdings are probably in financial distress; 
while growth firms with high cash holdings could be over valued. If this is true, low cash-
holding value firms should generate a higher rate of return than high cash-holding value 
firms; and high cash-holding growth firms should generate a lower rate of return than 
lower cash-holding growth companies. Although there appears to be a relationship 
between the book-to-market equity and cash holding, it remains unclear that whether the 
information contained in the book-to-market ratio is the same as that is included in the 
cash reserve.   
Although previous literature has established that the cash holding is important for a 
firm’s investment and operation, it is not clear whether cash holding can enhance the 
value of firms. Mikkelson and Partch (2003) find that in the long run, firms that retain 
high cash reserves grow faster and undertake high levels of investment, and they 
conclude that conservative financial policy can enhance the operating performance. 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) point out that cash holding is more valuable for 
financially constrained companies as well as firms with better growth opportunities and 
more volatile investment opportunities. Faulkender and Wang (2006) adopt a 
methodology that examines the variation in excess equity returns as a measure of 
marginal value of cash. They find that the market rewards firms holding internal cash 
with higher values, while the marginal market value of cash declines as the level of cash 
increases. They also find that on average, the market value of cash is higher for 
financially constrained firms than those that are not constrained. Sibilkov (2005) finds 
                                                 
6 Intangible assets include copyrights, patents, intellectual property, and goodwill. Goodwill is a blanket 
term that represents, in one lump sum, the value of brand names, patents, customer base loyalty, 
competitive position, R&D, and other hard-to-price assets a company might own. 
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that cash holdings are more valuable for financially constrained firms, partly because 
constrained firms use cash more efficiently to invest in more valuable projects than 
financially unconstrained firms. 
In microstructure literature, the financial liquidity refers to the speed and ease with 
which an asset can be converted into cash (Glossary of Bodie, Kane and Marcus 4th 
edition, 1999). Amihud and Mendelson (1986) examines the role of the bid-ask spread as 
a liquidity measure in determining asset returns and predicts that expected asset return is 
an increasing and concave function in the relative bid-ask spread. One implication of the 
model is that firms can reduce the opportunity cost of capital by implementing financial 
policies that can increase the liquidity of their securities, and thereby increasing the 
firms’ value.  
Several studies try to provide interpretations for the size effect in terms of illiquidity. 
Stoll and Whaley (1983) find that the small firms tend to have higher bid-ask spreads. 
They show that transaction costs, representing a missing factor from the CAPM, can 
partially explain the small firm effect. They argue that the CAPM should be applied to 
the return net of transaction costs. Schultz (1983) also finds that small firms tend to have 
higher transaction costs; however, he concludes that transaction costs cannot fully explain 
the high average returns to the stocks of small firms.  
A substantial body of asset pricing literature addresses the issue of financial liquidity, 
however, there has been little focus on corporate liquidity.  If firms keep asset liquidity to 
prevent financial distress risk, to avoid high transaction costs of accessing external 
financial market, or to invest in value-enhancing investments, this corporate liquidity 
effect could be reflected in the firms’ stock prices as well as the expected returns on their 
equity. If companies stock financial slack for the precautionary purposes, due to the 
asymmetric information, investors would take the higher level of cash holdings as an 
indication of future volatile cash flows or decreasing profitability of the firms, therefore 
require a higher return on the equity. In addition, if a company is financially constrained, 
accumulation of internal resources is even more important. Given investors are rational 
and information is asymmetric, a high level of financial liquidity will signal the constraint 
risk and is associated with a greater required rate of return. 
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Now we have a better understanding of the firm characteristics that determine the level 
of liquid assets that a firm keeps, it is tempting to further explore how the market values 
can be affected by the cash holdings of firms, and how the expected equity returns are 
related to corporate liquidity. It is interesting to ask questions such as: How do liquidity 
positions of large and small firms affect their expected returns? Do firm cash holdings 
have different implications for value firms and growth firms? How does corporate 
liquidity relate to stock market anomalies like the size and book-to-market effect? Does 
corporate liquidity share similar information with size and book-to-market equity? Does 
corporate liquidity explain stock return variations beyond the size and value effects?  
This study tries to explore the effect of individual corporate liquidity on the stock 
returns. It can be shown empirically that firms that hold a higher proportion of liquid 
assets have higher expected returns than firms with low liquidity, which seems to be 
counter to the standard risk-based theory at the first glance, where lower holdings of cash 
may indicate financial distress. I also find that firms’ whose future cash flows are more 
volatile tend to hold more cash and have higher stock returns compared to firms with 
more stable cash flows. In addition, evidence shows that the positive relationship between 
equity returns and corporate liquidity is more distinct for firms with financial constraints. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence shows that corporate liquidity is positively related to 
beta, which indicates that higher level of financial slack indicates risks and might serve as 
a risk factor. Finally, regression results suggest that corporate liquidity contains 
information different what is contained in important firm characteristics such as size and 
book-to-market equity since the impact of corporate liquidity on equity returns exist even 
after these characteristics are controlled for. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section II discusses the hypothesis 
to be tested in the empirical estimation; section III describes the data and variables; 
section IV discusses the empirical findings, and section V concludes.  
 
 
II. Hypothesis 
The previous literature has shown that firm characteristics, such as size, book to 
market ratio, leverage and whether the firm is financially constrained, are closely related 
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to the future stock returns. Whether corporate liquidity, an important characteristic for 
individual firms, represents or indicates an idiosyncratic risk and affects the equity 
returns remains unclear. 
If a company accumulates a high level of financial slack for precautionary purpose 
because the managers know that the firm’s cash flow risks will be greater in the future, 
expected equity returns will be higher for this company if information is symmetric. Even 
if managers know the insider information and information is asymmetric, given investors 
are rational, they would know that the observation of large financial reserves signals 
future cash flow fluctuations and will require higher returns on the firm’s stocks. This 
leads to the first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Higher corporate liquidity is associated with higher expected 
stock returns if future cash flows are more volatile. 
  
One important motive for holding liquid assets is to speculate on profitable investment 
opportunities, and this is especially important when the firm is financially constrained. A 
firm is financially constrained if it is unable to borrow or to issue stocks, or it can only 
raise external capital at a high cost.  Previous literature has provided evidence that firms 
stock more financial slack if they have difficulty in accessing capital market (Pinkowitz 
and Williamson (2001)). Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) present a model in 
which companies respond to potential financial constraints by hoarding more cash today. 
Furthermore, Lamont, Polk and Saá-Requejo (2001) find that stock returns of financially 
constrained firms tend to move together, which indicates that these firms are subject to 
common shocks. Campello and Chen (2005), Whited and Wu (2006) show that 
constrained firms earn higher returns and external finance constraints do indeed represent 
a risk factor that is priced in financial markets.  If financial constrained firms are riskier, 
which is the reason for these firms to maintain a high level of liquidity, such firms will 
have higher expected stock returns. The relationship between corporate liquidity and 
equity returns should be more pronounced for companies that are financially constrained. 
This can be tested by the second hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2: Higher corporate liquidity is associated with higher expected 
stock returns if the firm is financially constrained. 
 
From the asset pricing point of view, idiosyncratic risk is the portion of the variability 
in stock returns not related to overall movements in the general market or economy. This 
risk is unique to a particular security and is associated with such factors as business and 
financial risk as well as liquidity risk.  
According to the capital asset pricing model, beta is a measure of the systematic risk of 
a security that cannot be diversified through diversification. Beta is a relative measure of 
risk — the risk of an individual stock relative to the market portfolio of all stocks. A firm 
characteristic unique to a specific company would represent a risk if they are correlated 
with the market factor. If higher cash holding indicates possible higher risks for firms in 
the future, such as financial constraint risk, low or volatile cash flows risk, then it can be 
expected that corporate liquidity is positively related to future betas. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Corporate liquidity is positively correlated with firm beta if 
liquid asset holding signals a higher level of future risk for the firm.    
 
Finally, although empirical research in general agrees that size and value effects are 
real, there is no agreement on what kind of underlying risk that firm size proxies for. 
Previous literature also discusses the relationship between cash holding level and size or 
book-to-market equity ratio. If the information incorporated in the corporate liquidity is 
similar to that in firm size and book-to-market ratio, corporate liquidity will disappear 
after size and value effects are controlled for. Otherwise, we would expect the corporate 
liquidity effect remains existing even when the size and value effects are removed. 
 
     Hypothesis 4: If corporate liquidity contains information different from that in 
firm size and book-to-market equity, corporate liquidity will exist even after size 
and book-to-market are controlled for. 
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    The above four hypothesis are tested through statistics obtained from portfolio 
construction as well as formal regressions. The results are presented in part IV. 
 
 
III. Data  
To examine the effect of corporate liquidity on stock returns, I construct a sample of 
firms for the empirical tests by merging the COMPUSTAT annual files and the stock and 
indices databases from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for the period 
1962:1 to 2005:12. The CRSP returns cover all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. I 
exclude financial firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 
and 6999 because they usually hold substantial inventories of marketable securities, 
which are included in cash. Transportation and public utility firms having SIC codes 
between 4000 and 4999 are excluded as well because cash holdings of these firms are 
subject to regulatory supervision.  
The individual firms’ monthly stock returns are taken from CRSP. As the risk free 
interest rate for the asset pricing model, I use monthly observations of the one month 
Treasury bill rate obtained from Professor Kenneth French’s webpage.7 Market excess 
returns are downloaded from professor Kenneth French’s webpage as well.  
I follow Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) and measure corporate liquidity as the ratio 
of cash and marketable securities (Compustat item #1) to total assets (Compustat item #6): 
it
it
it AssetsTotal
CashCL =
, 
where Cashit includes the following items: bank drafts, cash, checks (cashiers or 
certified), demand certificates of deposit, demand deposits, letters of credit and money 
orders. It also includes government and other marketable securities and time deposits, 
which are usually considered as cash equivalents. A firm with a high cash-to-asset ratio 
has more liquid assets to serve interest payments, and therefore postpone bankruptcy and 
reduce the financial distress; or has more freedom to invest in profitable projects without 
incurring transaction costs. Alternatively, corporate liquidity is measured by the ratio of 
cash and cash equivalents to net assets, where net assets equal total assets less cash and 
                                                 
7 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french 
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cash equivalents (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003), Faleye (2004), etc.). 
Following Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2005), I also measure liquidity using cash, 
marketable securities and short term investment in ratio to total assets, since short term 
investment is often quite liquid as well. The results are similar when the two alternative 
measures of corporate liquidity are used. 
The size of a firm is measured by the market value of equity, which equals the stock 
price of the stock at the end of June of year t times the total shares outstanding. Following 
Fama and French (1992), the book-to-market equity ratio (BE/ME) at time t is calculated 
by dividing book equity (BE) at the fiscal ending of year t-1 by market equity (ME) at 
December of year t-1. The book-to-market equity ratios at time t are matched by the stock 
returns from July of year t to June of year t+1. Therefore there is at least a 6 months’ lag 
between accounting data and market data in order for the firms’ accounting information 
to be released and understood by the public. The book value of firm equity is defined as 
in Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2003). 8  Following Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (1999), I calculate leverage as (long-term debt + short-term debt)/book value 
of assets. 9  Cash flow is calculated as “earnings before extraordinary items and 
depreciation after dividends” 10, following Almeida, Campello and Weisbach’s approach.  
Cash flow volatility for each firm is measured as standard deviation of cash flow over 
total assets.  
There are various measures for financial constraints. I use three alternative measures 
suggested by the literature. (1) Asset size. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) argue that 
smaller firms are more likely to be subject to financial constraint because they are usually 
young and less well known, hence have difficulty in accessing external capital market. (2) 
KZ index, which is a linear index of firm financial constraints constructed based on 
                                                 
8 Book equity is defined as the stockholders’ equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes (Compustat item #74) 
and investment tax credit (Compustat item #208), plus postretirement benefit liabilities (Compustat item 
#330), minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, they measure the book value of 
preferred stock by the order of redemption (Compustat item #56), liquidation (Compustat item #10), or par 
value (Compustat item #130). Stockholders’ equity is measured by Compustat item #216 or the book value 
of common equity (Compustat item #60), plus he par value of  preferred stock, or the book value of assets 
(Compustat item #6) minus total liabilities (Compustat item #181). 
9 Long term debt is measured by Compustat item #9 and short term debt is measured by Compustat item #5. 
10 Cash flow is calculated as income before extraordinary items (Compustat item #18), plus depreciation 
and amortization  (Compustat item #14), minus preferred dividends (Compustat item#19) minus common 
dividends (Compustat item #21). 
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Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Following Lamont, Polk and Saá-Requejo (2001), the KZ 
index is calculated using the following equation11:  
gsCashHoldinDividends
LeverageQCashFlowKZindex
×−×−
×+×+×−=
315.1368.39                  
319.3283.0002.1
 
The KZ index is a linear combination of five accounting measures and it measures the 
likelihood of financial constraint. The higher the KZ index, the less cash flow, the higher 
leverage and lower dividend distribution and therefore the more constrained the firm is. 
(3) Dividend payout, which is calculated as the ratio of total dividends distributions to 
operating income. Fazzari et al. (1988) finds that firms with financial constraints 
distribute significantly less dividends. As a robustness check, I follow Almeida, 
Campello and Weisbach (2004) and use the total distribution or payout to shareholders 
measure as a proxy for the financial constraint. The “Distribution to shareholders” 
variable is defined as the sum of dividends and stock repurchases divided by operating 
earnings. 
To reduce the impact of outliers, firm specific characteristics and other dependent 
variables are winsorized at the 1 percent tails of the entire sample. Firms with negative 
total assets, book value and market value of equity are deleted from the sample. I also 
delete firms with less than 36 monthly observations. There are 6908 firms and 528 
months in the combined COMPUSTAT and CRSP dataset. Summary statistics are 
provided in Table 1. 
 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
IV.1. Firm Characteristics and Corporate Liquidity 
In this section, I first present the relationships between firms’ characteristics. Table 2 
exhibits the correlations between size, book-to-market ratio, liquidity holdings, leverage, 
cash flows and financial constraint measures of the firm. In order to remove the effect of 
industry differentials, I also calculate the deviation of firms’ cash holdings and financial 
leverage compared to the industry norm. I assign each firm to one of the Fama-French 17 
                                                 
11 Tobin’s Q, calculated as the market value of assets divided by book assets. Cash flow, dividends and 
cash holdings are all standardized by total capital 
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industries based on its CRSP four-digit SIC code and the firm’s liquidity and leverage 
deviation are estimated as the difference between liquidity and leverage of that firm and 
the mean level of the industry that the firm belongs to. If the firm holds more liquid assets 
compared to an average firm in the same industry, the firm can be considered as hoarding 
too much cash, possibly because it is expecting good investment opportunities while 
having difficulty raising external funds, or because it grows relatively slowly and cannot 
spend the cash it has accumulated. If a firm has a higher leverage ratio than an average 
firm in the same industry, the firm could be facing financial problem.  
Panel A shows the overall correlation between firms’ characteristics. The size and 
book-to-market ratio of a firm are only weakly correlated with its cash position, leverage, 
as well as deviations of cash holdings and leverage from industry standard. Firms’ 
liquidity is negatively correlated with its leverage ratio, indicating that the more cash the 
firm has, the less debt it keeps. In addition, firms that generate more cash flows tend to 
accumulate more cash. In general, companies that are financially constrained keep higher 
level of liquid assets. 
Panel B summarizes the time series average of the cross-sectional correlations between 
firms’ features. It can be shown that cross-sectionally, size and book-to-market ratio are 
negatively correlated, while size and cash holdings are positively related. At any point in 
time, larger companies accumulate more cash and cash equivalents than smaller firms. 
Again, larger firms borrow less than smaller firms and average firms in the same industry. 
In addition, firms with larger market value tend to have less financial constraints. The 
book-to-market equity is negatively correlated with corporate liquidity as well as 
liquidity deviation, but positively related to leverage ratio and leverage deviation. Value 
firms tend to hold less cash while borrowing more than growth firms, which is consistent 
with the financial distress story and the information asymmetry theory. Furthermore, 
value firms are less financially constrained relative to growth firms. Companies with 
more financial constraints tend to be more liquid, which supports the speculative motive.  
The cross sectional averages of time series correlations between the firms’ 
characteristics are displayed in Panel C. Over time, firm size is negatively correlated with 
the book-to-market ratio and leverage but positively correlated with cash holdings. As 
time goes by, large firms tend to accumulate more and more cash while may not find 
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profitable opportunities to invest. Consistent with Panel A and Panel B, large firms 
generate more cash flows and are less constrained. The book-to-market ratio is negatively 
correlated with leverage and cash flows. It seems that value firms face less financial 
constraints. Liquid companies have higher cash flows, borrow less, and are more 
financially constrained. 
Next all the stocks are sorted into quintiles based on corporate liquidity, size and book-
to-market ratio, then the average firm characteristics are obtained for each portfolio. 
Panel A of Table 3 exhibits the average monthly rate or returns, cash position, firm size 
and book-to-market ratio, leverage, cash flow, cash flow volatility, and three measures of 
financial constraints of the five portfolios sorted by firm’s cash holdings. Average stock 
returns increase monotonically with the cash holdings of the firm. The average monthly 
stock returns for the most illiquid portfolio is only 0.731 percent, which is significantly 
lower than the most liquid portfolio. The return differential between the top liquid 
portfolio and the bottom liquid portfolio is 1.269 percent per month, which is 
economically significant. At first glance, this seems to contradict the risk-based story, 
according to which firms holding less liquid assets should be riskier and more vulnerable 
to financial distress and therefore have higher required rates of return. However there are 
several alternative possible explanations for the negative relationship between average 
stock return and firm liquidity. First, it is possible that those firms that hoard more liquid 
assets because they have riskier cash flows or higher betas, and therefore high risk is 
associated with higher expected returns. This is supported by the precautionary motive of 
hoarding cash. Second, since firms hold more cash instead of investing or distributing 
cash as dividends, investors might think these firms lack growth opportunities, lowering 
the current stock prices. Third, the companies hold more liquid assets because the 
managers expect high cost of external capital due to limited access to the capital market 
and investors would require higher returns in order to hold these liquid firms’ equity, 
therefore we can observe a negative relationship between cash holding and expected 
equity returns from the data.  
Except for the most liquid firms, average firm size increases as the cash holding 
proportion increases except for the most liquid firm, probably because large firms are 
usually more mature, already in the stable stage of their life cycles, and hence have 
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relatively less investment opportunities where they can spend cash. It is interesting to see 
that firms with highest corporate liquidity are actually the smallest firms. Average book-
to-market equity ratio increases along with the corporate liquidity except for the most 
liquid portfolio. The most illiquid firms have the lowest book-to-market ratio equal to 
1.498. The book-to-market equity increases substantially and reaches its peak at 3.949, 
and then declines. Cash flow increases with corporate liquidity first but drops later, while 
the cash flow volatility rises with cash holding level monotonically, implying that liquid 
firms stock financial slack for precautionary purposes due to lower cash flows and more 
volatile cash flows. The relationship between the four measures of financial constraints 
and the liquidity portfolio indicates that firms with more corporate liquidity are those 
subject to more financial constraints. This is consistent with the speculative motive 
hypothesis. 
Panel B shows the average portfolio characteristics when quintiles are formed by 
sorting stocks based on firm size. Average stock returns decrease along with the increase 
of firm size. Liquidity increases with the firm size except for the biggest companies. Both 
the smallest and largest firms seem not to be the most liquid firms. For small firms, this 
maybe because they have capital constraints and have plenty of investment opportunities 
to spend cash; for large firms, this might be because they have easy access to the capital 
market and do not need to hold excess liquidity. Larger companies have higher and more 
stable cash flows compared to smaller firms. Evidence also indicates that larger 
companies are less likely to have financial constraint problems. Panel C shows that when 
the sample is sorted into five portfolios by book-to-market equity, stock return increases 
from low to high book-to-market equity, which is consistent with the value effect. The 
return differential between the firms with the highest book-to-market equity ratio and the 
lowest book-to-market ratio is statistically significant. Corporate liquidity declines 
monotonically with the book-to-market ratio, which supports the view that growth firms 
need to stock more cash to take advantage of good investment opportunities because they 
normally have limited access to the external capital market and a higher cost of capital. 
The negative relationship between cash holding and the book-to-market ratio is also 
consistent with Myers (1977), Shleifer and Vishny (1992), and John (1993), if the book-
to-market ratio can be viewed as a proxy for growth options or asset tangibility, since 
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firms with more growth opportunities or intangible assets tend to hold a higher proportion 
of liquid assets in order to reduce financial distress costs. Value firms generate more cash 
flows than growth firms and the cash flow volatility is much lower for value firms. Panel 
A has shown that cash flows of liquid firms are more volatile, it seems that book-to-
market equity ratio proxies different risk. Finally, all the four financial constraint 
measures show that value firms are less constrained relative to growth firms.  
 
IV.2. The Corporate Liquidity Effect 
In order to separate the effects of size, book-to-market and liquidity on the firm’s 
characteristics, I examine the size effect and value effect controlled by corporate liquidity 
(See Appendix for details). It can be shown that size effect and value effect remain exist 
when we control for the corporate liquidity. Market equity and book-to-market ratio 
contains some different information than corporate liquidity does. Will the relationship 
between corporate liquidity and equity returns disappear if firm size and book-to-market 
ratio are controlled for? Table 4 and Table 5 display variations of firms’ characteristics 
across liquidity sub-portfolios when firm size or book-to-market ratio is controlled for. 
Firms are first sorted into five portfolios by size or book-to-market ratio, and then further 
sorted into five liquidity groups. If corporate liquidity does affect the expected equity 
returns, we should expect to observe a clear relationship between corporate liquidity and 
equity returns even after firm size and book-to-market ratio are controlled for. 
 
IV.2.1 The Corporate Liquidity Effect Controlled by Size 
Table 4 exhibits the firm liquidity effect when firm size is controlled for. Panel A 
shows that within each size cohort, returns steadily rise with the firm’s cash position. The 
more liquid assets the firm holds, the higher average returns it generates relative to firms 
of similar size, which implies that firm size does not explain liquidity effect. Furthermore, 
return differentials between liquid and illiquid companies are much larger for smaller 
firms than for larger firms, indicating that corporate liquidity effect is stronger for smaller 
companies. Since small firms are considered to be riskier than large firms, we would 
expect corporate liquidity effect is more pronounced for small firms if higher cash 
holdings can signal higher risks. According to Panel C, except for the largest firms, 
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firms’ equity size is fairly stable across liquidity sub-groups. For those biggst firms, 
although size varies substantially, no clear pattern can be found. Panel D displays the 
relationship between book-to-market ratio and corporate liquidity. Across the size 
portfolios, more liquid firms tend to have higher book-to-market ratio except for the most 
liquid group. It seems that firms hold more financial slack as they are subject to financial 
distress risk, if book-to-market ratio contains some information about the distress risk. On 
average, for each size portfolio, firms holding more cash and cash equivalents tend to 
have lower leverage ratios, which also tend to deviate negatively from industry norm, as 
shown in Panel E and Panel G. Panel H exhibits the cash flow pattern across firms with 
different cash positions. On average, the smallest firms generate negative cash flows. For 
smaller companies, cash flows tend to be lower for those accumulate more cash, except 
for the most liquid firms. This pattern is reversed for larger firms, where cash flows are 
higher form more liquid companies. Moreover, Panel I indicates that firms with more 
liquid assets actually have more volatile cash flows, regardless of their size. Companies 
may stock financial slack if the managers know that cash flow risk is high, which is 
consistent with the precautionary saving motive. Panel J shows that within each size 
group, the more liquid a firm is, the higher beta coefficient that firm has. This suggests 
that more liquid firms have higher market risk. I perform t-test to see whether the most 
liquid firms have significantly different beta compared to most illiquid firms. It turns out 
that for each size portfolio, average beta of the most liquid companies are significantly 
higher than the most illiquidity ones. I have done the F test for difference in β to partially 
test Hypothesis 3.  More specifically, F-tests are performed to test the following two null 
hypothesis (i) beta differences of all liquidity-size quintiles are not significant; (ii) beta 
differences of the most liquid and most illiquid-size quintiles are not significant. The F-
statistics are displayed at the bottom of Panel J. It can be shown that the F-statistic for 
beta difference of all the liquidity-size quintiles is 57.37 with p value almost equal to zero, 
and therefore we conclude that betas of the firms within different size quintiles are 
statistically different across different liquidity portfolios. In addition, F test is performed 
to identify whether firm betas are statistically different between the most liquid firms and 
the most illiquid firms, and the p-value is equal to 0.0007. We conclude that holding firm 
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sizes, beta is statistically different across corporate liquidity portfolios, with the pattern 
that liquid firms have higher beta on average.  
Finally, in order to test whether financial constraint risk plays a role in determining the 
level of financial slack, financial constraint measures across the 25 size-corporate 
liquidity portfolios are summarized in Panel K through Panel N. Total assets increase first 
with corporate liquidity and declines as firms hold more and more cash, which indicates 
that both extremely liquid and illiquid companies are financially constrained. The other 
three proxies for financial constraints – the KZ index, dividend payout, and distribution 
to shareholders display a more linear relationship across liquidity portfolios. Within each 
size groups except the smallest ones, firms that hold high level of cash and cash 
equivalents tend to be more financially constrained, which supports the speculative 
motive of saving since they have difficulty in accessing external capital market. Smallest 
firms seem to have the opposite pattern, firms that are hoard more liquid assets turn out to 
be less constrained. This might be because smallest firms as a group tend to have 
financial constraint problem, those with more liquid assets then suffer less.  
 
IV.2.2 The Corporate Liquidity Effect Controlled by Book-to-Market Equity 
Table 5 summarizes the effect of cash holdings controlled for the book-to-market ratio. 
Panel A displays the average rate of return of firms’ stocks. We observe a monotonically 
positive relationship between the liquidity and rate of return. No matter weather a firm is 
a growth firm or a value firm, as long as it holds a higher level of liquid assets, it will 
bring shareholders a higher rate of return. The return differential between most liquid 
firms and most illiquid firms are significantly different, with the narrowest monthly 
spread equal to 1.059 percent and the widest spread equal to 1.65 percent. Panel C shows 
the average size when book-to-market ratio and liquidity are held constant. It can be 
shown that within each book-to-market equity cohort, more liquid firms tend to be 
smaller firms. Compared to large firms, smaller firms are less mature, subject to 
information asymmetry problem, and face more financial constraints and higher 
transaction costs, therefore they need to hoard more liquid assets in order to survive 
through hard times and exploit profitable investment projects. As can be seen from Panel 
D, the relationship between liquidity and the book-to-market ratio exhibits no clear 
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pattern except for the highest book-to-market portfolio, where more liquid firms tend to 
have higher book-to-market ratios, indicating that they are subject to distress risk. Panel 
E shows the average leverage across the 25 BE/ME-liquidity portfolios. Within each 
BE/ME portfolio, firms with more liquidity tend to borrow less. Similar to Panel G of 
Table 4, on average, firms that hold more cash tend to borrow less from external sources, 
no matter if they are growth firms or value firms.  
According to Panel H, controlling for book-to-market ratio, liquid firms seem to 
generate less cash flows. The relationship between average cash flow volatility and 
corporate liquidity is presented in Panel I. Again we observe a positive relationship, 
implying that firms hold more financial slack because of higher cash flow risk. Cash flow 
volatility differential between the most liquid and illiquid portfolios are statistically 
significant. Panel J summarizes the average beta across different liquidity groups. Within 
each book-to-market portfolio, firm beta increases monotonically with the liquidity. This 
result indicates that higher liquidity firms are associated with higher risks measured by 
beta. The beta difference between the most liquid firms and the most illiquid firms is 
highly significant, supported by the t-test. Panel J of Table 5 also reports the F-statistics 
for beta differential across liquidity-BE/ME portfolios. Specifically, F-statistic for beta 
difference of all Liquidity-BE/ME quintiles is 47.84 with the p-value equal to zero; F-
statistic for beta difference of most Liquid and illiquid-BE/ME quintiles equals to 73.52 
and the p-value is 0.001.  
Panel K through Panel N display the financial constraint measures for the BE/ME-
corporate liquidity sorted portfolios. The results are mixed. Total assets and KZ index 
suggest that growth, liquid firms as well as value, illiquid firms tend to be financially 
constrained. There is no linear, monotonic relationship between corporate liquidity and 
the dividend payout ratio or distribution to shareholders. According to the dividend 
payout ratio, liquid firms are more likely to be constrained, except for the lowest BE/ME 
portfolio, where illiquid firms are more financially constrained. This pattern is similar 
when the distribution to shareholder variable is used to measure financial constraint, 
except for the two portfolios of value firms. 
Table 4 and Table 5 both provide evidence that corporate liquidity is related to the 
individual firm beta, even if we controlled for the important characteristics such as size 
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and book-to-market ratio. In order to formally test whether corporate liquidity can serve 
as a proxy for firm beta, I have run regressions of beta on corporate liquidity, firm size 
and BE/ME. As it can be shown in Table 6, corporate liquidity contributes to interpreting 
firm beta in all the three regressions. The coefficients on the corporate liquidity are 
positive and highly significant for all the three regressions. The R-squared ranges from 9 
percent to about 17 percent. Together with the information in Panel I of Table 4 and 
Table 5, we can draw a conclusion that corporate liquidity is positively correlated with 
firm beta, which makes it reasonable for cash holding to serve as a proxy for the 
underlying idiosyncratic risks.    
 
IV.3. Fama-MacBeth Two-Pass Regression 
To examine the impact corporate liquidity can impose on expected equity returns, I run 
Fama-MacBeth two-pass regressions on all the individual firms in the sample. In the first 
pass, a time series of excess portfolio returns are regressed on market factor, SMB and 
HML using the following formula:  
 
                                                                                                                   , 
where R is the portfolio stock return, RF is the 3-month T-bill rate, MKT-RF is the market 
factor, SMB is the size factor and HML is the value factor. In order to generate the 
portfolio returns, individual firms are sorted based on size and book-to-market 
independently to form 25 portfolios, or are sorted based on size, book-to-market and 
corporate liquidity independently to form 27 portfolios. Then individual firms are 
assigned the beta coefficients (derived in the first pass regression) of the portfolio which 
they belong to. I assume that a firm’s betas are stationary.  
For the second pass, excess stock returns of individual firms are regressed on their 
factor betas, as well as other variables such as corporate liquidity level, squared corporate 
liquidity level, and the interaction term of corporate liquidity and cash flow volatility, and 
interaction term of corporate liquidity and financial constraint measures. The baseline 
model is shown as follows: 
, 
ttitittiitti HMLhSMBsRFMKTbRFR εα +++−+=− )(,
iiiiii CLhsbRFR εγβββα +++++=− 321
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where b, s and h are the loadings of market factor, size factor and value factor 
respectively in the first pass regression, and CL is the corporate liquidity. Several 
different models are estimated and the results are presented in Table 7.  
The base model can be estimated to test Hypothesis 4. If Hypothesis 4 holds and 
corporate liquidity does contain information different from that in firm size and book-to-
market equity and corporate liquidity effect exists even after size and book-to-market are 
controlled for, then we can expect that the coefficient on corporate liquidity 
γ should be significant. Furthermore, we would like to see whether corporate liquidity CL 
imposes a positive impact on equity returns, as suggested by the previous portfolio 
sorting.  
In order to formally test Hypothesis 1, I include an interaction term of cash holding and 
cash flow volatility in the base model. If the impact of cash holding on equity return is 
stronger for firms with more volatile cash flows, we expect to see a significant and 
positive coefficient on the interaction term.  
For Hypothesis 2, I estimate the base model with an additional interaction term of 
corporate liquidity and a financial constraint measure. If the positive relationship between 
corporate liquidity and equity return is more pronounced for financially constrained 
companies, the coefficient on the interaction term should be positive and statistically 
significant.  
Panel A of Table 7 presents the results of second pass regressions on individual firms 
with firm betas derived from time series regressions on 25 size-BE/ME portfolios in the 
first pass.  Model 1 presents the result of the base model which regresses equity returns 
on market beta, size beta and value beta. It can be seen the coefficients on the individual 
firm’s market beta and value beta are statistically significant, while size beta does not 
have a significant coefficient in the second pass regression. Model 2 formally tested the 
impact of corporate liquidity on the equity returns. The result shows that the coefficient 
of corporate liquidity is positive and significant at 1 percent level. As a firm increases its 
cash holding by the 10 percent, its monthly equity returns increase about 0.15 percent, 
which is about 1.8 percent per year. Market beta and value beta do not lose their 
significance while size beta is still insignificant. It seems that corporate liquidity contains 
some different information than market portfolio and the book-to-market ratio. Tradeoff 
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theory suggests that there should be an optimal cash level that will maximize the 
shareholders’ value, thus the relationship between corporate liquidity and equity returns 
may not be linear. In order to test this, a squared corporate liquidity term is added to 
model 2 and the result is presented in Model 3. Regression results show that the squared 
corporate liquidity has a significantly negative sign, which provides support for the 
tradeoff theory, and the relationship between corporate liquidity and equity returns is 
concave.  
Model 4 formally tests Hypothesis 1. The coefficients on both corporate liquidity and 
the interaction term between corporate liquidity and cash flow volatility are positive and 
significant, which supports the Hypothesis 1. Firms with more volatile cash flows tend to 
have a more pronounced relationship between cash holding and equity returns. Cash flow 
volatility plays an important role in explaining the positive impact of corporate liquidity 
on equity returns. As the previous evidence shows that firms that have highly volatile 
cash flows tend to hold more cash compared to those with stable cash flows, the positive 
link between corporate liquidity and stock returns can be attributed to the precautionary 
saving motive. Companies whose cash flows are not stable over time are subject to higher 
risks, thus managers may stock relatively more financial slack as a cushion. High cash 
holdings therefore can signal the cash flow volatility risk and lead to a higher required 
return on stocks. Furthermore, industry is a very important factor in determining the cash 
holdings. Some industries on average hold more liquid assets compared to others due to 
higher business risk or more financial constraints. Table 8 presents the distribution of 
firms across industries and average corporate liquidity and corporate liquidity variability 
for each industry. It can shown that those industries with higher average corporate 
liquidity are the ones have more volatile cash holdings, such as drugs, tobacco, 
machinery and business equipment. In order to control for industry effect, Model 5 
include industry dummies, where industries are defined following Fama and French 17-
industry classification. The coefficients do not seem to be varying much compared to the 
regression without industry dummies, but the explanatory power of the regression is 
enhanced substantially.  
 Model 6 through Model 8 test Hypothesis 2 using different measures for financial 
constraints. If the financial constraint does impose firms to additional risks, firms ought 
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to have the incentive to save more liquid assets in order to lower down the cost of seeking 
external financing. Previous empirical evidence from portfolio sorting shows that 
companies that face financial constraints tend to have higher cash holdings compared to 
those are less constrained. In this case hoarding financial slack signals the financial 
constraint risk faced by a company, therefore the relationship between corporate liquidity 
and stock returns should be strengthened for constrained firms relative to unconstrained 
firms. As a result we should observe a significant coefficient on the corporate liquidity-
financial constraint interaction term that indicates stronger relationship between cash 
holding and equity returns for financially constrained companies. Model 6 includes the 
interaction term between corporate liquidity and KZ index in the Fama-MacBeth second-
pass regression. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant. KZ 
index is higher for companies that are more financially constrained, and therefore a 
positive coefficient on the interaction term is consistent with the Hypothesis 2. Model 7 
uses dividend payout ratio as a proxy for financial constraint. Companies that are not 
financially constrained tend to distribute more after tax earnings as dividends to 
shareholders, so that a higher dividend payout ratio indicates less financial constraint. We 
observe a statistically significant and negative coefficient on the corporate liquidity- 
dividend payout ratio interaction term, providing evidence to support the view that firms 
have difficulty accessing capital market tend to save more cash to speculate on future 
investment opportunities or to prepare for the potential financial distress. As a robustness 
check, Model 8 uses distribution to shareholder as the financial constraint measure. It 
turns out that the regression result is fairly similar to that using the dividend payout ratio 
in the interaction term. 
Panel B shows results of second pass regressions on individual companies with beta 
coefficients estimated from time series regressions on 27 size-BE/ME-corporate liquidity 
portfolios in the first pass. It can be shown that individual companies’ cash holding 
positions strongly affect the expected returns of the stock. The coefficient of corporate 
liquidity is significantly positive for all the models in panel B, ranging from 1.245 to 
3.452. Model 2 shows that when market beta, SMB beta and HML beta are included in the 
regression, individual firm’s liquidity position still affects the firm’s stock returns 
substantially. For every 10 percent increase in the firm’s cash holding, average monthly 
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stock return will rise by 0.164 percent. Put in another way, for 1 standard deviation12 
change in the firm’s liquidity, monthly equity return changes for 0.31 percent on average. 
Model 3 shows that equity returns and corporate liquidity holding exhibit a quadratic 
relationship, with the coefficient of corporate liquidity variable positive and the squared 
corporate liquidity variable negative.  
Model 5 tests Hypothesis 1 and provides empirical evidence that corporate liquidity is 
associated with higher equity returns if the firm has higher level of cash flow volatility. 
The empirical result is similar to the regression based on betas derived from 25 Size-
BE/ME portfolios. The relationship between corporate liquidity and equity returns is 
stronger for firms with cash flow risks. Model 5 controls for industry effect, and the 
coefficient on the interaction term becomes much greater.  
Model 6 and model 7 use KZ index and dividend payout ratio respectively as financial 
constraint measures to test Hypothesis 2. The coefficient on the interaction term of 
corporate liquidity and KZ index is significantly positive while the coefficient on 
corporate liquidity – dividend payout interaction term is significantly negative, consistent 
with the hypothesis that more constrained firms’ cash position has greater impact on 
equity returns. Model 8 replaces the dividend payout ratio with distribution to 
shareholders as a robustness check. The value and significance of the coefficients do not 
change appreciably. 
Fama-MacBeth second-pass regressions on individual firms formally test the 
hypotheses in question. The empirical evidence shows that companies holding more cash 
tend to have higher equity returns on average. The effect of corporate liquidity imposes 
on stock returns is statistically significant, even after market, size and value effect have 
been controlled for. I also find that the equity returns are more sensitive to corporate 
liquidity holding for companies with more volatile cash flows and companies that are 
financially constrained. This suggests that firms hoard high financial slack due to 
precautionary saving motive, and higher cash holding may signal higher cash flow risk 
and financial constraint risk. Investors consider corporate liquidity as a proxy for the 
relevant risks and require higher equity returns on more liquid companies.  
 
                                                 
12 Standard deviation of corporate liquidity is 0.195, as shown in Table 1. 
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V. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect corporate liquidity may impose on the equity returns. 
We ask how corporate liquidity is related to the expected equity returns and whether the 
information embedded in corporate liquidity the same as in size and book-to-market 
equity ratio. At the first glance, the results seem to contradict the risk-based story that 
firms with lower cash holding are possibly in financial distress and therefore have higher 
expected stock returns. In fact, I find that firms that hold more liquid assets offer higher 
returns than firms with low liquidity. The results suggest that the market rewards firms 
that keep a higher level of liquidity with higher expected returns. However, these findings 
can be interpreted using asymmetric information and signaling theory. Firms stock higher 
financial slack since the inside managers know that future risks will increase, because 
information is asymmetric, rational investors will require higher future returns on liquid 
firms because they see higher level of corporate liquidity as a signal for riskier future 
cash flows and uncertain operating performance.  
Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that even after controlling for size and value 
effect, corporate liquidity is positively correlated with firm beta. This implies that liquid 
asset holding serves as a signal of higher level of future risk for liquid firms. Regression 
results show that corporate liquidity contributes to interpreting beta and therefore can be 
used as a proxy for risks. 
Models using the Fama-MacBeth two-pass regression approach and incorporating firm 
cash holding and its deviation from the industry average as an explanatory variable show 
that a higher level of firm liquidity or holding more cash than the average industry level 
will increase the expect stock returns. Empirical results show that corporate liquidity 
contains information different from that in firm size and book-to-market equity, since 
corporate liquidity effect exists even after size and book-to-market are controlled for. 
Furthermore, the effect of corporate liquidity on equity returns differs across firms with 
various cash flow volatilities and financial constraints. Specifically, the positive impact 
of corporate liquidity on expected equity returns are stronger for firms with more volatile 
cash flows and are financially constrained. Regression results support the precautionary 
saving motive for companies and signaling effect of corporate liquidity. Corporate 
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liquidity may serve as a proxy for the potential volatile cash flow risk and financial 
constraint risk of the firms. 
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APPENDIX of Chapter 1 
 
The appendix first presents the empirical evidence of size effect and value effect after the 
corporate liquidity effect is controlled for; and then discusses some additional Fama-
MacBeth two-pass regression results. 
    The paper shows that there exists a significant corporate liquidity effect when size and 
value effect are controlled for. This suggests that the financial liquidity held by a 
company contains important information other than what is included in firm size and 
book-to-market ratio. 
 
A.1. The Size Effect Controlled by Corporate Liquidity 
In order to separate the effects of size, book-to-market and liquidity on the firm’s 
characteristics, I first control for the corporate liquidity and examine how the average 
firm return, liquidity, size, book-to-market, average leverage vary with size and book-to-
market value. Table 1 shows the size effect controlled by firm liquidity. First, all the 
firms are sorted into five portfolios based on corporate liquidity, within each liquidity 
cohort, firms are further sorted into five portfolios by size. Panel A exhibits the variation 
of average stock returns when corporate liquidity is controlled for. For each of the 
liquidity portfolio, smaller firms tend to generate higher rate of return than larger firms. 
The difference between average returns for the smallest firms and the largest firms are all 
significant. Firm size seems to contain different information other than corporate liquidity, 
otherwise we should expect that size effect no longer exists after we control for the cash 
holding level. Panel B shows the average liquidity. Within a specific liquidity group, 
average firm cash holdings do not vary much with size. Panel C and Panel D display the 
average size and book-to-market ratios of the 25 portfolios. Panel E shows that the 
average leverage ratio declines with company size for each of the corporate liquidity 
group. Larger companies tend to borrow more than smaller firms regardless their cash 
position. Average leverage deviations from industry norm are shown in Panel G.  For the 
most illiquid portfolios, all the five size portfolios tend to borrow more than industry 
average, and smaller firms tend to borrow more, while the most liquid portfolios tend to 
have lower than average leverage. Panel H displays the average cash flows for the 25 
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subsequently sorted portfolios. For all 5 liquidity portfolios, big companies are able to 
provide more cash flows compared to small companies, given the corporate liquidity 
level. Panel I shows that cash flows generated by smaller companies are much riskier 
than large companies because these cash flows are more volatile. Furthermore, it is 
noticeable that the 5 most liquid portfolios have the most volatile cash flows compared to 
less liquid companies for all 5 size portfolios. Panel J examines the average beta 
coefficients. Though the pattern is not monotonic and obvious, it seems that larger firms 
tend to have lower betas than smaller firms within each liquidity group. Panel K through 
Panel N display the four different financial constraint measures for the 25 corporate 
liquidity-size portfolios. It can be seen that after the corporate liquidity is controlled for, 
larger companies seem to be less financially constrained than smaller companies, which 
is consistent with the literature. 
 
A.2. The Value Effect Controlled by Corporate Liquidity 
Table 2 presents the value effects when corporate liquidity is controlled for. Panel A 
shows there is a clear pattern that average rate of return increases with the book-to-
market ratios for each liquidity cohort. Value firms tend to offer higher returns regardless 
of the proportion of cash holding in total assets. The return differential between firms 
with highest and lowest book-to-market equity ratio is statistically significant. It seems 
that corporate liquidity contains different information other than book-to-market ratio, 
otherwise value effect would disappear after we remove the liquidity effect. According to 
Panel B, the differences of average corporate liquidity across BE/ME sub-portfolios are 
very small and can be neglected. For the most liquid portfolio, the average cash-to-asset 
ratio decreases monotonically as book-to-market equity increases. Panel C and Panel D 
display the average firm size and book-to-market value for the 25 corporate liquidity-
BE/ME portfolios. Panel F shows that firms in the three bottom liquidity portfolios tend 
to hold less cash as a portion of their total assets compared to the industry average, but 
this negative deviation seems to shrink as the book-to-market equity increases. In other 
words, for relatively illiquid firms, value firms tend to deviate less negatively than 
growth firms in terms of cash holdings. However, this pattern reverses for the most liquid 
portfolio, where growth firms tend to deviate positively from the industry standard with a 
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magnitude greater than value firms. Average leverage is displayed in Panel E, which 
shows how much growth firms tend to borrow more than value firms. In addition, Panel 
G provides evidence that compared to value firms, growth firms tend to raise more 
external debt than industry average. Panel H displays average cash flow for the 25 
liquidity-book-to-market portfolios. There seems to be a concave relationship between 
cash flow and book-to-market ratio within each liquidity group. It is apparent that the 
growth firms tend to generate more volatile cash flow streams compared to value firms, 
as it can be seen from Panel I. While on average, liquid portfolios have higher cash flow 
volatilities than illiquid portfolios. Panel J shows that there is an inverse relationship 
between book-to-market equity and average beta for each liquidity portfolio. In order to 
examine how the firms are subject to financial constraints, average total assets, KZ index 
and dividend payout are measure for each of the 25 portfolios. Panel K through panel N 
present the results. Value firms seem to be less financially constrained, although the 
relationship is not always monotonic.  
 
A.3. Additional Fama-MacBeth Two-Pass Regression 
    When I estimate the Fama-MacBeth two-pass regression to test the effect of corporate 
liquidity on equity returns, in addition to the level of corporate liquidity, I also include 
the dummy variables that indicate the relevant liquidity position of companies. Liquidity 
constraint dummies are formed such that D_low equals one if the time series average of 
an individual firm’s cash holdings falls below the bottom 30 percentile of the industry 
average level and zero otherwise. Excess liquidity dummy D_high equals one if the time 
series average of individual firm’s cash holdings is higher than the top 30 percentile of 
the industry average level and zero otherwise. The results are presented in this part. 
    Panel A of Table 3 presents the results of models that include these dummy variables 
as well as interaction terms between liquidity dummy and corporate liquidity, in addition 
to firm betas derived from 25 portfolios in the first pass. Model 8 includes liquidity 
constraint dummy D_low as a regressor, whose coefficient is significantly positive. If a 
firm’s liquid asset holding is lower than the bottom 30 percentile of its industry level, it is 
considered to be liquidity constrained, and the monthly equity return of the firm will be 
0.15 percent higher than those unconstrained firms. The interaction term of corporate 
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liquidity and liquidity constraint dummy is added in model 9, which is positive and 
significant. 
    Model 10 and 11 show that neither excess liquidity dummy variable D_high nor the 
interaction term of corporate liquidity and excess liquidity dummy has a significant effect 
on the stock returns. This indicates that holding excess cash does not necessarily hurt the 
firm, probably because the firm has accumulated abundant cash from successful 
operations, or maybe the firm piles up cash on purpose for the future growth 
opportunities. Furthermore, when both liquidity constraint dummy and excess liquidity 
dummy are included in the regression, the constraint dummy is still significantly positive 
but the excess liquidity dummy is insignificant. 
    The above estimations are repeated using the firm betas derived from the 27 portfolios, 
and the empirical results are exhibited in panel B of Table 3. When the liquidity 
constraint dummy is added into the regression, neither the magnitude nor the significance 
of the corporate liquidity coefficient is strongly affected. Model 8 indicates that if a firm 
is liquidity constrained, the expected stock returns will increase by 0.183 percent per 
month compared to those unconstrained firms in the same industry. When the interaction 
term of corporate liquidity and liquidity constraint dummy is included in the regression in 
model 9, it turns out that the interaction term is significant. Model 10 examines how 
excess corporate liquidity can impact the stock returns. The coefficient of excess liquidity 
dummy is negative and but not significant. Model 11 includes the interaction term 
between corporate liquidity and the excess liquidity dummy. The negative coefficient on 
the interaction term indicates that if a firm keeps too much cash and other liquid assets 
compared to other firms in the same industry, its expected monthly stock return will be 
0.253 percent lower on average.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for the 1962.1 – 2005.12 Sample 
 
Stocks are sorted into quintiles on the basis of monthly stock return, size, BE/ME, CL, Leverage, CL 
deviation and Leverage deviation. Sample mean and standard deviation, and average of each quintile 
are displayed. Return is monthly stock returns in percentage. SIZE denotes the market value of the 
stocks, measured in June of each year. BE/ME denotes the book-to-market equity. CL is corporate 
liquidity, measured as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets. Leverage is the debt-
to-asset ratio. In order to remove the effect of industry differentials, CL deviation and Leverage 
deviation denote the deviation of firms’ cash holdings and financial leverage compared to the 
industry average based on the Fama-French 17 industries. Financial constraint measures include total 
assets, KZ index and dividend payout. Total assets is the book value of total assets. KZ index is a 
linear index of firm financial constraints constructed based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
Dividend payout is calculated as the ratio of total dividends distributions to operating 
income. Distribution to Shareholders is defined as the sum of total dividends and stock 
repurchases divided by operating income. 
 
Variable Mean 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th  Std. Dev.
Return 1.143 -18.809 -5.811 0.068 6.350 23.920 16.289
SIZE 837.380 10.294 35.743 97.215 307.910 3735.700 3209.500
BE/ME 1.158 0.151 0.377 0.593 0.907 3.762 4.020
CL 0.158 0.010 0.035 0.078 0.175 0.491 0.195
Leverage 0.418 0.128 0.291 0.411 0.523 0.739 0.222
CL 
deviation 
0 -0.194 -0.082 -0.039 0.031 0.281 0.175
Leverage 
deviation 
0 -0.309 -0.132 -0.019 0.091 0.307 0.232
Cash Flow 0.018 -0.284 0.032 0.071 0.103 0.168 0.234
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
0.220 0.024 0.050 0.086 0.163 0.779 0.504
Total Assets 1267.141 15.865 52.879 138.170 422.950 5704.920 5069.896
KZ index -2.411 -16.902 -3.699 0.368 1.516 6.663 13.827
Dividend 
Payout 0.101 -0.108 0.000 0.016 0.137 0.461 0.344
Distribution 
to 
Shareholders 0.177 -0.244 0.000 0.059 0.206 0.862 0.712
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Table 2. Firm Characteristics and Corporate Liquidity 
SIZE denotes the market value of the stocks, measured in June of each year. BE/ME denotes the book-to-market equity. CL is the corporate liquidity, measured 
as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets. Leverage is debt-to-asset ratio. In order to remove the effect of industry differentials, CL deviation 
and Leverage deviation denote the deviation of firms’ cash holdings and financial leverage compared to the industry average based on the Fama-French 17 
industries. Panel A shows the overall correlation between firms’ characteristics. Panel B summarizes the time series average of the cross-sectional correlations 
between firms’ features. Panel C shows the cross sectional average time-series correlations between firm characteristics  
 
Panel A. Overall Correlation between Average Firm Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SIZE BE/ME CL Leverage CL deviation 
Leverage 
deviation 
Cash 
Flow 
Total 
Assets KZ index 
Dividend 
Payout 
Distribution 
to 
Shareholders 
SIZE 1 -0.0043 0.0123 -0.0013 -0.0394 -0.0020 0.0438 0.5594 -0.0315 0.0371 0.0480 
BE/ME  1 -0.0039 -0.0002 -0.0021 -0.0001 0.0268 0.2649 -0.0376 0.0360 0.0137 
CL   1 -0.3065 0.9032 -0.3300 0.2863 -0.0762 0.0655 -0.0833 -0.0449 
Leverage    1 -0.2831 0.9995 -0.1212 0.0475 0.0888 -0.0322 -0.0185 
CL deviation     1 -0.0331 0.1936 -0.0877 0.0215 -0.0426 -0.0389 
Leverage 
deviation      1 -0.1486 0.0009 0.1290 -0.0901 -0.0496 
Cash Flow       1 0.0497 -0.1091 0.0723 0.0748 
Total Assets        1 -0.0682 0.0727 0.0606 
KZ index         1 -0.9798 -0.6792 
Dividend 
Payout          1 0.6918 
Distribution to 
Shareholders           1 
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Table 2. (continued) 
Panel B. Time Series Average of Cross-sectional Correlations between Firm Characteristics 
 
Panel C. Cross Sectional Average of Time-series Correlations between Firm Characteristics 
 SIZE BE/ME CL Leverage CL deviation 
Leverage 
deviation 
Cash 
Flow 
Total 
Assets KZ index 
Dividend 
Payout 
Distribution 
to 
Shareholders 
SIZE 1 -0.5160 0.0475 -0.0513 -0.0076 -0.0498 0.1146 0.6706 -0.0746 0.0820 0.0652 
BE/ME  1 -0.0503 0.0360 -0.0668 0.0321 -0.0945 0.2191 -0.0425 0.0337 0.0172 
CL   1 -0.2870 0.9637 -0.2909 0.0145 -0.0743 0.0191 -0.0028 0.0106 
Leverage    1 -0.2963 0.9820 -0.2863 0.0119 0.1587 -0.1033 -0.0890 
CL deviation     1 -0.3018 0.0285 -0.0577 -0.0251 0.0029 0.0114 
Leverage 
deviation      1 -0.2860 0.0130 0.1527 -0.1043 -0.0876 
Cash Flow       1 0.0599 -0.0321 0.0118 0.0196 
Total Assets        1 -0.0124 0.1102 0.0777 
KZ index         1 -0.9740 -0.7732 
Dividend Payout          1 0.7939 
Distribution to 
Shareholders           1 
 SIZE BE/ME CL Leverage CL deviation 
Leverage 
deviation 
Cash 
Flow 
Total 
Assets KZ index 
Dividend 
Payout 
Distribution 
to 
Shareholders 
SIZE 1 -0.4850 0.0529 -0.1635 0.0197 -0.1159 0.1650 0.4765 0.0124 0.0645 0.0817 
BE/ME  1 -0.0303 -0.1192 -0.0149 -0.1268 -0.1033 0.1161 -0.1938 -0.0899 -0.0085 
CL   1 -0.2761 0.8480 -0.2241 0.1227 -0.0965 0.1430 -0.0484 -0.0106 
Leverage    1 -0.2482 0.8285 -0.2984 0.0427 0.3881 0.0918 -0.0311 
CL deviation     1 -0.2742 0.1046 -0.1630 -0.1404 -0.0563 -0.0215 
Leverage 
deviation      1 -0.1785 0.0149 0.0741 -0.0459 -0.0667 
Cash Flow       1 0.0102 -0.0877 -0.1283 -0.0072 
Total Assets        1 -0.0654 0.0423 0.0839 
KZ index         1 -0.5231 -0.5142 
Dividend Payout          1 0.7180 
Distribution to 
Shareholders           1 
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Table 3. Quantile Average Sorted by Firm Characteristics 
 
From 1962.1 to 2005.12, at the beginning of each month, stocks are sorted into 5 portfolios on the basis of 
corporate liquidity, size and BE/ME. The equally weighted averages of return, corporate liquidity, size and 
BE/ME are reported. “Liquid-Illiquid” is the differences in return, corporate liquidity, size and BE/ME 
between the most liquid and illiquid portfolios. “Small-Big” is the differences in return, corporate liquidity, 
size and BE/ME between the smallest and biggest size portfolios. “High-Low” is the differences in return, 
corporate liquidity, size and BE/ME between the highest BE/ME and lowest BE/ME portfolios. 
 
Panel A. Portfolios Sorted on the Basis of Corporate Liquidity 
 Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5 Liquid – Illiquid t-statistic 
Return* 0.731 0.961 1.283 1.706 2.000 1.269 22.105 
CL ** 0.010 0.035 0.078 0.175 0.495 0.485  
Size*** 1095.100 1141.600 1250.500 1276.700 952.710 -142.390  
BE/ME 1.498 1.750 3.094 3.949 1.695 0.197  
Leverage 0.554 0.493 0.451 0.382 0.334 -0.220  
CF† 0.005 0.036 0.041 0.023 -0.161 -0.166  
CF_sigma†† 0.158 0.224 0.264 0.368 0.493 0.335  
Total Assets 1373.67 1281.92 1530.84 1268.73 465.82 -907.85  
KZ index -2.228 -3.039 -3.285 -2.781 -0.722 1.506  
DivPayout 0.103 0.121 0.123 0.105 0.046 -0.058  
Dist. to Shareholder 0.183 0.195 0.196 0.185 0.120 -0.063  
 
Panel B. Portfolios Sorted on the Basis of Firm Size 
 Small 1 2 3 4 Big 5 Small – Big t-statistic 
Return* 2.212 2.165 1.562 1.078 -0.335 2.547 48.561 
CL ** 0.130 0.157 0.182 0.185 0.139 0.008  
Size*** 10.250 35.743 97.215 307.910 5265.500 5255.250  
BE/ME 6.968 1.963 1.373 1.061 0.623 -6.345  
Leverage 0.580 0.445 0.403 0.383 0.403 -0.178  
CF† -0.154 -0.027 0.003 0.041 0.081 0.234  
CF_sigma†† 0.436 0.345 0.303 0.253 0.171 -0.264  
Total Assets 112.12 204.13 354.99 755.05 4494.70 -4382.58  
KZ index -0.407 -1.517 -2.260 -3.294 -4.576 4.169  
DivPayout 0.049 0.077 0.094 0.120 0.157 -0.107  
Dist. to Shareholder 0.084 0.129 0.159 0.198 0.308 -0.224  
 
Panel C. Portfolios Sorted on the Basis of BE/ME 
 Low 1 2 3 4 High 5 High - Low t-statistic 
Return* -0.835 0.509 1.328 2.278 3.401 4.236 72.522 
CL ** 0.238 0.187 0.142 0.121 0.105 -0.133  
Size*** 2730.700 1556.200 782.680 438.830 208.150 -2522.550  
BE/ME 0.193 0.357 0.576 0.891 10.355 10.162  
Leverage 0.607 0.382 0.394 0.405 0.426 -0.181  
CF† -0.241 0.045 0.055 0.049 0.035 0.276  
CF_sigma†† 0.650 0.297 0.223 0.179 0.158 -0.492  
Total Assets 1245.32 1192.49 994.68 804.64 1684.42 439.10  
KZ index -0.007 -2.362 -3.102 -3.452 -3.131 -3.124  
DivPayout 0.061 0.095 0.112 0.119 0.109 0.049  
Dist. to Shareholder  0.146 0.190 0.191 0.192 0.159 0.013  
*Average return is reported in per month percentage terms. **CL stands for corporate liquidity, which is measured by the 
proportion of cash and cash equivalents in the firm’s total assets. ***Firms size is in millions of dollars. †CF is cash flow. 
††CF_sigma is the cash flow volatility. 
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Table 4. Corporate Liquidity Effect Controlled by Size 
 
From 1985.7 to 2003.12, at the beginning of each month, stocks are sorted into 5 size portfolios. Within each size 
portfolios, stocks are subsequently sorted into 5 portfolios on the basis of corporate liquidity. The equally 
weighted averages of return, corporate liquidity, size, BE/ME, leverage, deviations of corporate liquidity and 
leverage from industry norm, beta and alternative financial constraint measures are reported. “Liquid-Illiquid” is 
the differences in the returns between the most liquid and illiquid portfolios. 
 
        
Panel A. Average Return* 
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5 Liquid – Illiquid t-statistic 
Small 1 1.671 1.936 2.287 2.752 3.162 1.492 2.631 
2 0.689 0.976 1.061 1.617 1.858 1.169 2.418 
3 0.690 0.867 1.066 1.343 1.511 0.820 1.771 
4 0.791 0.815 1.184 1.255 1.382 0.590 1.362 
Big 5 0.779 0.785 0.986 1.029 1.316 0.537 1.418 
* Average return is monthly stock returns measured in percentage terms 
        
Panel B. Average Corporate Liquidity   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5   
Small 1 0.014 0.036 0.074 0.151 0.374   
2 0.016 0.042 0.090 0.182 0.403   
3 0.017 0.044 0.095 0.189 0.408   
4 0.016 0.041 0.085 0.168 0.379   
Big 5 0.015 0.036 0.069 0.130 0.297   
        
Panel C. Average Size**   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5   
Small 1 12.001 12.149 12.272 12.603 12.926   
2 39.919 40.208 40.189 40.853 40.870   
3 103.680 104.050 104.220 103.970 103.100   
4 299.880 299.350 300.850 298.050 290.260   
Big 5 2957.000 4195.300 4133.100 4683.900 3694.800   
**Firms size is in millions of dollars   
        
Panel D. Average BE/ME   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5   
Small 1 3.083 3.021 6.521 7.659 2.390   
2 1.104 1.438 2.078 2.115 0.798   
3 0.986 1.258 1.349 1.558 1.048   
4 0.828 0.984 1.251 1.136 0.630   
Big 5 0.660 0.637 0.716 0.678 0.478   
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Table 4. (continued) 
        
Panel E. Average Leverage Ratio   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5   
Small 1 0.706 0.551 0.522 0.469 0.491   
2 0.525 0.496 0.465 0.400 0.305   
3 0.487 0.476 0.430 0.379 0.296   
4 0.462 0.450 0.414 0.369 0.295   
Big 5 0.447 0.437 0.401 0.370 0.314   
        
Panel F. Average Cash Holding Deviation from Industry Norm   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5   
Small 1 -0.112 -0.093 -0.060 0.010 0.222   
2 -0.106 -0.085 -0.044 0.037 0.244   
3 -0.102 -0.081 -0.037 0.046 0.247   
4 -0.101 -0.083 -0.043 0.028 0.220   
Big 5 -0.102 -0.085 -0.056 -0.007 0.143   
        
Panel G. Average Leverage Deviation from Industry Norm   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5   
Small 1 0.228 0.117 0.084 0.033 -0.095   
2 0.086 0.062 0.033 -0.031 -0.122   
3 0.054 0.043 -0.004 -0.053 -0.128   
4 0.029 0.017 -0.019 -0.058 -0.125   
Big 5 0.014 0.006 -0.027 -0.051 -0.101   
        
Panel H. Average Cash Flow   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5   
Small 1 -0.124 -0.019 -0.032 -0.077 -0.228   
2 0.037 0.035 0.024 0.013 -0.050   
3 0.062 0.045 0.055 0.047 0.001   
4 0.078 0.078 0.080 0.079 0.060   
Big 5 0.087 0.088 0.092 0.100 0.113   
        
Panel I. Average Cash Flow Volatility   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5 Liquid – Illiquid t-statistic 
Small 1 0.372 0.297 0.338 0.370 0.878 0.506 13.002 
2 0.302 0.308 0.347 0.331 0.615 0.313 11.286 
3 0.237 0.233 0.271 0.388 0.515 0.278 8.772 
4 0.206 0.245 0.267 0.334 0.574 0.368 12.922 
Big 5 0.232 0.234 0.225 0.349 0.511 0.279 9.386 
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Table 4. (continued) 
        
Panel J. Average Beta   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5 Liquid – Illiquid t-statistic 
Small 1 0.934 1.051 1.071 1.294 1.352 0.418 12.297 
2 0.929 0.948 1.199 1.239 1.412 0.483 16.805 
3 0.957 0.990 1.062 1.341 1.447 0.490 18.594 
4 0.855 0.907 0.998 1.299 1.419 0.564 17.985 
Big 5 0.850 0.868 0.896 1.138 1.289 0.439 15.012 
F-stat for Beta difference of all Liquidity-size quintiles: F-value=57.37; p value=2.7622e-009 
F-stat for Beta difference of most Liquid and illiquid-size quintiles: F-value=92.16; p value=0.0007 
        
Panel K. Average Total Assets   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5 Liquid – Illiquid t-statistic 
Small 1 62.003 112.361 227.382 172.031 39.614 -22.389 -6.201 
2 133.610 220.264 318.583 165.832 58.101 -75.509 -13.661 
3 276.611 454.123 429.181 379.054 189.732 -86.87 -6.939 
4 672.692 969.914 1043.428 669.625 290.593 -382.1 -14.930 
Big 5 3874.335 4722.146 4472.523 3892.813 1948.212 -1926.1 -14.759 
        
Panel L. Average KZ index   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5 Liquid – Illiquid t-statistic 
Small 1 0.261 -0.863 -0.368 -0.910 -1.989 -2.251 -12.767 
2 -2.339 -2.408 -1.911 -2.316 -2.684 -0.345 -1.644 
3 -3.432 -3.712 -3.619 -3.412 -4.002 -0.570 -2.230 
4 -4.581 -4.456 -4.982 -4.465 -4.873 -0.292 -1.253 
Big 5 -6.765 -6.581 -6.964 -6.708 -5.361 1.404 6.889 
        
Panel M. Average DivPayout   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5 Liquid – Illiquid t-statistic 
Small 1 0.045 0.056 0.054 0.055 0.072 0.026 6.243 
2 0.096 0.097 0.089 0.088 0.087 -0.008 -1.883 
3 0.126 0.133 0.128 0.120 0.116 -0.011 -1.937 
4 0.154 0.152 0.167 0.145 0.149 -0.005 -0.904 
Big 5 0.211 0.211 0.217 0.208 0.171 -0.040 -7.948 
        
Panel N. Average Distribution to Shareholders   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5 Liquid – Illiquid t-statistic 
Small 1 0.068 0.094 0.092 0.085 0.100 0.031 5.428 
2 0.141 0.160 0.136 0.149 0.123 -0.018 -2.983 
3 0.177 0.191 0.187 0.184 0.164 -0.012 -2.109 
4 0.210 0.207 0.241 0.209 0.212 0.002 0.286 
Big 5 0.299 0.302 0.323 0.308 0.269 -0.030 -4.763 
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Table 5. Corporate Liquidity Effect Controlled by BE/ME 
 
From 1962.1 to 2005.12, at the beginning of each month, stocks are sorted into 5 BE/ME portfolios. Within 
each size portfolios, stocks are subsequently sorted into 5 portfolios on the basis of corporate liquidity. The 
equally weighted averages of return, corporate liquidity, size, BE/ME, leverage, deviations of corporate 
liquidity and leverage from industry norm, beta and alternative financial constraint measures are reported. 
“Liquid-Illiquid” is the differences in the returns between the most liquid and illiquid portfolios. 
 
        
Panel A. Average Return* 
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5 Liquid – Illiquid t-statistic 
Low 1 -0.352 -0.068 0.313 0.366 0.707 1.059 2.274 
2 0.263 0.470 0.756 1.245 1.862 1.599 3.506 
3 0.703 0.898 1.132 1.541 2.209 1.505 3.418 
4 1.135 1.322 1.658 1.993 2.634 1.499 3.429 
High 5 2.236 2.435 2.678 2.959 3.886 1.650 3.494 
* Average return is monthly stock returns measured in percentage terms 
        
Panel B. Average Corporate Liquidity   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5   
Low 1 0.023 0.071 0.149 0.264 0.483   
2 0.017 0.046 0.097 0.187 0.398   
3 0.015 0.037 0.073 0.145 0.338   
4 0.015 0.033 0.064 0.127 0.314   
High 5 0.014 0.031 0.059 0.110 0.283   
        
Panel C. Average Size**   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5   
Low 1 2514.400 2974.600 2251.900 1646.800 1086.500   
2 1525.700 1652.500 1306.100 809.160 475.580   
3 711.250 962.610 834.770 536.650 256.770   
4 458.050 533.580 551.260 410.630 180.480   
High 5 246.300 230.910 264.000 248.800 119.990   
**Firms size is in millions of dollars   
        
Panel D. Average BE/ME   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5   
Low 1 0.269 0.271 0.328 0.261 0.245   
2 0.505 0.505 0.500 0.496 0.487   
3 0.719 0.720 0.719 0.713 0.708   
4 1.002 1.000 0.995 0.995 0.984   
High 5 4.053 4.064 6.684 12.808 9.688   
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Table 5. (continued) 
        
Panel E. Average Leverage Ratio   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5   
Low 1 0.535 0.480 0.418 0.345 0.275   
2 0.519 0.461 0.416 0.363 0.288   
3 0.472 0.459 0.427 0.377 0.299   
4 0.473 0.461 0.432 0.384 0.305   
High 5 0.470 0.461 0.447 0.410 0.328   
        
Panel F. Average Cash Holding Deviation from Industry Norm   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5   
Low 1 -0.106 -0.069 0.001 0.108 0.314   
2 -0.106 -0.084 -0.039 0.042 0.238   
3 -0.105 -0.086 -0.057 0.008 0.186   
4 -0.104 -0.088 -0.061 -0.006 0.167   
High 5 -0.102 -0.089 -0.063 -0.017 0.140   
        
Panel G. Average Leverage Deviation from Industry Norm   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5   
Low 1 0.103 0.051 -0.008 -0.075 -0.138   
2 0.047 0.029 -0.013 -0.063 -0.134   
3 0.039 0.026 -0.007 -0.053 -0.126   
4 0.039 0.028 -0.002 -0.047 -0.122   
High 5 0.036 0.028 0.013 -0.024 -0.104   
        
Panel H. Average Cash Flow   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5   
Low 1 0.036 0.039 0.037 0.023 -0.047   
2 0.038 0.074 0.075 0.072 0.030   
3 0.071 0.072 0.069 0.068 0.042   
4 0.059 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.038   
High 5 0.039 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.028   
        
Panel I. Average Cash Flow Volatility   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5 Liquid – Illiquid t-statistic 
Low 1 0.677 0.650 0.697 0.786 0.881 0.204 12.363 
2 0.291 0.294 0.335 0.389 0.475 0.183 16.992 
3 0.244 0.238 0.231 0.240 0.377 0.132 18.742 
4 0.171 0.191 0.204 0.207 0.329 0.158 17.300 
High 5 0.155 0.127 0.187 0.181 0.238 0.084 10.953 
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Panel J. Average Beta   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5 Liquid – Illiquid t-statistic 
Low 1 0.942 1.056 1.236 1.434 1.492 0.550 12.363 
2 0.936 0.954 1.103 1.225 1.451 0.515 16.992 
3 0.892 0.919 0.968 1.119 1.354 0.462 18.742 
4 0.862 0.914 0.902 1.019 1.198 0.336 17.300 
High 5 0.846 0.839 0.878 0.934 1.048 0.202 10.953 
F-stat for Beta difference of all Liquidity-BE/ME quintiles: F-value=47.84; p value=1.0527e-008 
F-stat for Beta difference of most Liquid and illiquid-BE/ME quintiles: F-value=73.52; p value=0.001 
        
Panel K. Average Total Assets   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5 Liquid – Illiquid t-statistic 
Low 1 1201.411 1269.293 986.316 599.050 340.262 -861.140 -16.758 
2 1489.823 1546.406 1100.109 657.953 342.413 -1147.390 -18.761 
3 1125.348 1390.816 1111.067 668.044 306.124 -819.180 -23.496 
4 983.152 1151.628 1083.351 741.831 300.962 -682.190 -20.105 
High 5 854.530 1196.312 1987.549 2249.157 1102.396 247.470 5.599 
        
Panel L. Average KZ index   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5 Liquid – Illiquid t-statistic 
Low 1 -1.120 -1.593 -2.177 -2.483 -2.928 -1.808 -7.733 
2 -3.226 -3.332 -3.392 -3.299 -3.783 -0.558 -2.653 
3 -4.143 -4.183 -4.255 -4.166 -4.075 0.068 0.361 
4 -4.034 -3.852 -4.552 -4.332 -4.908 -0.874 -4.342 
High 5 -3.420 -4.062 -3.933 -4.139 -4.053 -0.633 -2.610 
        
Panel M. Average DivPayout   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5 Liquid – Illiquid t-statistic 
Low 1 0.092 0.099 0.106 0.112 0.116 0.024 4.437 
2 0.127 0.128 0.126 0.116 0.116 -0.011 -2.019 
3 0.146 0.147 0.146 0.137 0.121 -0.024 -4.970 
4 0.143 0.137 0.150 0.139 0.137 -0.006 -1.130 
High 5 0.119 0.128 0.129 0.134 0.117 -0.002 -0.421 
        
Panel N. Average Distribution to Shareholders   
  Illiquid 1 2 3 4 Liquid 5 Liquid – Illiquid t-statistic 
Low 1 0.158 0.179 0.164 0.158 0.144 -0.014 -2.105 
2 0.203 0.203 0.191 0.180 0.169 -0.034 -6.078 
3 0.207 0.216 0.214 0.201 0.185 -0.022 -3.730 
4 0.191 0.190 0.229 0.204 0.210 0.019 2.760 
High 5 0.150 0.164 0.182 0.193 0.164 0.014 2.197 
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Table 6. Regression of Individual Firm Beta on Firm Characteristics 
 
This table shows the regression results of individual firm’s market beta on corporate liquidity (CL), 
size and book-to-market ratio (BE/ME). The sample period is from 1962:01 to 2005:12. t statistics 
are in parenthesis. 
 
Time series average 
of cross-sectional 
regression 
Pooled regression 
Cross-sectional 
regression on Time 
series average 
Constant 1.191 1.079 1.019 
 (68.725) *** (1590.100) *** (92.185) *** 
CL 0.296 0.993 1.506 
 (8.073) *** (369.630) *** (37.081) *** 
Size  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-4.111) *** (-22.134) *** (0.758) *** 
BE/ME -0.051 -0.010 -0.009 
 (-3.920) *** (-59.310) *** (-3.813) *** 
R2 0.089 0.113 0.171 
 
* 90% significance level       ** 95% significance level      *** 99% significance level 
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Table 7. Fama-MacBeth Second-pass Regression on Individual Firms 
Panel A. 25 Size-BE/ME portfolios 
In the first pass, portfolio excess returns are regressed on market, SMB and HML factors. Each individual firm is assigned with betas of the portfolio that the firm belongs to. 
In the second pass, individual stocks’ 1 year forward expected excess returns are regressed on factor betas from the first pass, corporate liquidity measures, liquidity constraint 
dummies or interaction terms of corporate liquidity and liquidity constraint dummies. Liquidity constraint dummies are defined as follows: D_low equals one if the time series 
average of individual firm’s cash holdings falls below the bottom 30 percentile of the industry average level and zero otherwise. D_high equals one if the time series average 
of individual firm’s cash holdings is higher than the top 30 percentile of the industry average level and zero otherwise. CF_sigma is the cash flow volatility. Financial 
constraint measures include KZ index and dividend payout. Total assets is the book value of total assets. KZ index is a linear index of firm financial constraints constructed 
based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Dividend payout is calculated as the ratio of total dividends distributions to operating income. Distribution to Shareholders is defined as 
the sum of total dividends and stock repurchase divided by operating income. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
constant -4.482 -4.709 -4.900 -4.660 -5.030 -6.913 -6.952 -6.955 
 (-9.768) *** (-10.291) *** (-10.522) *** (-10.281) *** (-11.206) *** (-11.438) *** (-11.486) *** (-11.495) *** 
b (Market beta) 5.208 5.293 5.365 5.252 5.528 8.885 8.931 8.932 
 (10.852) *** (11.176) *** (11.276) *** (11.144) *** (11.821) *** (13.702) *** (13.743) *** (13.759) *** 
s (Size beta) -0.057 -0.008 -0.020 -0.003 -0.013 0.276 -0.171 0.175 
 (-0.290) (-0.042) (-0.107) (-0.018) (-0.073) (0.157)  (0.126) (0.140) 
h (Value beta) 2.513 2.401 2.389 2.390 2.402 4.310 4.305 4.209 
 (14.409) *** (16.469) *** (16.385) *** (16.467) *** (17.678) *** (17.038) *** (16.849) *** (16.826) *** 
CL - 1.465 3.459 1.346 1.399 1.073 1.123 1.005 
 - (4.811) *** (5.518) *** (4.472) *** (5.176) *** (3.029) *** (3.118) *** (2.789) *** 
CL squared - - -4.948 - - - - - 
 - - (-3.683) *** - - - - - 
- - - 0.311 0.310 - - - CL × CF_sigma - - - (1.822) * (1.821) * - - - 
- - - -  - - - With industry 
dummies - - - -  - - - 
CL × KZ Index - - - - - 0.086 - - 
 - - - - - (5.184) *** - - 
- - - - - - -2.922 - CL × Dividend 
Payout - - - - - - (-4.508) *** - 
- - - - - - - -1.883 CL × Distribution 
to Shareholders - - - - - - - (-3.895) *** 
R2 0.047 0.052 0.053 0.054 0.088 0.050 0.048 0.049 
* 90% significance level       ** 95% significance level      *** 99% significance level   
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Table 7.  (Continued) 
 
Panel B. 27 Size-BE/ME-Corporate Liquidity portfolios 
In the first pass, portfolio excess returns are regressed on market, SMB and HML factors. Each individual firm is assigned with betas of the portfolio that the firm belongs to. 
In the second pass, individual stocks’ 1 year forward expected excess returns are regressed on factor betas from the first pass, corporate liquidity measures, liquidity constraint 
dummies or interaction terms of corporate liquidity and liquidity constraint dummies. Liquidity constraint dummies are defined as follows: D_low equals one if the time series 
average of individual firm’s cash holdings falls below the bottom 30 percentile of the industry average level and zero otherwise. D_high equals one if the time series average 
of individual firm’s cash holdings is higher than the top 30 percentile of the industry average level and zero otherwise. Financial constraint measures include KZ index and 
dividend payout. Total assets is the book value of total assets. KZ index is a linear index of firm financial constraints constructed based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
Dividend payout is calculated as the ratio of total dividends distributions to operating income. Distribution to Shareholders is defined as the sum of total dividends and stock 
repurchase divided by operating income. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
constant -4.934 -5.016 -4.892 -4.821 -5.335 -5.674 -4.891 -4.506 
 (-7.586) *** (-9.995) *** (-9.564) *** (-9.598) *** (-10.985) *** (-10.893) *** (-9.654) *** (-8.512) *** 
b (Market beta) 5.847 5.885 5.811 5.383 6.134 6.495 6.557 5.753 
 (9.934) *** (11.404) *** (11.177) *** (10.304) *** (12.187) *** (12.401) *** (12.981) *** (11.859) *** 
s (Size beta) -0.089 -0.101 -0.087 -0.071 -0.119 0.198 -0.103 0.114 
 (-0.350) (-0.541) (-0.470) (-0.448) (-0.668) (0.657) (-0.826) (0.776) 
h (Value beta) 2.568 2.393 2.426 2.111 2.372 2.492 2.562 3.015 
 (12.495) *** (17.323) *** (17.108) *** (16.745) *** (18.775) *** (17.002) *** (18.168) *** (18.112) *** 
CL - 1.640 3.452 1.245 1.922 2.573 2.667 2.349 
 - (3.998) *** (2.110) ** (2.209) ** (3.364) *** (3.938) *** (3.765) *** (4.028) *** 
CL squared - - -3.539 - - - - - 
 - - (-2.148) ** - - - - - 
CL × CF_sigma - - - 0.305 0.879 - - - 
 - - - (2.148) ** (4.598) *** - - - 
- - - -  - - - With industry 
dummies - - - -  - - - 
CL × KZ Index - - - - - 0.094 - - 
 - - - - - (6.003) *** - - 
- - - - - - -2.712 - CL × Dividend 
Payout - - - - - - (-3.902) *** - 
- - - - - - - -2.426 CL × Distribution 
to Shareholders - - - - - - - (-2.590) ** 
R2 0.044 0.045 0.048 0.065 0.084 0.052 0.050 0.056 
* 90% significance level       ** 95% significance level      *** 99% significance level   
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Table 8. Distribution of Firms across Industries and Corporate Liquidity  
/ Corporate Liquidity Volatility Portfolios 
Each firm is assigned to one of the Fama-French 17 industries based on its CRSP four-digit SIC 
code. Deviation of the firm’s liquidity and leverage to industry norm are estimated as the difference 
between liquidity and leverage of that firm and the mean level of the industry that the firm belongs 
to. Corporate liquidity volatility is measured as the time-series standard deviation of each firm. 
Stocks are sorted into quintiles on the basis of corporate liquidity and corporate liquidity volatility. 
Panel A shows the distribution of firms on the basis of corporate liquidity, which is measured as the 
ratio of cash and cash equivalents over total assets. Panel B displays the distribution of firms on the 
basis of corporate liquidity volatility. Industry average of corporate liquidity and corporate liquidity 
volatility are displayed in the last column for each panel respectively.  
 
Panel A. Numbers of Firms in 17 Industries and Corporate Liquidity Portfolios 
  low CL 1 2 3 4 high CL 5
Average Cash-to-
asset ratio 
1 26 20 19 18 12 0.105 
2 9 9 10 9 10 0.132 
3 32 30 28 20 11 0.107 
4 26 19 15 12 9 0.096 
5 24 21 21 17 14 0.123 
6 15 15 12 9 7 0.124 
7 10 14 18 21 40 0.366 
8 27 31 29 20 13 0.087 
9 18 15 13 9 4 0.090 
10 10 9 6 5 3 0.076 
11 63 71 75 93 88 0.186 
12 13 12 11 9 4 0.099 
13 10 10 8 6 5 0.098 
14 *                   N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
15 34 39 38 34 20 0.102 
16 *                   N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  
17 104 108 120 140 182 0.210 
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Table 8.  (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Numbers of Firms in 17 Industries and Corporate Liquidity Volatility Portfolios 
  low Volatility 1 2 3 4 high Volatility 5
Average Corporate 
Liquidity Volatility 
1 27 24 22 13 8 0.095 
2 6 10 13 11 8 0.128 
3 32 39 26 15 10 0.082 
4 26 20 15 12 8 0.085 
5 25 26 16 17 12 0.102 
6 12 24 11 5 4 0.093 
7 8 18 24 27 25 0.210 
8 29 41 30 13 6 0.088 
9 16 20 15 6 2 0.069 
10 9 11 8 3 2 0.080 
11 52 80 86 87 85 0.141 
12 13 16 12 7 2 0.081 
13 9 11 8 7 4 0.091 
14 *                   N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
15 35 47 44 27 12 0.102 
16 *                   N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
17 84 118 130 154 167 0.159 
* Industry 14 is utilities and 16 is banks, insurance companies and other financials, which are excluded from 
the sample because the liquid assets held by utility industry are under certain regulation while financial 
industry usually hold a substantial inventory of marketable securities. 
Notes:       
  1 Food   Food      
  2 Mines  Mining and Minerals     
  3 Oil    Oil and Petroleum Products     
  4 Clths  Textiles, Apparel & Footware     
  5 Durbl  Consumer Durables     
  6 Chems  Chemicals      
  7 Cnsum  Drugs, Soap, Prfums, 
Tobacco     
  8 Cnstr  Construction and Construction 
Materials    
  9 Steel  Steel Works Etc      
 10 FabPr  Fabricated Products     
 11 Machn  Machinery and Business Equipment    
 12 Cars   Automobiles      
 13 Trans  Transportation     
 14 Utils  Utilities      
 15 Rtail  Retail Stores      
 16 Finan  Banks, Insurance Companies, and Other Financials  
 17 Other  Everything Else     
57 
 
Table A1. Size Effect Controlled by Corporate Liquidity 
 
From 1985.7 to 2003.12, at the beginning of each month, stocks are sorted into 5 portfolios on 
the basis of corporate liquidity. Within each liquidity portfolios, stocks are subsequently sorted 
into 5 size quintiles. The equally weighted averages of return, corporate liquidity, size, BE/ME, 
leverage, deviations of corporate liquidity and leverage from industry norm, beta and alternative 
financial constraint measures are reported. “Small-Big” is the differences in the returns between 
the smallest and biggest size portfolios.  
        
Panel A. Average Return* 
  Small1 2 3 4 Big 5 Small - Big t-statistics
Illiquid 1 1.748 0.684 0.671 0.817 0.779 0.969 2.252 
2 1.972 0.922 0.866 0.830 0.842 1.130 2.568 
3 2.340 1.024 1.017 1.100 0.961 1.380 3.072 
4 2.760 1.499 1.312 1.293 1.073 1.688 3.553 
Liquid 5 3.097 1.867 1.607 1.387 1.277 1.820 3.435 
* Average return is monthly stock returns measured in percentage terms 
        
Panel B. Average Corporate Liquidity   
  Small1 2 3 4 Big 5   
Illiquid 1 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.015   
2 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.038   
3 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.079   
4 0.161 0.163 0.163 0.162 0.160   
Liquid 5 0.386 0.387 0.385 0.382 0.345   
        
Panel C. Average Size**   
  Small1 2 3 4 Big 5   
Illiquid 1 11.291 38.353 107.680 336.950 3276.000   
2 12.045 42.908 124.800 374.210 4875.500   
3 12.554 42.371 115.500 348.930 4740.600   
4 13.436 43.274 106.880 292.880 3942.000   
Liquid 5 13.902 41.105 91.621 228.290 2757.400   
**Firms size is in millions of dollars   
        
Panel D. Average BE/ME   
  Small1 2 3 4 Big 5   
Illiquid 1 3.160 1.083 0.941 0.816 0.655   
2 2.890 1.432 1.263 0.904 0.639   
3 6.885 2.047 1.333 1.117 0.703   
4 7.546 2.281 1.571 1.172 0.693   
Liquid 5 2.117 0.793 1.056 0.788 0.436   
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Table A1. (continued) 
        
Panel E. Average Leverage Ratio   
  Small1 2 3 4 Big 5   
Illiquid 1 0.706 0.532 0.487 0.464 0.446   
2 0.551 0.499 0.481 0.451 0.436   
3 0.512 0.468 0.442 0.417 0.398   
4 0.463 0.406 0.389 0.370 0.356   
Liquid 5 0.483 0.308 0.303 0.288 0.304   
        
Panel F. Average Cash Holding Deviation from Industry Norm   
  Small1 2 3 4 Big 5   
Illiquid 1 -0.112 -0.107 -0.103 -0.102 -0.102   
2 -0.090 -0.087 -0.084 -0.085 -0.082   
3 -0.054 -0.053 -0.050 -0.048 -0.050   
4 0.020 0.020 0.023 0.022 0.018   
Liquid 5 0.234 0.229 0.227 0.223 0.187   
        
Panel G. Average Leverage Deviation from Industry Norm   
  Small1 2 3 4 Big 5   
Illiquid 1 0.230 0.091 0.053 0.031 0.013   
2 0.116 0.066 0.048 0.017 0.003   
3 0.075 0.036 0.008 -0.015 -0.028   
4 0.027 -0.025 -0.043 -0.058 -0.065   
Liquid 5 -0.102 -0.119 -0.120 -0.133 -0.109   
        
Panel H. Average Cash Flow   
  Small1 2 3 4 Big 5   
Illiquid 1 -0.124 0.035 0.061 0.079 0.086   
2 -0.021 0.037 0.048 0.080 0.088   
3 -0.031 0.027 0.060 0.080 0.093   
4 -0.076 0.021 0.053 0.080 0.102   
Liquid 5 -0.234 -0.040 0.003 0.042 0.098   
     
Panel I. Average Cash Flow Volatility   
  Small1 2 3 4 Big 5   
Illiquid 1 0.347 0.324 0.230 0.195 0.217   
2 0.300 0.305 0.230 0.240 0.254   
3 0.334 0.321 0.289 0.258 0.221   
4 0.372 0.348 0.359 0.351 0.345   
Liquid 5 0.874 0.608 0.528 0.569 0.552   
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Table A1. (continued) 
     
Panel J. Average Beta   
  Small1 2 3 4 Big 5   
Illiquid 1 0.885 0.856 0.840 0.820 0.839   
2 0.924 0.903 0.879 0.885 0.858   
3 1.054 1.037 1.034 1.190 0.957   
4 1.302 1.320 1.295 1.285 1.186   
Liquid 5 1.367 1.416 1.430 1.416 1.345   
     
Panel K. Average Total Assets   
  Small1 2 3 4 Big 5   
Illiquid 1 61.65 125.00 290.45 728.14 4185.20   
2 113.31 222.05 544.08 1055.30 5308.92   
3 234.28 334.44 462.62 1137.30 4602.34   
4 164.96 211.30 392.93 705.39 2986.04   
Liquid 5 41.41 64.04 183.98 309.37 1415.41   
     
Panel L. Average KZ index   
 Small1 2 3 4 Big 5   
Illiquid 1 0.175 -2.118 -3.282 -4.817 -6.873   
2 -0.811 -2.265 -3.688 -4.497 -6.606   
3 -0.520 -2.181 -3.792 -5.037 -7.000   
4 -1.087 -2.509 -3.623 -4.645 -6.043   
Liquid 5 -1.954 -2.633 -3.998 -4.716 -5.052   
     
Panel M. Average DivPayout   
 Small1 2 3 4 Big 5   
Illiquid 1 0.047 0.093 0.122 0.159 0.211   
2 0.054 0.096 0.132 0.156 0.213   
3 0.057 0.095 0.133 0.171 0.215   
4 0.056 0.095 0.124 0.150 0.193   
Liquid 5 0.072 0.086 0.118 0.144 0.160   
     
Panel N. Average Distribution to Shareholders   
 Small1 2 3 4 Big 5   
Illiquid 1 0.071 0.137 0.166 0.216 0.305   
2 0.093 0.165 0.187 0.217 0.311   
3 0.097 0.142 0.196 0.247 0.320   
4 0.086 0.151 0.194 0.215 0.294   
Liquid 5 0.097 0.122 0.161 0.200 0.241   
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Table A2. Value Effect Controlled by Corporate Liquidity 
 
From 1985.7 to 2003.12, at the beginning of each month, stocks are sorted into 5 portfolios on 
the basis of corporate liquidity. Within each liquidity portfolios, stocks are subsequently sorted 
into 5 BE/ME quintiles. The equally weighted averages of return, corporate liquidity, size, 
BE/ME, leverage, deviations of corporate liquidity and leverage from industry norm, beta and 
alternative financial constraint measures are reported. “High-Low” is the differences in the 
returns between the highest BE/ME and lowest BE/ME portfolios. 
        
Panel A. Average Return* 
  Low1 2 3 4 High 5 High - Low t-statistics
Illiquid 1 -0.033 0.367 0.880 1.249 2.440 2.473 5.894
2 0.012 0.553 1.025 1.543 2.515 2.503 5.892
3 0.195 0.657 1.247 1.736 2.822 2.627 5.974
4 0.332 0.959 1.495 2.031 3.185 2.853 6.216
Liquid 5 0.452 1.006 1.742 2.432 3.605 3.153 6.225
* Average return is monthly stock returns measured in percentage terms 
        
Panel B. Average Corporate Liquidity   
  Low1 2 3 4 High 5   
Illiquid 1 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015   
2 0.040 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.039   
3 0.083 0.081 0.080 0.080 0.080   
4 0.167 0.165 0.164 0.162 0.160   
Liquid 5 0.402 0.392 0.381 0.366 0.364   
        
Panel C. Average Size**   
  Low1 2 3 4 High 5   
Illiquid 1 1757.300 935.130 609.190 417.890 213.510   
2 2749.900 1379.000 871.680 508.250 226.010   
3 2606.200 1322.100 793.190 519.170 264.250   
4 2205.300 1143.100 582.340 363.040 198.850   
Liquid 5 1445.900 832.980 504.740 347.500 112.490   
**Firms size is in millions of dollars   
        
Panel D. Average BE/ME   
  Low1 2 3 4 High 5   
Illiquid 1 0.276 0.565 0.766 1.054 4.470   
2 0.281 0.567 0.757 1.052 5.150   
3 0.248 0.527 0.726 1.005 10.390   
4 0.288 0.464 0.660 0.909 11.508   
Liquid 5 0.172 0.357 0.517 0.737 3.577   
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Table A2. (continued) 
        
Panel E. Average Leverage Ratio   
  Low1 2 3 4 High 5   
Illiquid 1 0.528 0.520 0.477 0.474 0.469   
2 0.499 0.463 0.462 0.458 0.460   
3 0.463 0.431 0.420 0.418 0.431   
4 0.408 0.378 0.369 0.364 0.387   
Liquid 5 0.314 0.294 0.292 0.286 0.292   
        
Panel F. Average Cash Holding Deviation from Industry Norm   
  Low1 2 3 4 High 5   
Illiquid 1 -0.110 -0.107 -0.105 -0.102 -0.100   
2 -0.091 -0.089 -0.085 -0.084 -0.081   
3 -0.058 -0.054 -0.049 -0.048 -0.044   
4 0.018 0.020 0.023 0.025 0.027   
Liquid 5 0.239 0.228 0.220 0.212 0.215   
        
Panel G. Average Leverage Deviation from Industry Norm   
  Low1 2 3 4 High 5   
Illiquid 1 0.098 0.042 0.043 0.040 0.034   
2 0.068 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.026   
3 0.034 -0.003 -0.017 -0.015 -0.004   
4 -0.018 -0.051 -0.061 -0.065 -0.048   
Liquid 5 -0.104 -0.129 -0.132 -0.137 -0.137   
    
Panel H. Average Cash Flow   
  Low 1 2 3 4 High 5   
Illiquid 1 0.046 0.034 0.069 0.058 0.039   
2 0.048 0.075 0.069 0.058 0.045   
3 0.041 0.073 0.068 0.061 0.043   
4 0.025 0.070 0.068 0.062 0.045   
Liquid 5 -0.066 0.019 0.037 0.039 0.021   
    
Panel I. Average Cash Flow Volatility   
  Low 1 2 3 4 High 5   
Illiquid 1 0.320 0.327 0.272 0.245 0.153   
2 0.343 0.291 0.294 0.231 0.145   
3 0.374 0.296 0.366 0.259 0.177   
4 0.492 0.416 0.358 0.279 0.205   
Liquid 5 0.812 0.609 0.485 0.467 0.328   
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Table A2. (continued) 
    
Panel J. Average Beta   
  Low1 2 3 4 High 5   
Illiquid 1 0.905 0.892 0.876 0.886 0.843   
2 0.978 0.935 0.919 0.873 0.862   
3 1.086 1.007 0.982 0.915 0.897   
4 1.295 1.220 1.173 1.057 0.995   
Liquid 5 1.491 1.438 1.341 1.246 1.145   
    
Panel K. Average Total Assets   
  Low1 2 3 4 High 5   
Illiquid 1 1196.91 1191.70 1092.28 973.22 890.93   
2 1555.63 1525.67 1306.14 1127.83 1690.41   
3 1264.52 1190.19 1058.72 993.55 2261.82   
4 839.24 824.62 613.49 548.66 1609.56   
Liquid 5 433.54 443.32 329.97 264.21 571.08   
    
Panel L. Average KZ index   
  Low1 2 3 4 High 5   
Illiquid 1 -1.503 -3.650 -3.995 -4.002 -3.716   
2 -2.003 -3.575 -4.291 -3.839 -4.120   
3 -2.015 -3.777 -4.290 -4.499 -3.904   
4 -2.217 -3.272 -4.098 -4.276 -4.038   
Liquid 5 -2.396 -3.169 -3.921 -4.437 -4.438   
    
Panel M. Average DivPayout   
  Low1 2 3 4 High 5   
Illiquid 1 0.097 0.135 0.141 0.141 0.124   
2 0.108 0.133 0.149 0.136 0.128   
3 0.104 0.136 0.145 0.146 0.131   
4 0.109 0.118 0.136 0.134 0.125   
Liquid 5 0.115 0.109 0.119 0.129 0.120   
    
Panel N. Average Distribution to Shareholders   
  Low1 2 3 4 High 5   
Illiquid 1 0.164 0.202 0.196 0.186 0.154   
2 0.189 0.207 0.219 0.189 0.172   
3 0.175 0.204 0.209 0.221 0.185   
4 0.166 0.182 0.208 0.210 0.177   
Liquid 5 0.143 0.153 0.173 0.191 0.174   
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Table A3.  Fama-MacBeth Second-pass Regression on Individual Firms 
Panel A. 25 Size-BE/ME portfolios 
In the first pass, portfolio excess returns are regressed on market, SMB and HML factors. Each individual firm is assigned with betas 
of the portfolio that the firm belongs to. In the second pass, individual stocks’ 1 year forward expected excess returns are regressed on 
factor betas from the first pass, corporate liquidity measures, liquidity constraint dummies or interaction terms of corporate liquidity 
and liquidity constraint dummies. Liquidity constraint dummies are defined as follows: D_low equals one if the time series average of 
individual firm’s cash holdings falls below the bottom 30 percentile of the industry average level and zero otherwise. D_high equals 
one if the time series average of individual firm’s cash holdings is higher than the top 30 percentile of the industry average level and 
zero otherwise. CF_sigma is the cash flow volatility. 
 
  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
constant -4.726 -4.718 -4.699 -4.799 -4.710 -4.804 
 (-10.350) *** (-10.321) *** (-10.253) *** (-10.540) *** (-10.293) *** (-10.561) *** 
b (Market beta) 5.285 5.279 5.294 5.333 5.289 5.319 
 (11.156) *** (11.153) *** (11.177) *** (11.291) *** (11.163) *** (11.266) *** 
s (Size beta) -0.002 -0.006 -0.017 -0.015 -0.011 -0.013 
 (-0.012) (-0.032) (-0.091) (-0.080) (-0.060) (-0.067) 
h (Value beta) 2.402 2.403 2.403 2.401 2.404 2.403 
 (16.479) *** (16.480) *** (16.520) *** (16.486) *** (16.520) *** (16.497) *** 
CL 1.569 1.516 1.877 2.367 1.943 2.373 
 (5.196) *** (4.980) *** (6.113) *** (7.051) *** (6.312) *** (7.058) *** 
D_low 0.148 - - - 0.110 - 
 (2.779) *** - - - (2.176) ** - 
CL × D_low - 0.466 - - - 0.271 
 - (2.487) ** - - - (2.349) ** 
D_high - - -0.276 - -0.267 - 
 - - (-1.587) - (-1.555)  - 
CL × D_high - - - -0.220 - -1.057 
 - - - (-1.581)  - (-3.683) *** 
R2 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.054 0.054 
 
* 90% significance level       ** 95% significance level      *** 99% significance level   
 
64 
Table A3. (continued) 
 
Panel B. 27 Size-BE/ME-Corporate Liquidity portfolios 
In the first pass, portfolio excess returns are regressed on market, SMB and HML factors. Each individual firm is assigned with betas 
of the portfolio that the firm belongs to. In the second pass, individual stocks’ 1 year forward expected excess returns are regressed on 
factor betas from the first pass, corporate liquidity measures, liquidity constraint dummies or interaction terms of corporate liquidity 
and liquidity constraint dummies. Liquidity constraint dummies are defined as follows: D_low equals one if the time series average of 
individual firm’s cash holdings falls below the bottom 30 percentile of the industry average level and zero otherwise. D_high equals 
one if the time series average of individual firm’s cash holdings is higher than the top 30 percentile of the industry average level and 
zero otherwise. 
 
  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
constant -5.134 -5.012 -4.923 -5.129 -4.922 -5.119 
 (-9.349) *** (-9.992) *** (-9.764) *** (-10.247) *** (-9.775) *** (-10.233) *** 
b (Market beta) 5.602 5.858 5.820 5.948 5.801 5.919 
 (11.011) *** (11.355) *** (11.229) *** (11.541) *** (11.191) *** (11.487) *** 
s (Size beta) -0.083 -0.103 -0.080 -0.099 -0.085 -0.101 
 (-0.428) (-0.557) (-0.429) (-0.530) (-0.459) (-0.546) 
h (Value beta) 2.347 2.400 2.418 2.386 2.422 2.395 
 (16.699) *** (17.376) *** (17.503) *** (17.265) *** (17.539) *** (17.324) *** 
CL 1.145 1.584 1.156 1.261 1.079 1.266 
 (3.293) *** (3.830) *** (2.492) ** (1.771) (1.948) * (2.486) ** 
D_low 0.183 - - - 0.132 - 
 (1.832) * - - - (1.896) * - 
- 0.149 - - - 0.207 CL × D_low 
 - (1.641) - - - (1.633) 
D_high - - -0.143 - -0.234 - 
 - - (-1.097) - (-2.100) ** - 
CL × D_high - - - -0.253 - -0.285 
 - - - (-2.048) ** - (-1.781) * 
R2 0.045 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.048 
 
* 90% significance level       ** 95% significance level      *** 99% significance level  
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Figure 1. Time Series of Corporate Liquidity 
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Figure 1 presents the time series of corporate liquidity for the sample period from 
1962:01 to 2005:12. Each month all the firms are sorted into 5 portfolios based on 
corporate liquidity, and average corporate liquidity for the portfolio is calculated. Liq 1 
represents the most illiquid portfolio, and Liq 5 represents the most liquid portfolio. 
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Chapter 2 
Is Corporate Liquidity A Risk Factor? 
 
I. Introduction 
Is corporate liquidity a risk factor? Does corporate liquidity contain information that can 
predict changes in the future investment opportunity set? Is corporate liquidity priced 
cross-sectionally or is it just an idiosyncratic risk? An extensive corporate finance 
literature investigates the determinants of corporate liquidity levels (Kim, Mauer and 
Sherman (1998) and Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999)). These studies try to 
answer the question why firms keep liquid assets and examine the characteristics of firms 
associated with large cash holdings. 
Although previous literature has established that cash holdings are important for firm 
investment and operation, and how various firm characteristics can affect the chosen 
asset liquidity level, it remains unclear whether cash holdings can enhance the value of 
firms, and to what extent aggregate cash holdings can be varying with equity returns. 
Some recent papers have started investigating the value of cash holdings at the individual 
firm level. Mikkelson and Partch (2003) find that, in the long run, firms retaining high 
cash reserves grow faster and undertake higher levels of investment, and they conclude 
that conservative financial policy can enhance operating performance. Pinkowitz and 
Williamson (2004) point out that cash holdings are more valuable for financially 
constrained companies and for firms with better growth opportunities, more volatile 
investment opportunities and a lower probability of financial distress. Faulkender and 
Wang (2006) adopt a methodology that examines the variation in excess equity returns as 
a measure of the marginal value of cash. They find that the market rewards firms holding 
internal cash with higher values, while the marginal market value of cash declines as the 
level of cash increases. They also find that on average, the market value of cash is higher 
for financially constrained firms than for those that are not constrained. Sibilkov (2005) 
finds that cash holdings are more valuable for financially constrained firms, partly 
because constrained firms use cash more efficiently to invest in more valuable projects 
than financially unconstrained firms. 
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On the aggregate level, Greenwood (2004) uses the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds 
data to construct a measure of aggregate corporate liquidity, and finds that aggregate 
corporate liquidity is negatively related to future stock market returns. He argues that the 
evidence supports the active market timing theory, in which firms assess capital markets 
and accumulate cash when they appear overvalued since they do not have investment 
opportunities.  
The asset pricing literature, on the other hand, tries to explain the asset returns with 
risk factors. The classical CAPM asserts that the only risk that the investors are 
compensated for bearing is the systematic risk that is associated with the stock market, 
which, however, turns out to be an empirical failure. Although Fama-French three-factor 
model can explain a substantial portion of cross-sectional stock return variations, it does 
not provide clear interpretations for the underlying risk factors that are proxied by SMB 
and HML. Meanwhile, there is an increasing body of microstructure literature that tries to 
analyze the behavior and formation of asset prices, in particular, the relationship between 
liquidity, information asymmetries and asset premia in the long run (see Easley and 
O’Hara (2003)).  
    The liquidity of a financial asset refers to the speed and ease with which the asset can 
be converted into cash (Glossary of Bodie, Kane and Marcus 4th edition, 1999). The 
financial liquidity is typically considered a characteristic of an asset, but the market 
liquidity as an aggregate factor is also widely examined. Liquidity can be time-varying 
for the market as a whole, and therefore investors may be compensated for bearing this 
systematic risk. Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) argue that liquidity is not only 
an individual asset’s attribute, but that there exists a commonality across assets based on 
underlying microstructure phenomena. The existence of commonality in liquidity raises 
the question whether trading cost shocks can be priced as a source of non-diversifiable 
risk. Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) examine whether the market-wide liquidity is priced 
in an asset pricing model. They find that liquidity risk is capable of explaining cross-
sectional expected return variation that is not captured by the Fama-French three factors. 
Stocks with higher “liquidity betas”, tend to have higher expected returns on average, 
which provides support to the idea of aggregate liquidity as a factor. It is found that small 
stocks are less liquid and are more sensitive to aggregate liquidity. Acharya and Pedersen 
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(2005) present a liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model in which the expected 
return of a financial asset is positively related to its expected illiquidity and its “net beta”, 
which is proportional to the covariance of its return net of illiquidity costs with the net 
return on the market portfolio. The net beta can be further decomposed into the standard 
market beta and three betas representing different forms of liquidity risk associated with: 
(i) commonality in liquidity with market liquidity, ),cov( Mi cc  (Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986)); (ii) return sensitivity to market liquidity, ),cov( Mi cr  (Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003)); and (iii) liquidity sensitivity to market returns, ),cov( Mi rc . The model also 
shows that liquidity moves together with contemporaneous returns and is able to predict 
expected future returns. 
Holmström and Tirole (2001) make adjustments to asset pricing theory using a 
corporate finance approach. They develop an asset pricing model based on firms’ desire 
to hoard financial slack. Collateralizable assets require a premium determined by the 
covariation between the asset’s return and the marginal value of liquidity13 in different 
states. Risk neutral firms pay a premium on assets that can help them through the time 
when liquidity is in shortage. According to their model, asset prices are completely 
determined by corporate demand for liquidity. 
This paper examines whether corporate liquidity can be a risk factor and can be priced 
in an asset pricing model. If aggregate corporate liquidity contains information about 
changes in future investment opportunities, it can be used as a factor to price equity 
returns. I construct a corporate liquidity factor LMI, which stands for “Liquid Minus 
Illiquid”. LMI is a zero-investment portfolio that is long stocks with the most liquid assets 
and short stocks with the least liquid assets.  
I estimate the multifactor asset pricing models for the 25 portfolios constructed by 
independently sorting stocks by size and book-to-market equity, and the 27 portfolios 
constructed by independently sorting stocks by size, book-to-market equity and corporate 
liquidity. The explanatory power of SMB strengthens while the loadings on HML are 
reduced substantially. The liquidity factor, LMI, captures the time-series variation of the 
excess stock returns, with loadings turning negative to positive from the most illiquid 
                                                 
13 Liquidity in Holmström and Tirole (2001)’s paper refers to the aggregate value of financial securities that 
can transport wealth over time and back up future payments. 
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portfolios to the most liquid portfolios and all the slopes for the liquid portfolios are 
highly significant. The opposite signs of the LMI loadings suggest that the corporate 
liquidity factor loads on illiquid firms and liquid firms in an opposite way. On average, 
liquidity loads negatively on expected returns for the most illiquid firms but positively on 
more liquid firms. The Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (GRS) test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that intercepts from the time-series regression are jointly indistinguishable 
from zero and the four-factor model well explains the common variations in a cross-
section of excess stock returns.   
In addition, when CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model and the four-factor model 
are estimated for 10 corporate liquidity portfolios, I find that market betas are higher for 
liquid portfolios than illiquid ones, and loadings on LMI increase along with corporate 
liquidity, which supports that corporate liquidity is a risk factor.  
Furthermore, multifactor regressions are performed for the 25 portfolios constructed by 
subsequently sorting all the firms by size and corporate liquidity, and by BE/ME and 
corporate liquidity. The empirical results provide more support for the existence of 
corporate liquidity effect.    
    There is no clear evidence that the LMI factor co-moves with macroeconomic 
conditions. The corporate liquidity premia are not quite sensitive to changes in 
macroeconomic conditions or monetary policy. Furthermore, when examining the 
relationship between companies’ performance and macroeconomic conditions, the 
regression results show that liquid firms are actually less cyclical than illiquid firms.  
Moreover, I find that the corporate liquidity beta is higher during recessions, and it 
seems that the corporate liquidity beta is more sensitive to changes in macroeconomic 
variables for liquid firms than illiquid firms. These results support the idea that 
companies pile up cash and cash equivalents for precautionary purposes. Firms who are 
more sensitive to the less favorable economic conditions will increase their liquid asset 
holdings when they forecast an economic downturn. Those firms are riskier because of 
their higher sensitivity to changes in macroeconomic condition.  
Finally, I examine whether the corporate liquidity beta of financially constrained firms 
and unconstrained firms responds differently to the changes in a macroeconomic variable. 
The corporate liquidity beta of financially constrained companies is more sensitive to 
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economic news. These empirical results support the view that firms stock liquidity 
because they are financially constrained and therefore have greater exposure to 
macroeconomic fluctuations.  
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section II formulates the 
hypotheses to be tested. Section III briefly discussed the data and variables. Section IV 
presents the empirical results. Section V investigates the relationship between corporate 
liquidity and macroeconomic variables. Section VI concludes. 
 
 
II. Hypotheses 
Variability in a security's total returns that is directly associated with overall 
movements in the general market or economy is systematic risk. Systematic risk is not 
diversifiable. Expected returns are higher for stocks with priced higher systematic risk 
because investors require more compensation for higher non diversifiable risk. Chapter 1 
discusses the corporate liquidity as a source of idiosyncratic risk, and empirical evidence 
shows that equity returns are positively related to corporate liquidity, even if size and 
value effect have been controlled for. Furthermore, Chapter 1 shows that firm market 
betas have a direct relationship with corporate liquidity, and the regression results support 
the precautionary saving motive for companies and a signaling effect of corporate 
liquidity. These findings lead to another interesting question: Can corporate liquidity be 
associated with systematic risk, and why?  
Let’s assume a dynamic world where the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(ICAPM) of Merton (1973, 1990) is true. Different from the static asset pricing models 
where the distribution of asset returns does not change over time, Merton’s ICAPM is 
derived in an environment with time-varying investment opportunities.  
In Merton’s model, a vector of state variables represents changes in investment 
opportunities over time. In a simple discrete time version of ICAPM14, the marginal 
utility given a change in wealth during a certain period can be expressed as a linear 
combination of these uncorrelated state variables. Therefore, if the return of each asset in 
                                                 
14  The original Merton’s ICAPM applies continuous time stochastic dynamic programming approach, 
where returns are assumed to follow a Brownian motion process. Constantinides (1989) discusses a 
discrete-time analog of Merton’s ICAPM, in which returns are multivariate normally distributed. 
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one’s wealth portfolio can be represented by a set of portfolio returns which are 
correlated with those state variables, we can use the portfolio returns as factors to mimic 
the state variables and hence the future investment opportunities. Merton’s ICAPM does 
not specify what these factors would be, rather, it provides a very general framework in 
which any variable that can explain cross sectional asset returns can be considered as a 
factor that proxies the varying investment opportunities. 
If only the firms observe their own changes in real investment opportunities, then it 
may well be that aggregate corporate liquidity is the best publicly available measure for 
expected future returns, which in turn summarizes the available investment opportunities.  
So effectively then we have a Merton model in which the aggregate liquidity is the state 
variable that serves as a second factor in addition to the market factor.  SMB and HML 
may capture other state variables representing different aspects of investment 
opportunities. 
If firms accumulate liquid assets because managers have better information about 
changes in future investment opportunities, aggregate corporate liquidity may signal this 
information, measure expected equity returns, hence can be used as an aggregate factor. 
Given that investors are rational, they will understand that liquid asset piling up signals 
changes in a set of investment opportunities, which may represent potential risks for 
investors. Investors therefore will require higher equity returns in order to bear the risks 
from the varying investment opportunities and expected returns. In general, aggregate 
corporate liquidity can proxy a state variable and can be used as a factor to model the 
equity return variation. A higher level of aggregate corporate liquidity may indicate 
riskier investment opportunities in the future. The above analysis leads to the first 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  If corporate liquidity contains information about changes in 
investment opportunities which may represent a source of risk, aggregate 
corporate liquidity serves as a factor and requires a positive risk premium.  
 
Fama-French three-factor model adds two factors SMB and HML to CAPM to reflect a 
portfolio's exposure to these two classes. Fama and French see high returns as a reward 
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for taking on higher risk; in particular if returns increase with the book/price ratio, then 
stocks with a high book-to-market equity ratio must be riskier than an average stock. 
They argue high book-to-market equity could mean a stock is "distressed", temporarily 
selling at low prices because future earnings look doubtful. Fama and French interpret 
HML as a risk factor measuring financial distress. Given a Merton environment, 
aggregate corporate liquidity may serve as a state variable and capture part of the 
financial distress risk. Here I construct a factor LMI (Liquid Minus Illiquid), which 
represents changes in investment opportunities, including likely changes in distress risk 
as firms stock more cash if they anticipate financial distress. Similar arguments may 
apply for the size factor SML. This leads to the second hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: If LMI is a systematic risk factor, the explanatory power of 
Fama-French distress factors SMB and/or HML should decrease when LMI is 
included in the multifactor regression. 
 
On an aggregate level, if the corporate liquidity signals the firms’ risk, then the equity 
returns of more liquid and more illiquid firms should respond differently to changes in 
macroeconomic conditions. If holding more corporate liquidity implies higher risk of the 
firm, the proxy for the systematic risk – the corporate liquidity factor LMI - will vary 
together with the macroeconomic changes.  
 
    Hypothesis 3: If the corporate liquidity factor is a proxy for systematic risk, it 
should forecast future returns and should be contemporaneously correlated with 
leading indicators of the business cycle.  
 
Asset pricing theories indicate the sources of systematic risk come from the correlation 
between equity returns and the changes in macroeconomics. In the long run, equity 
returns are determined by fundamentals. If liquid firms store financial slack because they 
expect riskier future cash flows and poorer operating performance after negative shocks 
to the aggregate economy, then corporate liquidity signals a systematic risk. In other 
words, companies with a higher level of financial reserves may experience poorer 
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fundamentals during economic downturns. For example, if a firm expects the economy is 
slowing down, to better prepare itself to get through the next recession, the firm will 
stock more liquid assets as a cushion. When macroeconomic condition becomes less 
favorable, the firm’s sales decrease, profits plummet and cash flows are more volatile, but 
these liquid firms may probably be safe since they have enough cash as a buffer. On the 
contrary, for those companies whose fundamentals are less sensitive to the worse 
economic condition, they do not need to stock more liquidity. What we observe maybe 
that on the aggregate level, liquid firms’ business fundamentals maybe more cyclical than 
less liquid firms. If corporate liquidity signals adverse changes in investment 
opportunities and represents a source of systematic risk, we would expect that business 
fundamentals of firms with more corporate liquidity are more closely tied to the business 
cycle. This leads to hypothesis 4 as follows: 
 
    Hypothesis 4: If firms with higher corporate liquidity are riskier, then 
fundamental business activities of more liquid firms should be more cyclical than 
those of illiquid firms. 
 
The first two hypotheses are tested in Section IV and the last two hypotheses are tested 
in Section V. 
 
 
III. Data 
To test whether corporate liquidity is a risk factor, I construct a sample of firms for the 
empirical tests by merging the COMPUSTAT annual files and the stock and indices 
databases from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for the period 1962:1 
to 2005:12. The CRSP returns cover NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. Financial 
firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6999 are 
excluded from the sample because they usually hold substantial inventories of marketable 
securities, which are included in corporate liquidity measure. Transportation and public 
utility firms with SIC codes between 4000 and 4999 are excluded as well because cash 
holdings of these firms are subject to regulatory supervision.  
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Firms’ monthly stock returns are taken from CRSP. Market excess returns are 
downloaded from Kenneth French’s webpage.15 Monthly risk free interest rates are one 
year Treasury bill rates obtained from Kenneth French’s webpage. 
    Corporate liquidity is measured by the ratio of cash and marketable securities 
(Compustat item #1) to total assets (Compustat item #6): 
it
it
it AssetsTotal
CashCL =
, 
where Cashit includes the following items: bank drafts, cash, checks (cashiers or 
certified), demand certificates of deposit, demand deposits, letters of credit and money 
orders. It also includes government and other marketable securities and time deposits, 
which are usually considered as cash equivalents. A firm with a high cash-to-asset ratio 
has more liquid assets to serve interest payments, and therefore postpone bankruptcy and 
reduce financial distress; or has more freedom to invest in profitable projects without 
incurring transaction costs.  
Firm size is measured by the market value of equity, which equals the stock price of 
the stock at the end of June of year t times the total shares outstanding. Following Fama 
and French (1992), the book-to-market equity ratio (BE/ME) at time t is calculated by 
dividing book equity (BE) at the fiscal ending of year t-1 by market equity (ME) at 
December of year t-1. The book-to-market equity ratios at time t are matched by the stock 
returns from July of year t to June of year t+1. Therefore there is at least a 6 months’ lag 
between accounting data and market data in order for the firms’ accounting information 
to be released and understood by the public. The book value of firm equity is defined as 
in Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2003).16 Leverage is calculated as (long-term debt + 
                                                 
15 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french 
16 Book equity is defined as the stockholders’ equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes (Compustat item 
#74) and investment tax credit (Compustat item #208), plus postretirement benefit liabilities (Compustat 
item #330), minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, they measure the book 
value of preferred stock by the order of redemption (Compustat item #56), liquidation (Compustat item 
#10), or par value (Compustat item #130). Stockholders’ equity is measured by Compustat item #216 or the 
book value of common equity (Compustat item #60), plus he par value of  preferred stock, or the book 
value of assets (Compustat item #6) minus total liabilities (Compustat item #181). 
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short-term debt)/(book value of assets) 17  following Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (1999). 
I use three alternative financial constraint measures suggested by the literature. (1) 
Asset size. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) argue that smaller firms are more likely to 
be subject to financial constraint because they are usually young and less well known, 
hence have difficulty in accessing external capital market. (2) KZ index, which is a linear 
index of firm financial constraints constructed based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
Following Lamont, Polk and Saá-Requejo (2001), the KZ index is calculated using the 
following equation18:  
 
gsCashHoldinDividends
LeverageQCashFlowKZindex
×−×−
×+×+×−=
315.1368.39                  
319.3283.0002.1
 
 
The KZ index is a linear combination of five accounting measures and it measures the 
likelihood of financial constraint. The higher the KZ index, the less cash flow, the higher 
leverage and lower dividend distribution and therefore the more constrained the firm is. 
(3) Dividend payout, which is calculated as the ratio of total dividends distributions to 
operating income. Fazzari et al. (1988) finds that firms with financial constraints 
distribute significantly less dividends. 
Firm specific characteristics and dependent variables are trimmed at the 1 percent tails 
of the entire sample. Firms with negative total assets, book value and market value of 
equity are deleted from the sample. I also delete firms with less than 36 monthly 
observations. There are 4525 firms and 528 months in the sample. Table 1 presents the 
summary statistics. 
Macroeconomic variables include GDP, Industrial production (IP) index, the NBER 
recession dummy, the federal funds rate (FFR) and the CPI. Macroeconomic variables 
are obtained from websites of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Federal Reserve Board 
(Statistical Release H.15), the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, and the NBER.  
                                                 
17 Long term debt is measured by Compustat item #9 and short term debt is measured by Compustat item 
#5. 
18 Tobin’s Q, calculated as the market value of assets divided by book assets. Cash flow, dividends and 
cash holdings are all standardized by total capital 
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IV. Empirical Results 
IV.1. Does the Corporate Liquidity Factor Have a Risk Premium? 
Chapter 1 finds that firms with higher corporate liquidity have higher expected equity 
returns as well as market betas. One reasonable interpretation is that corporate liquidity 
contains some private information and can proxy for the underlying unobservable risks. 
In order to investigate the pricing implication of corporate liquidity, first we need to 
examine whether corporate liquidity as a factor entails positive risk premium.   
Table 1 summarizes the basic statistics for various company characteristics. Panel A 
shows the distribution of these variables. Panel B displays the average premium on Fama-
French risk factors as well as the corporate liquidity factor LMI (Liquid Minus Illiquid). 
LMI is a zero-investment portfolio that is long stocks with relatively highly liquid asset 
holding and short stocks with the least liquid asset holdings. It is constructed by taking 
the difference between the average returns of the top 30 percent liquid stocks and the 
bottom 30 percent illiquid stocks. It can be shown that the average value of LMI is 0.753 
percent per month (9.024 percent per year), with the t-value equal to 5.142, both 
statistically and economically significant.  
The corporate liquidity factor is further decomposed into two sub liquidity factors 
LMImed_low and LMIhigh_low, which stand for median minus low and high minus low 
respectively. LMI med_low t is a zero-investment portfolio that is long stocks with medium 
level liquid asset and short stocks with the least liquid asset holdings. It is constructed by 
taking the difference between the average returns of the medium 40 percentile liquidity 
level stocks and the bottom 30 percentile illiquid stocks. LMI high_med t is a zero-investment 
portfolio that is long stocks with the highest corporate liquidity and short stocks with 
medium liquid asset holdings. It is constructed by taking the difference between the 
average returns of the top 30 percentile liquid stocks and the medium 40 percentile 
liquidity stocks. These two sub liquidity factors are constructed in order to examine 
whether the importance of corporate liquidity factor varies with the degree of corporate 
liquidity itself. In another word, we would like to find out whether corporate liquidity 
effect is stronger for higher cash holding firms or lower cash holding firms. LMI med_low t 
tries to capture the effect of liquidity constraints impose on the expected equity returns 
while LMI high_med t is designed to examine the impact of excess liquidity on the expected 
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equity returns. It turns out that the corporate liquidity premium is positive for both sub 
liquidity factors, but it seems that LMI high_med t requires a much higher premium than LMI 
med_low t. The monthly mean return is a highly significant 0.538 percent for LMI high_med t, 
while it is only 0.285 percent for LMI med_low t. 
 
 
IV.2. Does Corporate Liquidity Contain the Same Information As SMB and HML? 
We have observed strong evidence of the existence of positive corporate liquidity 
premium, which is greater for relatively more liquid firms than illiquid firms. If corporate 
liquidity contains information that represents investment opportunities over time, then the 
aggregate liquidity may serve as a factor and moves together with equity returns. Does 
corporate liquidity contain different information with the commonly accepted market, 
size and value factor? Panel C of Table 1 presents the Pearson’s correlation matrix 
between various factors. It can be shown that aggregate corporate liquidity factor is 
positively correlated to market factor and size factor, but strongly negatively correlated to 
the value factor. Fama and French (1996) suggest that financially distressed firms are 
more sensitive to the shocks to future earning streams. Fama and French (1995) and Liew 
and Vassalou (2000) find that distress risk has a stronger effect during recessions. In a 
word, value firms are riskier during a recession. On the other hand, illiquid firms are 
riskier in recessions since they have less financial slack as a cushion while sales may 
drop, cash flows are expected to be low and external financing becomes more difficult. 
This gives a negative correlation between HML and LMI, and is consistent with the issue 
that when a recession is anticipated illiquid firms will start hoarding more cash. 
In addition, In order to formally investigate whether the corporate liquidity factor 
shares some similar information with the well-known CAPM and Fama-French three risk 
factors or if it contains different information, we estimate the following time series 
regressions: 
 
  
                                                                                                       , 
where LMIt is the overall corporate liquidity factor. MKT, SMB and HML are the three 
Fama-French factors. In addition, we also run the time series regression for the two 
ttt MKTLMI εβα ++=
ttttt HMLhSMBsMKTLMI εβα ++++=
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decomposed sub corporate liquidity factors: LMImed_low and LMIhigh_med. Here we have 
three things to look at. First, if the coefficients on MKT SMB and HML are significant, 
then we can conclude that our corporate liquidity factor does share some information 
with the size and value factor, and that the corporate liquidity risk premium moves 
together with the common risk factors. Otherwise, LMI serves as a risk factor that is 
different from MKT, SMB and HML. Second, if the other three common factors have 
priced the corporate liquidity factor itself an excess return correctly, we should expect an 
insignificant intercept. Third, we can tell whether the LMI can serve as an additional 
source to explain the stock return variations by looking at the R-squared. If the R-squared 
is low, then return variation in LMI is not well explained by the above asset pricing 
models, and it may contain different information other than that in existing factors. 
Table 2 presents the regression results of the above models. Column 1 shows the 
results for the CAPM. The corporate liquidity factor has a significant market beta equal 
to 0.201, indicating that liquid firms have higher betas than illiquid firms. The intercept is 
statistically significant, meaning that the corporate liquidity factor is mispriced by the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model by 66.3 basis points monthly. The R-squared is only 7 
percent, which says that market factor can only explain a small portion of the information 
contained in the LMI.  
Column 2 uses the Fama-French three-factor model. The market factor loads positively 
on LMI. The size factor SMB has a significant positive loading 0.205 regressed on the 
overall corporate liquidity factor LMI. The value factor HML loads significantly but 
negatively, with a loading of -0.685, which means that liquid firms have lower HML 
betas. The overall corporate liquidity factor has a strong relationship with the size and 
value factors, indicating that the relative performance of liquid firms versus illiquid firms 
tends to move together with the size and value portfolios. The constant alpha is again 
highly significant, which means the corporate liquidity factor is still mispriced by the 
Fama-French three-factor model. The adjusted R-squared is 0.43, implying a substantial 
explanatory power of the regression. To some extent, corporate liquidity factor shares 
common information with size and value factor, however still more than half of the return 
variations in LMI cannot be accounted for.  
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As the dependent variable is changed to LMImed_low and LMIhigh_med respectively, we can 
see that the SMB loading becomes is reduced substantially for LMImed_low regression and 
remains about the same for LMIhigh_med. The loadings on HML are always negative. 
However, the magnitude of HML loading decreases when it is regressed on LMImed_low. 
Similarly to the size factor, the coefficient of the value factor in the LMIhigh_med regression 
is similar in magnitude than that in the LMI regression. Finally, the R-squared for the 
LMImed_low regression drops to only 0.30, while it remains roughly the same for the 
LMIhigh_med regression. These results suggest that corporate liquidity effect seems to 
concentrate in firms with more liquid assets; and the corporate liquidity factor seems to 
be more important and shares more common information with size and value factor for 
those firms with more corporate liquidity.  
 
IV.3. Multifactor Asset Pricing Models on 25 Size-BE/ME portfolios 
    To further explore the asset pricing implications of corporate liquidity, together with 
established factors such as market, size and BE/ME, I consider the multifactor asset 
pricing models, in particular, the Fama-French three-factor model, and test whether the 
fourth factor – a corporate liquidity factor – can replace the size or value factor, or help 
improve the overall performance. Following Fama and French (1993), I adopt a time-
series approach, in which asset-pricing tests consist of two parts. First, it needs to be 
shown that the four factors – market, size, value and corporate liquidity – capture the 
common variation in stock returns and are indeed risk factors. This can be established by 
looking at the slopes and R-squareds of the regression directly. Then, intercepts of the 
time-series stock return regressions need to be examined to test whether the risk factors 
explain the cross-section of average stock returns. The test assets for both Fama-French 
three-factor model and the multifactor asset pricing model with the additional corporate 
liquidity factor in this section are the 25 portfolios formed from the intersection of 
independent sorting of all the stocks into five size and five book-to-market equity 
portfolios.    
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IV.3.1 The Fama-French Three-Factor Model 
Fama-French three-factor model is performed first as a benchmark. In this time-series 
regression, portfolio excess returns are regressed on the three factors that are considered 
to be able to explain the common variation of stock returns. The model is as follows: 
tt
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tMKT  is the return on the market factor, which equals the stock market return minus the 
risk free rate. tSMB  proxies the size risk factor, which is calculated as the difference 
between the average returns on small- and big-stock portfolios with same book-to-market 
equity in the my sample. tHML  stands for the risk factor in returns related to book-to-
market equity; it is defined as the difference between the simple average returns of the 
top 30 percent BE/ME portfolios (high BE/ME) and the bottom 30 percent BE/ME 
portfolios (low BE/ME) with same size. The size factor is the zero-investment portfolio 
that longs small firms and shorts large firms while the book-to-market factor is the zero-
investment portfolio that longs high book-to-market stocks and shorts low book-to-
market stocks. Panel B of Table 1 shows that the average value of the market factor is 
0.448 percent per month, which is both statistically and economically significant. The 
size factor SMB produces an average monthly premium equal to 0.229 percent. The 
average value of HML is 0.464 percent, with a t-value equal to 2.896. The slopes b, s and 
h are the factor loadings which measure the impact of these factors on the portfolio 
returns. If the factors can capture common variation in stock returns and establish 
themselves as risk factors, then we should observe significant slopes from the time-series 
regression. The intercept, a, is the mis-pricing residual, or called alpha. If the above 
explanatory factors are good proxies for common risk factors or underlying state 
variables, according to the multifactor asset-pricing models of Merton (1973) and Ross 
(1976a), a simple test of whether and how well the average return premia for the risk 
factors can explain the cross sectional variation of average stock returns is to examine the 
significance of the intercepts in the time-series regression. We should observe intercepts 
that are insignificantly different from zero if the explanatory factors are sufficient to 
describe the cross-section of average stock returns. 
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Table 3a presents the results of the Fama-French three-factor model. The excess 
returns on the market portfolio capture a substantial amount of cross-sectional variation 
of stock returns. The market betas for stocks are all more than 9.10 standard errors from 0. 
SMB contributes significantly to explain stock returns variations over time. Consistent 
with Fama-French (1993), the coefficients of SMB are negatively related with size. In all 
the book-to-market quintiles except the highest BE/ME portfolio, the slope of SMB 
decreases as size increases. The slopes of HML, on the other hand, decline with the book-
to-market ratio. The loadings on HML do not seem to increase from lower- to higher-
book-to-market quintiles. Most of the slopes for the value factor are highly significant. 
However, it seems that the sensitivities of stock returns to the value factor are not as 
strong as to the size factor in this sample. The R-squareds are all above 0.68, suggesting 
the three-factor model does a good job in capturing the common variation in stock returns 
and therefore the three stock returns: MKT, SMB and HML are risk factors. 
The second test focuses on the intercepts of the time-series regressions. It is apparent 
that in Table 3a, all the 25 intercepts are not statistically distinguishable from 0 except for 
the two extreme portfolios: the one with the smallest size and highest book-to-market 
equity and the one with the largest size and the smallest book-to-market equity. Time 
series regression intercepts that are not significantly different from zero suggest that the 
set of premiums that are associated with the three risk factors is sufficient to absorb the 
time-series variation and explain the cross-section of average stock returns. The absolute 
value of alpha is from 0.01 percent to 0.72 percent per month, which is an annual 
abnormal return of 0.12 percent to 8.64 percent. The formal test on the hypothesis of joint 
zero intercepts is the F-statistic of Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989), which tests 
whether the intercepts from the time-series regression of the excess stock returns on the 
risk factor return premiums are jointly significantly different from zero. The F-statistic 
for GRS test is 2.95, greater than the critical value 1.53 at the 95 percent level. Contrary 
to the insignificant intercepts for the 25 portfolios individually, the null hypothesis that 
the intercepts are jointly insignificantly different from zero can be rejected with a p-value 
equal to 0.000.  
As a comparison, Table 3b presents the regression results of the excess returns on 
market factor and the corporate liquidity factor for the 25 size-BE/ME portfolios. The 
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loadings on the LMI are all positive and significant for 20 out of the 25 portfolios. 
Furthermore, it seems that LMI loadings are higher for big firms and value firms. The R-
squareds are decent with only two factors, which is especially true for big firms and 
value firms. For portfolios with the highest BE/ME ratio, the market factor and LMI 
captures at least 62 percent of the return variations.  
 
IV.3.2 The Four-Factor Model 
Since the intent of this study is to examine whether the firm’s liquidity helps explain 
the cross-section of stock returns and whether this liquidity can serve as a risk factor and 
be priced, a four-factor model is estimated in this section as follows: 
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The first three factors are the same as in the Fama-French three-factor model. The new 
factor, tLMI , stands for “Liquid Minus Illiquid”. If firms’ cash positions can actually 
capture common variation in stock returns, we should expect the factor loadings of LMI 
to be significant. If all the price information contained in HML is related to the firms’ 
liquidity position and LMI can replace the role of the value factor, we should be able to 
see the slopes of HML to lose significance. Finally, if the corporate liquidity factor 
contains different risk information than HML but helps explain the cross-sectional 
variation of stock returns, it can be expected that the R-squareds would be increased 
greatly and the intercepts should collapse more closely to zero. Panel C of Table 1 shows 
that the correlation between HML and LMI is -0.629, which is statistically significant. 
LMI is positively correlated with MKT and SMB. 
    The time-series regression results of the four-factor model are exhibited in Table 4. 
With the inclusion of the corporate liquidity factor LMI, market betas still as in Table 3a, 
barely change for most of the size-BE/ME portfolios. In general, the market factor still 
captures a great deal of the time-series variations of stock returns. The slopes of the size 
factor SMB increase a little bit for each of the 25 portfolios, and the t-statistics increase as 
well. When the liquidity factor LMI is included in the time-series regression, the role of 
the size factor is strengthened, although to a limited extent. The loadings of HML have 
been decreased for all the 25 portfolios, with a significant magnitude. For the 14 
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portfolios with smaller size and higher book-to-market equity, the slopes of HML are 
reduced by more than 50 percent with the inclusion of LMI.  
Table 4 shows that 23 out of the 25 portfolios have significant slopes for the corporate 
liquidity factor LMI. There is no clear monotonic pattern of how the LMI loadings vary 
across size and BE/ME sorted portfolios. Relatively speaking, it seems that the excess 
stock returns are more sensitive to the corporate liquidity factor for growth firms and 
large firms, which may distinguish small and value firms. R-squareds do not improve 
much when LMI is added in the regression. The corporate liquidity factor improves the 
performance by capturing additional time-series stock returns variations of all the 25 
portfolios.  
The intercepts actually move away from zero, with higher absolute values of the t-
statistic. Although for 22 of the portfolios, the intercepts are still statistically 
indistinguishable from zero, the larger magnitude of the intercepts shows that the four-
factor model does not very well explain the cross-sectional variations of the stock returns 
for the 25 portfolios. The average value of alphas is 0.30 percent per month, which is an 
annual 3.60 percent. The GRS test also rejects the null hypothesis that the intercepts are 
jointly zero with an F statistic equal to 3.02 and p-value of 0.000.  
 
IV.4. Multifactor Asset Pricing Models on 27 Size-BE/ME-Corporate Liquidity 
Portfolios 
The previous section performs the multifactor asset pricing models on Fama-French 25 
portfolios, formed by independently sorting all stocks by size and book-to-market equity. 
In order to obtain the maximum dispersion against all explanatory variables, I run the 
multifactor models on a different set of 27 size-BE/ME-corporate liquidity portfolios. To 
construct the 27 portfolios, I perform a three-way independent sort. All the stocks in my 
sample are sorted into three portfolios according to size. Then they are sorted in three 
book-to-market equity portfolios. Finally, they are sorted in three portfolios according to 
corporate liquidity. Twenty-seven equally weighted portfolios are formed from the 
intersection of the three independent sortings. Table 5 provides the summary statistics of 
the 27 portfolios. It can be shown that holding size and BE/ME constant, liquid firms 
have higher equity returns, lower leverage, higher cash flow volatility and higher market 
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beta on average. In addition, within each size-BE/ME group, liquid firms tend to be 
larger firms and value firms. 
 
IV.4.1 The Fama-French Three-Factor Model 
Table 6 shows that the three factors capture the time-series variation of returns of the 
27 test portfolios, further confirming that market, size and value factors are risk factors. 
The slopes of excess market returns are highly significant for all the 27 portfolios, with 
the lowest t-statistics 10.70. The loadings on SMB are significant for all the portfolios. 
For each of the corporate liquidity and book-to-market equity tertiles, it can be shown 
that the slopes of SMB decline monotonically from the smallest portfolios to the biggest 
portfolios. Slopes of SMB vary substantially across the 27 portfolios and seem to 
successfully capture the shared variation across stocks that are related to size. The slopes 
of HML are significant at a significance level of at least 90 percent for 26 out of the 27 
portfolios. The slopes of the HML factor are related to book-to-market equity as well. For 
almost all the corporate liquidity and size portfolios, the slope coefficients increase 
monotonically as the book-to-market equity increases. R-squareds for the 27 time-series 
regressions are all above 0.61.  
Table 6 also shows that the estimated intercepts are not distinguishable from zero for 
21 portfolios at a 0.95 significance level. Moreover, intercepts do not exhibit any pattern 
that is related to size and book-to-market equity, which supports the argument that the 
average premia for the three risk factors well explain the cross-section of the average 
excess stock returns. A formal GRS test is performed to test the null hypothesis that the 
time-series regression intercepts are jointly equal to zero. The GRS F statistic for the 
three-factor model is 1.43 and the p-value is 0.09. Hence we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis at a 0.95 significance level. By testing whether the intercepts are significantly 
different from zero, we are able to draw the conclusion that the three factor model is able 
to interpret the common variation of stock returns cross-sectionally. 
 
IV.4.2 The Four-Factor Model 
The four-factor model is estimated by performing a time-series regression of excess 
stock returns on the 27 size, book-to-market equity and corporate liquidity sorted 
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portfolios on the Fama-French three factors and the corporate liquidity factor. The 
regression results are presented in Table 7.   
According to Table 7, all the slopes of the market factor are highly significant, with the 
minimum t statistic equal to 10.66. The loadings on the market factor do not change 
much compared to the three-factor model, hence the inclusion of LMI does not weaken 
the explanatory power of MKT. In addition, the sensitivities of excess stock returns on 
SMB do seem to be higher in the four-factor model. Compared to MKT factor and SMB 
factor, changes in the loadings on HML are much more pronounced. Specifically, for 25 
of the 27 portfolios, the loadings on HML are reduced substantially when LMI is included 
in the regression. Relative to the regressions using the three factors, the four-factor model 
implies that excess stock returns are less sensitive to the value factor. The corporate 
liquidity factor may contain some information similar to the HML and hence decreases 
the loadings on the value factor. Both the slopes of the SMB factor and the HML factor 
remain to be related with size and book-to-market equity respectively. For all the 
corporate liquidity and book-to-market equity portfolios, slopes of SMB decline along 
with the increase in size. For all the corporate liquidity and size portfolios, slopes of HML 
increase with the book-to-market equity. Size and value factors in the four-factor models 
capture the cross-sectional variation of the stock returns that are associated with size and 
book-to-market.  
As expected, the slopes of the liquidity factor LMI are negative for almost all the 
illiquid portfolios but are all positive for the most liquid portfolios. LMI decreases the 
average returns on stocks of the firms holding less cash and increases the average returns 
on stocks of the firms holding more cash. For those firms that have a low level of liquid 
assets, being more illiquid is quite risky since these firms might not be able to service 
their debts, survive through the next economic downturn, or take advantage of new 
profitable investment opportunities. Therefore investors may require a higher rate of 
return in order to be compensated for bearing the financial distress risks of holding 
illiquid firms’ stocks. On the other hand, for those companies that already fall into the 
most liquid portfolios in terms of cash holdings, hoarding extra liquid assets might send 
negative signals to the market, indicating that the firms do not have adequate growth 
opportunities and use cash inefficiently. An alternative interpretation is that holding 
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excessive corporate liquidity may indicate that the firms have volatile cash flows as well 
as higher underlying risks, sending negative signals to the stock markets. Investors hence 
require higher returns on those already-liquid firms with even more liquid assets holdings. 
Although not all the slope coefficients in the illiquid and medium liquidity portfolios are 
significant, almost all the slopes in the liquid portfolios are highly significant, implying 
that the sensitivities of stock returns to the liquidity factor are the strongest for firms with 
a high level of liquid assets. 
Furthermore, the loadings of the LMI factor are related to the corporate liquidity. 
Within each size and book-to-market equity portfolio, the slopes of LMI increase from 
the most illiquid portfolios to the most liquid portfolios, in most of the cases, from 
negative to positive. This indicates that the LMI does a great job in capturing the common 
variations that cannot be explained by size and value factor in a cross-section of the 
stocks. Table 7 provides evidence for the existence of a corporate liquidity factor because 
liquid firms have stock returns move together over time while illiquid firm’s returns 
covary. R-squareds increase moderately for most of the portfolios, with the greatest 
improvement in the nine portfolios that are most liquid.  
Table 7 shows that most of the intercepts of the time-series regressions on the 27 
portfolios are not significantly different from zero. The intercepts do not show any 
obvious pattern across size, book-to-market and corporate liquidity portfolios. The 
insignificant and similar intercepts say that return premiums associated with the four 
factors are sufficient to absorb the time-series variation as well as the cross-sectional 
variation in the average excess stock returns of the 27 portfolios so that little is left 
unexplained in the intercepts. Formal GRS test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
intercepts are jointly insignificantly different from zero with an F statistic equal to 1.31 
and the p-value of 0.18, which is a much stronger result than what is derived in the three-
factor model. The average alpha is around 1.15 percent annually, which is an 
economically insignificant abnormal return. In short, the four-factor model seems to do a 
better job in explaining the 27 size-BE/ME-corporate liquidity portfolios than the three-
factor model.   
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IV.5. Asset Pricing Models on 10 Corporate Liquidity Portfolios 
    In order to further examine whether the corporate liquidity factor can explain the return 
differentials across firms with different cash holding levels, I sort the sample into 10 
portfolios based on the firm’s corporate liquidity, instead of size, book-to-market ratio 
and corporate liquidity. Then I run the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model as well 
as the four-factor model similar to the previous section for the 10 corporate liquidity 
portfolios and look at the difference of the alphas as well as factor loadings. 
The regression estimations are presented in Table 8. Panel A shows the results for the 
simple CAPM across the 10 corporate liquidity portfolios. The constants are insignificant 
for all the 10 groups. Furthermore, the market factor has a significant impact on these 
portfolios’ excess returns. The loadings on the market factor show a substantial variation 
across the 10 corporate liquidity portfolios. Particularly, the excess equity returns of 
liquid firms are more sensitive to the market factor than illiquid portfolios. GRS test 
provides an F value equal to 0.44 and a p-value of 0.93, and we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the intercepts of the 10 portfolios are statistically insignificantly different 
from zero. 
Panel B exhibits the regression results of the Fama-French three-factor model for the 
10 corporate liquidity portfolios. The alphas are not significantly different from zero 
except for the most illiquid firms and the 6th illiquid group. Market betas increase with 
the corporate liquidity. Size factor has the highest loading on the most liquid portfolio 
while the value factor has the highest loading on the most illiquid portfolio. GRS test fails 
to reject the null hypothesis. 
Panel C shows the results of the augmented Fama-French three-factor model plus the 
corporate liquidity factor LMI. It is interesting to see the loadings on LMI are negative for 
illiquid companies but positive for liquid companies. Furthermore, loadings on LMI 
increase along with the corporate liquidity, which is consistent with the regression results 
for the previous 27 size-value-corporate liquidity portfolios in the previous section. The 
four-factor regression on 10 corporate liquidity portfolios further confirms that there is a 
corporate liquidity factor that can explain the stock return variations across firms with 
different cash holding levels. The alphas are statistically insignificant across all the 
corporate liquidity portfolios, which indicates that the four factors have absorbed most of 
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the return variations.  F statistic from the GRS test is 0.56 with a p-value equal to 0.84, 
which indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and the four-factor model 
provides a good fit to interpret the return variations across the 10 corporate liquidity 
portfolios. 
 
IV.6. Multifactor Asset Pricing Models on 25 Subsequently Sorted Size- or BE/ME-
Corporate Liquidity Portfolios 
Finally, following Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2005), instead of independently 
sorting the firms into 27 size-BE/ME-corporate liquidity portfolios, I subsequently sort 
firms into 25 size-corporate liquidity and 25 BE/ME-corporate liquidity portfolios, and 
run the Fama-French three-factor model for the two different double sorted 25 portfolios 
respectively. By comparing the three-factor model alphas across the 25 portfolios, we can 
see whether illiquid stocks underperform liquid stocks, and whether size and value effects 
exist significantly across liquidity portfolios. The results are summarized by Table 9 
through 12. 
Table 9 shows the coefficients of three Fama-French factors for the 25 size-corporate 
liquidity sorted portfolios. Controlling for size, alphas are turning from negative to 
positive as firms become more liquid. On average, market betas are slightly higher for 
liquid firms than illiquid firms given their size. For each size group, the loadings on size 
factor increase steadily along with the cash holding; while the loadings on value factor 
turn from positive to negative. Within each size portfolio, the most liquid portfolio has 
the highest size loading but the most negative value loading. The R-squareds are 
satisfactory for all the 25 groups and suggest the three-factor model is good in 
interpreting the time series variation in stock returns for these portfolios. Table 10 
presents the results for the 25 BE/ME-corporate liquidity portfolios. The patterns of the 
loadings are similar to the 25 size-corporate liquidity portfolios. 
Table 11 and 12 exhibit the four-factor time series regression result for the 25 size-
corporate liquidity and BE/ME-corporate liquidity portfolio respectively. The alphas now 
become statistically insignificant after the additional LMI factor is included in the 
regression, which indicates that the four-factor model does a better job in explaining the 
equity returns on average, and the LMI factor absorbs the return variations that cannot be 
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explained by the Fama-French three factors. However, it remains a puzzle that this is less 
obvious in the regressions for the 27 size-BE/ME-corporate liquidity portfolios. In 
addition, the loadings on the three factors MKT, SMB and HML do not show any obvious 
pattern across the liquidity portfolios with the LMI included the regression. Furthermore, 
similar to the three-factor model, loadings on LMI change sign from negative to positive 
as corporate liquidity increases for all the size or BE/ME portfolios. Equity returns of 
liquid firms respond positively to the LMI factor while illiquid firms respond in the 
opposite way. This clear pattern of LMI loadings across corporate liquidity portfolios 
provides strong support for the existence of corporate liquidity factor. Finally, GRS tests 
for both models show that with a highly significant F statistic, the jointly zero intercepts 
null hypothesis cannot rejected. 
 
 
V. Corporate Liquidity and Macroeconomic Variables 
We have found that there exists an equity premium for firms with higher corporate 
liquidity. The previous multifactor asset pricing models results show that the constructed 
LMI factor actually captures the time series equity return variations across portfolios 
formed in different ways. Particularly, loadings on LMI are higher for firms with higher 
corporate liquidity, and therefore we conclude that there is a corporate liquidity factor. 
Since the corporate liquidity factor is a risk factor, it is tempting to ask whether it is 
systematic, and what kind of risk it may proxy for. 
 
V. 1. Is Corporate Liquidity Factor a Proxy for Systematic Risk?  
In order to further examine whether corporate liquidity is actually a risk factor, I explore 
the dynamics of corporate liquidity and whether it predicts changes in macroeconomic 
condition. According to Hypothesis 3, we should observe the LMI factor moving together 
with aggregate economic conditions over time if it can serve as a proxy for systematic 
risk. If corporate liquidity factor can proxy for the changes in future investment 
opportunity set, LMI should contain information to forecast future macroeconomic 
changes. Similar to Lamont, Polk and Saá-Requejo (2001) but with different 
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macroeconomic variables, the time series regression of corporate liquidity on changes in 
macroeconomic condition has been estimated as follows: 
 
                         
LMI is the aggregate corporate liquidity factor. Current and two future values of 
macroeconomic variables: ΔGDP, ΔIP, ΔCPI, ΔFFR and NBER recession dummy are 
used to proxy for future macroeconomic condition changes that can affect operation 
performance, investment opportunities and financial condition.  
Table 13 summarizes the regression results. It seems that the corporate liquidity factor 
is not very closely related to the changes in macroeconomics. The average return 
differential between firms with high and low cash holding level is not very sensitive to 
changes in economic condition or monetary policy.   
 
V.2. Are Liquid Firms’ Fundamentals More Cyclical? 
    Asset pricing literature suggests that possible sources of systematic risks come from 
the co-movement between equity returns and macroeconomic conditions.  In the long run, 
equity returns are determined by business fundamentals. It is tempting to investigate 
whether and how the relationship between firms’ performance and macroeconomic 
variables differentiates between liquid and illiquid firms.  If Hypothesis 4 is true based on 
precautionary saving motive, we can expect that the fundamental business activities of 
more liquid firms are more cyclical than those of illiquid firms. If this is the case, then we 
can identify the corporate liquidity as a possible source of systematic risk in the sense 
that real performance is associated with economic conditions differently for liquid and 
illiquid firms. I follow Campello and Chen (2005) to examine the corporate liquidity and 
business fundamental sensitivities to changes in aggregate economy. The model to be 
estimated is as follows: 
 
where Performance is measured by median growth rate of earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT, COMPUSTAT item 14 + item 18), sales (item 12) and investment (item 
128). MacroCondition includes (1) aggregate demand, proxied by GDP – gross domestic 
production; (2) aggregate production, proxied by IP – industrial production index; (3) a 
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dummy variable indicating recession period defined by NBER, and (4) federal funds rate 
(FFR), a proxy for monetary policy. Federal funds rate is included in the bivariate 
regression with GDP to control for the monetary policy adjustments that can coincide 
with macroeconomic changes. In addition, the recession dummy variable takes a value of 
-1 for the year under recession in order to conveniently compare its regression coefficient 
with other macroeconomic condition changes. The above series can be obtained from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and from the Federal Reserve (Statistical Release H.15).  
In every year all the firms are sorted according to their corporate liquidity position. 
Liquid firms are defined as those whose cash holdings fall into top 30 percentile, while 
illiquid firms are those with bottom 30 percentile cash holdings. The above time series 
regression is estimated for liquid and illiquid firms separately, and the coefficient on 
macroeconomic change variable δ is compared for the two groups. If liquidity signals 
higher risks, we would expect that |δliquid| > |δilliquid| since liquid firms are more cyclical.  
Table 14 shows the regression results for both liquid portfolio and illiquid portfolio. In 
total there are 24 regressions: 3 performance variables, 4 macroeconomic change variable 
combinations for 2 liquidity portfolios. The regression results show that contrary to 
Hypothesis 4, illiquid firms are actually more cyclical compared to liquid firms. The 
coefficients on GDP, IP and the recession dummy variable are more pronounced for the 
illiquid group. When economic growth is strong, firms with a relatively lower level of 
financial slack have stronger sales growth, EBIT growth and investment growth; while 
illiquid companies tend to suffer more from a slower economy as their sales decline, 
profits slide and investment expenses are cut.  
 
V.3. Corporate Liquidity Beta and Changes in Macroeconomic Condition 
    In Chapter 1, I test that whether corporate liquidity is positively correlated with firm 
beta. If we believe that beta is an appropriate measure for market risk, then liquid asset 
holdings signal a higher level of future risk for the firm if a liquid firm has higher beta. In 
this chapter, I study how the corporate liquidity beta responds to the macroeconomic risks, 
and whether the corporate liquidity beta behaves differently for liquid firms and illiquid 
firms. In order to examine this issue, I perform a two-step regression similar to Almeida, 
Campello and Weisbach (2004) and Campello (2003). In the first step, time series 
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regressions are estimated for liquidity beta on a rolling basis for the liquid and illiquid 
portfolio separately every month using the previous 36 months data points, in which 
portfolios’ excess returns are regressed on the factors LMI, MKT, SMB and HML. The 
coefficients on corporate liquidity factor LMI are collected and “stacked” into the vector 
θt, which is then regressed on changes in the various macroeconomic variables, including 
current and two lagged changes in GDP, and contemporaneous LogCPI, changes in the 
federal funds rate LogFFR and a time trend.         
 
 
If higher levels of cash holdings are related to higher stock returns due to higher risks, 
then θt is expected to be higher when aggregate economic conditions become less 
favorable, hence the coefficient on ΔGDP is expected to have a negative sign. On the 
contrary, if higher cash holdings lead to higher stock returns because of good investment 
opportunities, θt should be higher when there is a positive aggregate demand shock, 
which indicates a positive coefficient on ΔGDP.  
The above two-step regression is performed on the portfolios containing firms with top 
30 percentile and bottom 30 percentile cash holdings to compare the impact of macro-
changes on corporate liquidity beta between high and low corporate liquidity firms. If 
firms holding excessively low levels of cash are subject to more default risk, these firms 
should have positive and higher coefficients on macroeconomic factors compared to 
firms with higher cash holdings. 
A summary for the two-step regression results is presented in Table 15. In general, 
coefficients on GDP changes are negative for both liquid and illiquid portfolios. When 
macroeconomic condition becomes less favorable, this increases the corporate liquidity 
beta for firms with both high and low cash holdings. Furthermore, it seems that the 
corporate liquidity beta is more sensitive to the macroeconomic changes for liquid firms 
than illiquid firms. This observation strengthens the idea that companies pile up cash for 
precautionary purposes. If there is an economic downtown, those firms which are more 
sensitive to the less favorable economic conditions will increase the liquid asset 
percentage in total assets. Higher sensitivity to the macroeconomic changes indicates 
higher risks. Therefore, based on the two-step regression, firms with higher corporate 
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liquidity are riskier than less liquid firms. As a robustness check, rolling corporate 
liquidity betas are estimated using the previous 60 months’ data points in the first pass, 
and the empirical results in the second step remain similar. 
 
V.4. Do Financial Constraints Affect the Relationship Between Corporate Liquidity 
Betas and Changes in Macroeconomic Variables? 
The last issue to be addressed is whether the corporate liquidity beta of financially 
constrained firms behaves differently from that of financially unconstrained firms when 
macroeconomic condition changes. Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) present a 
model in which companies respond to potential financial constraints by hoarding more 
cash today. Furthermore, Lamont, Polk and Saá-Requejo (2001) find that stock returns of 
financially constrained firms tend to move together, which indicates that these firms are 
subject to common shocks. Campello and Chen (2005), Whited and Wu (2006) show that 
constrained firms earn higher returns and external finance constraints do indeed represent 
a risk factor that is priced in financial markets.  A reasonable extension of the above 
literature would be that if financially constrained firms are riskier, which is the reason for 
these firms to maintain a high level of liquidity, such firms will have higher expected 
stock returns. The macroeconomic sensitivity of corporate liquidity should be more 
pronounced for companies that are financially constrained.  
The sample is split into constrained and unconstrained firms based on the following 
criteria: firm size, payout ratio and a KZ index. Then the previous two-step combination 
of cross sectional and time series regressions is performed for the constrained group and 
unconstrained group separately. If cash holding is more valuable for constrained firms, 
then a positive economic shock increases the benefit of keeping cash for constrained 
firms and reduces the risk; on the other hand, an adverse macroeconomic condition can 
impose more hardship for financially constrained companies, whose corporate liquidity 
beta will be more responding to the negative shock. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect 
that the coefficients on ΔGDP are negative and more remarkable for constrained firms, if 
financial constraint is considered as a risk. 
Table 16 presents the results for constrained and unconstrained portfolios defined by 
three different criteria. A negative shock increases the corporate liquidity beta for both 
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the constrained and unconstrained firms. As we expected, the corporate liquidity beta of 
the constrained group responds to the GDP growth more pronouncedly compared to 
unconstrained group. For firms with difficulty in accessing external financial markets, 
their corporate liquidity beta is more sensitive to fluctuations in macroeconomic 
conditions and is greater in absolute value than firms who are not financially constrained. 
The empirical results provides evidence to support the view that firms hoard cash and 
liquid assets because they are financially constrained and therefore more exposed to 
macroeconomic risks.  
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether aggregate corporate liquidity can be a systematic risk 
factor that is priced in an asset pricing model. Asset-pricing tests are performed to 
examine whether the corporate liquidity factor is a risk factor and whether it is systematic 
and priced. Empirical results have confirmed that although the three popular factors MKT, 
SMB and HML share some information contained in the corporate liquidity factor, LMI 
can still serve as an independent factor and is priced.  
By comparing the results from Fama-French three-factor model and the four-factor 
model on 27 portfolios formed by independently sorting stocks by size, book-to-market 
equity and corporate liquidity, it can be shown that the loadings of the SMB and HML 
factors change when the additional liquidity factor is included in the time-series 
regression. In particular, the explanatory power of SMB strengthens while the loadings of 
HML weaken substantially for the most liquid portfolios.  
The empirical results show that LMI certainly captures the time-series variation of the 
excess stock returns. The loadings of LMI turn negative to positive from most illiquid 
portfolios to the most liquid portfolios, with all the slopes for the liquid portfolios highly 
significant. The different signs of LMI loadings indicate that the corporate liquidity factor 
loads on illiquid firms and liquid firms in an opposite way. LMI lowers the average 
expected returns on illiquid firms while increasing the average returns on more liquid 
firms. The Gibbons-Ross-Shanken test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the time-
series regression intercepts are jointly insignificantly different from zero and the four-
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factor model actually well explains the common variations in a cross-section of excess 
stock returns.  
In addition, CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model and the four-factor model are 
estimated for the 10 portfolios constructed based on the corporate liquidity. The results 
show that liquid portfolios have higher market betas than illiquid ones, and loadings on 
LMI increase along with the corporate liquidity. Compared to CAPM and Fama-French 
three-factor model, the four-factor regression better explains the stock return variations 
across firms with different cash holding levels.      
Furthermore, multifactor regressions are performed for the 25 subsequently sorted size 
– corporate liquidity and BE/ME-corporate liquidity portfolios. The empirical results 
strongly suggest the existence of corporate liquidity effect.    
    More empirical estimations are completed to examine whether the corporate liquidity 
factor is systematic and what kind of risk it may proxy for. I have not found clear 
evidence that the LMI factor co-moves with the macroeconomic variables. It seems that 
he average return differential between firms with high and low level of cash holding is 
not sensitive to changes in economic condition or monetary policy. Furthermore, when 
looking at the relationship between companies’ performance and macroeconomic 
conditions, the regression results show illiquid firms are actually more cyclical than 
liquid firms. The coefficients on GDP, IP and the Recession dummy variable are more 
pronounced for the illiquid group. When economic growth gets stronger, illiquid firms 
tend to experience stronger sales growth, EBIT growth and investment growth; while 
these illiquid companies tend to suffer more from a slower economy as their sales decline, 
profits slide and investment expenses are cut.  
Moreover, I also find that negative changes in macroeconomic conditions will increase 
the corporate liquidity beta, and it seems that the corporate liquidity beta is more 
sensitive to the macroeconomic fluctuations for liquid firms than illiquid firms. These 
results support the idea that companies hoard cash and cash equivalents for precautionary 
purposes. If there is an economic recession, those firms who are more sensitive to the less 
favorable economic condition will increase the liquid asset holding. Firms with higher 
corporate liquidity are riskier than less liquid firms because their higher sensitivity to the 
macroeconomic changes signals higher risks. Finally, I examine whether the corporate 
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liquidity beta of financially constrained firms and unconstrained firms responds 
differently to a change in macroeconomic conditions. There is some evidence showing 
that the corporate liquidity beta of financially constrained companies is more sensitive to 
the  macroeconomic changes and is greater in absolute value than for firms who are not 
financially constrained. The empirical results offer evidence to support the view that 
firms increase asset liquidity because they are financially constrained and therefore more 
exposed to macroeconomic risks.  
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APPENDIX of Chapter 2 
 
This appendix examines the multifactor models with decomposed corporate liquidity 
factors. In addition, I also investigate whether corporate liquidity can forecast future 
equity returns.  
In Part 4 of Section IV, we have presented a four-factor asset pricing models on 27 
Size-BE/ME-Corporate liquidity portfolios. From the four-factor model it can be shown 
that expected stock returns are sensitive to the liquidity factor. Specifically, illiquid firms 
load negatively while liquid firms load positively on the LMI factor. In order to further 
explore whether the effect the corporate liquidity factor on expected equity returns varies 
along the corporate liquidity spectrum, I split the overall LMI factor into two factors to 
capture the risks associated with liquidity constraint and excess liquidity. These two sub 
liquidity factors are constructed in order to examine whether the importance of corporate 
liquidity factor varies with the degree of corporate liquidity itself. In another word, we 
would like to find out whether corporate liquidity effect is stronger for more high cash 
holding firms or low cash holding firms. 
 
A.1. The Four-Factor Model with Decomposed Corporate Liquidity Factors  
The overall corporate liquidity factor is decomposed into 2 sub-liquidity factors 
LMImed_low t and LMIhigh_med t, where LMImed_low t stands for “Medium Minus Low” and 
LMIhigh_med t stands for “High Minus Medium”. LMI med_low t is a zero-investment portfolio 
that is long stocks with medium level liquid asset and short stocks with the least liquid 
asset holdings. It is constructed by taking the difference between the average returns of 
the medium 40 percentile liquidity level stocks and the bottom 30 percentile illiquid 
stocks. LMI high_med t is a zero-investment portfolio that is long stocks with the highest 
corporate liquidity and short stocks with the medium liquid asset holdings. It is 
constructed by taking the return differential between the top 30 percentile liquid stocks 
and the medium 40 percentile liquidity stocks. LMI med_low t aims to capture the effect of 
liquidity constraints imposed on the expected equity returns while LMI high_med t is 
designed to examine the impact of excess liquidity on the expected equity returns. 
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The four-factor models with the 2 decomposed liquidity factors respectively estimated in 
this section are as follows:  
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    Table A1 and Table A2 exhibit the results of the four-factor model with corporate 
liquidity factor separated into two parts. The loadings on both the liquidity constraint 
factor and the excess liquidity factor behave quite differently across liquidity portfolios, 
which is consistent with the four-factor model using overall corporate liquidity factor as 
the fourth factor. It can be shown in Table A1 that the loadings on LMI med_low t are 
negative and highly significant for the most illiquid portfolios, while insignificant for 
medium liquid and liquid portfolios. This indicates that firms with low level of liquid 
assets holdings are more sensitive to the liquidity constraint factor while firms with 
higher corporate liquidity do not. For firms with lower level of liquid assets, holding less 
cash will increase the required returns of their equity substantially, because of the higher 
probability of financial distress. GRS test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the 
intercepts of the 27 portfolios are jointly insignificantly different from zero.  
Table A2 shows that the slopes on LMI high_med t are strongly significant and positive for 
almost all the liquid portfolios, which is consistent with the four-factor regression with 
overall corporate liquidity factor LMI. For those firms that hold a high proportion of cash, 
increasing corporate liquidity will raise the required returns as investors may believe that 
those firms may keep a high level of financial slack for the precautionary purpose 
because of volatile cash flows or underlying operational risks, which sends a signal to the 
market that these firms are really risky. If investors realize this they will require a higher 
rate of return in order to hold these firms’ equity. An alternative interpretation would be 
that current stock prices are pushed down because investors think liquid firms lack 
investment opportunities and hoard cash inefficiently, leading to high required returns. 
Most of the slopes of the excess liquidity factor on the illiquid and medium liquidity 
portfolios are, however, not significant and have mixed signs. Firms keeping a low or 
moderate proportion of cash are not sensitive to the excess liquidity factor. F statistic of 
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the GRS test is 1.43 with a p-value equal to 0.09, so that the null hypothesis can be 
rejected at the 10 percent significance level while cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level. 
 
A.2. The Five-Factor Model with Decomposed Corporate Liquidity Factors  
Next, a five-factor model is estimated to incorporate both liquidity constraint factor 
and excess liquidity factor.  
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Table A3 shows that the loadings on LMI med_low t and LMI high_med t are quite consistent 
with those estimated in the separate four-factor models. Particularly, the slopes of the 
factor LMI med_low t are significantly negative for the most illiquid portfolios while 
insignificant for medium and liquid portfolios. Furthermore, LMI high_med t loads positively 
and significantly for the most liquid portfolios while insignificantly for these illiquid and 
medium liquid portfolios. Again, the five-factor model confirms that illiquid firms are 
sensitive to the liquidity constraint factor, and lower corporate liquidity is associated with 
higher expected equity returns; while liquid firms are sensitive to the excess liquidity 
factor, and higher corporate liquidity leads to higher expected returns for these stocks. 
GRS test result is similar to the four factor model with LMI high_med t, and the intercepts of 
the 27 portfolios are significantly different from zero at a 10 percent level while 
insignificantly different from zero at a 5 percent level.  
To summarize, it seems that the impact of corporate liquidity factor on cross-sectional 
equity returns is different for firms with various corporate liquidity levels. LMI med_low 
better explains return variations for firms falling into the medium-to-low corporate 
liquidity cohort, while LMI high_med better interprets return variations for firms with the 
high-to-medium liquidity level. Furthermore, according to the GRS test, the explanatory 
power of the multifactor model with the LMImed_low factor is stronger compared to the 
model with LMIhigh_med factor. 
 
 
B. Future Equity Return Forecast Using Corporate Liquidity      
    Greenwood (2004) studies the relationship between investment in cash and liquid 
assets as a share of total investment, and subsequent market returns. He finds that 
changes in aggregate cash have significant incremental predictive power. In aggregate 
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level, increases in cash frequently predict negative equity returns while these changes are 
not correlated with planned investment expenditures and cannot be explained by current 
or lagged changes in profitability. Greenwood concludes that the empirical evidence 
supports the active market timing theory, in which cash accumulation is a consequence of 
additional equity issued by overvalued firms who cannot spend funds productively and do 
not return cash to investors. 
    Greenwood (2004) uses the data from Federal Reserve Flow of Funds to construct a 
measure of aggregate corporate investment in cash and financial securities; and uses OLS 
regressions to study the predictive power of aggregate cash. In stead, I adopt the portfolio 
construction approach to examine this issue. 
In order to investigate whether corporate liquidity can forecast future equity returns, I 
construct 9 zero-investment size-BE/ME portfolios that are long liquid stocks and short 
illiquid stocks and calculate the returns for a subsequent 6-month holding period. 
Specifically, in each June and December, the entire sample is sorted into 9 size-BE/ME 
portfolios. Within each portfolio, all the stocks are further sorted into 2 portfolios: liquid 
portfolio, which includes firms whose corporate liquidity is ranked in the top 30 
percentile, and illiquid portfolio, which includes firms whose corporate liquidity is 
ranked in the bottom 30 percentile. The 9 zero-investment portfolios are constructed as 
long the relatively liquid firms and short the relatively illiquid firms. Cumulative 
portfolio returns are calculated as the equal-weighted average of cumulative individual 
stock returns. Finally, geometric averages of cumulative portfolio returns for the 6 
months following the month when the portfolios are formed (excluding the immediate 
subsequent month) are calculated. To separate the effect of liquidity constraint and excess 
liquidity, the 9 zero-investment size-BE/ME portfolios are alternatively formed as long 
the medium level liquidity firms (40-70 percentiles) and short the illiquid firms, and long 
the liquid firms and short the medium level liquidity firms.  
Table B displays the results of the forecast ability of corporate liquidity. Panel A 
shows that the trading strategy that longs top 30 percentile liquid firms and shorts bottom 
30 percentile illiquid firms brings a positive monthly return of about 1.45 percent for 
small-growth firms. This is not only statistically but also economically significant. Small 
firms and growth firms earn positive returns but the returns are not significant. Panel B 
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shows that if investors hold the zero-investment portfolios that long medium liquid firms 
and short illiquid firms for 6 months, they can earn significantly positive returns on 
average for small-growth portfolios and small-value portfolios. All the 9 portfolios bring 
positive monthly returns if they are held for 6 months, though most are not significant. 
Panel C displays the average monthly returns for the 9 portfolios that long liquid firms 
and short medium liquid firms. Medium size-growth firms and large-growth firms have 
negative monthly returns, implying that firms with high levels of liquid assets 
underperform firms with medium levels of liquid assets during a 6-month subsequent 
period. We can conclude that medium liquid firms do very well on average. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 102 
REFERNCES 
 
Acharya, Viral, and Lasse H. Pedersen, 2005, Asset Pricing with Liquidity Risk, Journal 
of Financial Economics 77, 375-410. 
 
Almeida, Heitor, Murillo Campello, and Michael S. Weisbach, 2002, Corporate Demand 
for   Liquidity, NBER working paper No. W9253. 
 
Almeida, Heitor, Murillo Campello, and Michael S. Weisbach, 2004, The Cash Flow 
Sensitivity of Cash, Journal of Finance 59, 1777–1804. 
 
Banz, Rolf W., 1981, The Relationship Between Return and Market Value of Common 
Stocks, Journal of Financial Economics 9, 3–18. 
 
Baskin, Jonathan B., 1987, Corporate Liquidity in Games of Monopoly Power, Review of 
Economics and Statistics 69, 312–319. 
 
Basu, Sanjoy, 1977, Investment Performance of Common Stocks in Relation to Their 
Price-Earnings Ratios: A Test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, Journal of Finance 
32, 663–682. 
 
Basu, Sanjoy, 1983, The Relationship Between Earnings’ Yield, Market Value and 
Return For NYSE Common Stocks, Journal of Financial Economics 9, 129–156. 
 
Bhandari, Laxmi Chand, 1988, Debt/Equity Ratio and Expected Common Stock Returns: 
Empirical Evidence, Journal of Finance 43, 507–528. 
 
Brennan, Michael J., and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, 1996, Market Microstructure and 
Asset Pricing: On the Compensation for Illiquidity in Stock Returns, Journal of 
Financial Economics 41, 441–464. 
 
Campbell, John Y., Jens Hilscher, and Jan Szilagyi, 2005, In Search of Distress Risk, 
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2081, Harvard 
University. 
 
Campello, Murillo, 2003, Capital Structure and Product Markets Interactions: Evidence 
from Business Cycles, Journal of Financial Economics 68: 353–378. 
 
Campello, Murillo, and Long Chen, 2005, Are Financial Constraints Priced? Evidence 
from Firm Fundamentals, Stocks, and Bonds, AFA 2006 Boston Meeting. 
 
Chordia, Tarun, Richard Roll, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, 2000, Commonality in 
Liquidity, Journal of Financial Economics 56, 3–28. 
 
Cohen, Randolph B., Christopher Polk, and Tuomo Vuolteenaho, 2003, The Value 
Spread, Journal of Finance 58, 609–641. 
 103 
 
Constantinides, George M., 1989, Theory of Valuation: Overview and Recent 
Developments, in S. Bhattacharya and George M. Constantinides (eds.) Theory of 
Valuation: Frontiers of Modern Financial Theory, Volume 1, Totowa, N.J. Rowman 
and Littlefield. 
 
Damodaran, Aswath, 2005, Dealing with Cash, Cross Holdings and Other Non-Operating 
Asset: Approaches and Implications, working paper. 
 
Easley, David, Soeren Hvidkjaer, and Maureen O’Hara, 2002, Is Information a 
determinant of asset returns? Journal of Finance 57, 2185–2221. 
 
Easley, David, Nicholas. M. Kiefer, and Maureen O’Hara, 1997, One Day in the life of a 
very Common Stock, Review of Financial Studies 10, 805–835. 
 
Easley, David, and Maureen O’Hara, 2003, Microstructure and Asset Pricing, Handbook 
of the Economics of Finance, Edited by G.M. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R. Stulz. 
 
Easley, David, and Maureen O’Hara, 2004, Information and the Cost of Capital, Journal 
of Finance 59, 1553–1583. 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1992, The Cross-section of Expected Stock 
Returns. Journal of Finance 47, 427–465. 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1993, Common Risk Factors in the Returns on 
Stocks and Bonds. Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3–56. 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1995, Size and Book-to-Market Factors in 
Earnings and Returns, Journal of Finance 50, 131–155. 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1996, Multifactor Explanations of Asset 
Pricing Anomalies, Journal of Finance 51, 55–84. 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and James MacBeth, 1973, Risk, Return and Equilibrium: Empirical 
Tests, Journal of Political Economy 81, 607–636. 
 
Faulkender, Michael, and Rong Wang, 2006, Corporate Financial Policy and the Value of 
Cash, Journal of Finance 61, 1957–1990. 
 
Gibbons, Michael R., Stephen Ross and Jay Shanken, 1989, A Test of the Efficiency of a 
Given Portfolio, Econometrica 57, 1121–1152. 
 
Greenwood, Robin, 2004, Aggregate Corporate Liquidity and Stock Returns, Harvard 
Business School Working Paper, No. 05-014  
 
 104 
Grossman, Sanford J., and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1980, On the Impossibility of 
Informationally Efficient Markets, American Economic Review 70, 393–408. 
 
Holmström, Bengt, and Jean Tirole, 2001, LAPM: A Liquidity-Based Asset Pricing 
Model, Journal of Finance 56, 1837–1867. 
 
Kaplan, Steven N., and Luigi Zingales, 1997, Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities 
Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints? Quarterly Journal of Economics 
112, 169–215. 
 
Lamont, Owen, Christopher Polk and Jesús Saá-Requejo, 2001, Financial Constraints and 
Stock Returns, The Review of Financial Studies 14, 529–554. 
 
Liew, Jimmy, and Maria Vassalou, 2000, Can Book-to-Market, Size, and Momentum be 
Risk Factors that Predict Economic Growth? Journal of Financial Economics 57, 
221–245. 
 
Merton, Robert C., 1973, An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model, Econometrica 
41, 867–887. 
 
Merton, Robert C., 1990, Continuous-Time Finance. Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Mikkelson, Wayne H., and M. Megan Partch, 2003, Do Persistent Large Cash Reserve 
Hinder Performance? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 275–294. 
 
Opler, Tim, Lee Pinkowitz, Rene Stulz, and Rohan Williamson, 1999, The Determinants 
and Implications of Corporate Cash Holdings, Journal of Financial Economics 52, 3–
46. 
 
Pástor, Luboš, and Stambaugh, Robert F., 2003, Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock 
Returns, Journal of Political Economy 111, 642–685. 
 
Pinkowitz, Lee, and Rohan Williamson, 2004, What is a Dollar Worth? The Market 
Value of Cash Holdings, working paper, Georgetown University. 
 
Ross, Stephen A., 1976a, The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing, Journal of 
Economic Theory 13, 341–360. 
 
Ross, Stephen A., 1976b, Risk, Return, and Arbitrage, In Risk and Return in Finance, 
Edited by Irwin Friend and James Bicksler, 189-218. Cambridge, MA.: Ballinger. 
 
Sibilkov, Valeriy, 2005, Is Cash More Valuable for Constrained Firms? working paper, 
Purdue University. 
 
Stoll, Hans R., and Robert E. Whaley, 1983, Transaction Costs and the Small Firm Effect, 
Journal of Financial Economics 12, 57–79. 
 105 
 
Vassalou, Maria, and Yuhang Xing, 2004, Default Risk in Equity Returns, Journal of 
Finance 59, 831–868. 
 106 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for the 1962.1 – 2005.12 Sample 
 
Stocks are sorted into 10 portfolios on the basis of return, size, BE/ME, corporate liquidity (CL), leverage, CL deviation and Leverage deviation. Sample 
mean and standard deviation, and average of each quintile are displayed in Panel A. SIZE denotes the market value of the stocks, measured in June of 
each year. BE/ME denotes the book-to-market equity. CL is the corporate liquidity, measured as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets. 
Leverage is debt-to-asset ratio. In order to remove the effect of industry differentials, CL deviation and Leverage deviation denote the deviation of firms’ 
cash holdings and financial leverage compared to the industry average based on the Fama-French 17 industries. Panel B shows the mean and t statistics 
for the factors. MKT, SMB and HML are Fama-French three factors. LMI denotes “Liquid minus illiquid”, which is a factor constructed by taking the 
difference between the average returns of the top 30 percent liquid stocks and the bottom 30 percent illiquid stocks. LMImed_low denotes “medium minus 
low”, which is a factor  constructed by taking the difference between the average returns of the medium 40 percentile liquidity level stocks and the 
bottom 30 percentile illiquid stocks. LMIhigh_med denotes “high minus medium”, which is a factor constructed by taking the difference between the 
average returns of the top 30 percentile liquid stocks and the medium 40 percentile liquidity level stocks. Panel C presents the Pearson correlation matrix 
of the factors, p-values are in parenthesis. 
 
Panel A. 
Variable Mean 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th Std. Dev. 
Mret 1.432 -27.465 -13.794 -8.153 -4.353 -1.180 1.389 4.729 8.940 15.672 38.537 18.223 
SIZE 1123.1 5.2 13.9 26.9 47.2 81.1 144.2 268.3 535.6 1279.4 8829.1 3914.2 
BE/ME 1.835 0.081 0.186 0.279 0.374 0.482 0.613 0.779 1.012 1.451 13.091 8.596 
CL 0.183 0.004 0.012 0.024 0.042 0.071 0.113 0.173 0.266 0.415 0.711 0.220 
Leverage 0.177 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.048 0.098 0.156 0.216 0.285 0.375 0.577 0.185 
CL deviation 0.000 -0.245 -0.170 -0.122 -0.090 -0.068 -0.041 0.006 0.079 0.202 0.446 0.195 
Leverage 
Deviation 0.000 -0.205 -0.162 -0.145 -0.116 -0.074 -0.022 0.034 0.100 0.188 0.401 0.185 
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Table 1. (continued) 
 
Panel B.  Panel C.       
Variable Mean t-stat   MKT SMB HML LMI LMI med_low LMI high_med 
MKT 0.448 4.448  MKT 1 0.302 -0.410 0.266 0.242 0.252 
SMB 0.229 3.206   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HML 0.464 2.896  SMB  1 -0.277 0.348 0.249 0.374 
LMI 0.753 3.365    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LMI med_low 0.285 1.307  HML   1 -0.629 -0.537 -0.613 
LMI high_med 0.538 2.723     (0.000) (0.506) (0.000) (0.000) 
    LMI    1 0.875 0.951 
        (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    LMI med_low     1 0.689 
         (0.000) (0.000) 
    LMI high_med      1 
          (0.000) 
 
 
Table 2. Pricing Tests on the Corporate Liquidity Factor 
This table reports results from regressions of corporate liquidity factors (LMI, LMImed_low, LMIhigh_med) on Fama-French 3 risk factors (MKT, SMB and HML). t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1962 to December 2005, 528 months. t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LMI LMI LMI med_low LMI high_med 
Intercept 0.663 0.636 0.381 0.756 
 (4.668) *** (9.047) *** (7.720) *** (8.118) *** 
MKT 0.201 0.126 0.131 0.142 
 (6.335) *** (1.936) * (1.842) * (1.998) ** 
SMB - 0.205 0.044 0.197 
 - (5.545) *** (2.770) *** (6.559) *** 
HML - -0.685 -0.229 -0.537 
 - (-16.049) *** (-12.437) *** (-15.449) *** 
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.430 0.299 0.424 
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Table 3a. The Fama-French Three-Factor Model on 25 Size-BE/ME Portfolios 
Time series regressions of excess stock returns on the excess market returns (MKT) and the returns on size (SMB) and 
book-to-market equity (HML) factors: July 1963 to December 2005, 510 months. 
tt
i
t
i
t
ii
t
i
t eHMLhSMBsMKTbaRFR ++++=−  
Dependent variable: Excess returns on 25 stock portfolios formed on size and book-to-market equity 
Book-to-market equity (BE/ME) quintiles Size 
quintiles Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
    a         t(a)     
Small 0.30 -0.22 -0.06 0.28 0.72 0.81 -0.73 -0.24 1.02 3.67
2 0.39 0.01 0.12 0.32 0.33 1.30 0.01 0.44 1.49 1.57
3 0.32 0.13 0.21 0.23 0.22 1.12 0.55 0.85 0.85 0.97
4 0.38 -0.09 0.15 0.20 0.31 1.49 -0.33 0.47 0.74 1.13
Big 0.65 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.29 3.06 0.27 0.42 0.37 0.92
            
    b         t(b)     
Small 1.16 1.29 1.22 1.09 0.98 9.10 14.60 15.86 21.30 25.53
2 1.15 1.15 1.13 1.10 1.03 11.81 17.77 17.75 27.38 33.42
3 0.91 1.05 1.08 1.07 1.06 11.20 17.98 28.64 28.07 32.99
4 0.93 1.04 1.08 1.09 1.10 13.58 23.07 29.90 32.14 30.25
Big 0.97 0.96 1.08 1.10 1.12 19.35 22.68 28.49 25.67 28.57
            
    s         t(s)     
Small 1.78 1.31 1.05 0.74 0.21 10.60 11.34 10.44 10.99 4.06
2 1.26 1.12 0.94 0.68 0.07 9.80 13.16 11.23 12.84 1.68
3 1.21 1.01 0.75 0.55 0.21 11.40 13.07 15.04 10.89 4.97
4 1.30 0.95 0.82 0.56 0.13 14.32 16.03 17.26 12.55 2.72
Big 1.22 0.95 0.88 0.60 0.20 18.52 17.06 17.53 10.53 3.96
            
    h         t(h)     
Small 1.13 0.62 0.51 -0.03 -0.03 5.82 4.64 4.37 -0.37 -0.54
2 0.59 0.41 0.39 0.29 0.28 3.97 4.18 4.04 4.69 5.85
3 0.67 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.48 5.40 5.37 8.24 7.89 9.87
4 0.82 0.75 0.74 0.59 0.53 7.85 10.88 13.46 11.41 9.63
Big 0.82 0.70 0.78 0.76 0.59 10.81 10.90 13.55 11.68 9.94
            
    R2         s(e)     
Small 0.77 0.87 0.84 0.81 0.84  11.39 8.21 6.65 4.65 3.47
2 0.81 0.84 0.79 0.74 0.78  8.66 5.85 5.34 3.64 2.44
3 0.82 0.81 0.73 0.72 0.71  7.45 5.34 3.45 3.34 2.67
4 0.83 0.81 0.68 0.69 0.72  6.54 4.02 3.98 3.12 3.67
Big 0.85 0.74 0.72 0.68 0.73  4.67 3.98 3.45 3.99 3.56
 
GRS test:  F value = 2.95, p-value = 0.00 
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Table 3b. The Market Factor + Corporate Liquidity Factor  
on 25 Size-BE/ME Portfolios 
Time series regressions of excess stock returns on the excess market returns (MKT) and the returns on corporate liquidity 
(LMI) factors: July 1963 to December 2005, 510 months. 
tt
i
t
ii
t
i
t eLMIcMKTbaRFR +++=−  
Dependent variable: Excess returns on 25 stock portfolios formed on size and book-to-market equity 
Book-to-market equity (BE/ME) quintiles Size 
quintiles Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
    a         t(a)     
Small -0.50 1.42 2.02 1.82 1.46 -0.86 3.54 5.99 7.90 9.24
2 1.02 1.49 2.08 1.49 1.06 2.36 4.95 7.26 7.99 8.66
3 0.88 1.03 0.85 0.84 0.66 2.38 3.76 4.65 4.93 5.08
4 -0.29 0.42 0.49 0.20 0.14 -0.86 1.85 2.60 1.25 0.97
Big -1.51 -0.72 -0.29 -0.15 -0.04 -5.67 -3.32 -1.43 -0.78 -0.25
            
    b         t(b)     
Small 1.26 1.44 1.39 1.26 1.06 9.62 15.82 18.10 24.02 29.38
2 1.29 1.30 1.26 1.19 1.03 13.12 18.89 19.35 27.97 37.06
3 1.04 1.18 1.16 1.13 1.06 12.37 18.88 27.90 29.08 35.46
4 1.05 1.12 1.13 1.13 1.07 13.88 21.68 26.20 31.64 31.48
Big 1.06 1.05 1.14 1.11 1.09 17.53 21.22 24.95 24.83 29.25
            
    c         t(c)     
Small 0.08 0.17 0.42 0.02 0.10 0.49 1.41 4.12 0.33 2.19
2 0.11 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.29 0.81 12.75 2.04 1.77 7.87
3 0.22 1.12 0.24 0.30 0.40 1.99 2.06 4.43 5.93 10.11
4 0.28 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.40 2.78 5.20 5.94 8.08 9.02
Big 0.26 0.34 0.36 0.42 0.41 3.24 5.20 6.00 7.11 8.35
            
    R2         s(e)     
Small 0.16 0.33 0.38 0.54 0.63  12.91 8.96 7.57 5.18 3.54
2 0.26 0.42 0.42 0.61 0.72  9.66 6.77 6.42 4.18 2.74
3 0.23 0.41 0.60 0.62 0.71  8.26 6.15 4.10 3.83 2.93
4 0.27 0.47 0.57 0.66 0.65  7.46 5.10 4.24 3.52 3.34
Big 0.37 0.46 0.54 0.54 0.62  5.97 4.85 4.48 4.41 3.66
 
   GRS test: F statistic = 13.858, p value < 0.0001 
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Table 4. The Fama-French Three-Factor + Corporate Liquidity Factor 
on 25 Size-BE/ME Portfolios 
 
Time series regressions of excess stock returns on the excess market returns (MKT), the returns on size (SMB), book-to-
market equity (HML) and the corporate liquidity (LMI) factors: July 1963 to December 2005, 510 months. 
tt
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t eLMIcHMLhSMBsMKTbaRFR +++++=−  
Dependent variable: Excess returns on 25 stock portfolios formed on size and book-to-market equity 
 
Book-to-market equity (BE/ME) quintiles Size 
quintiles Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
    a         t(a)     
Small 0.56 -0.20 -0.19 0.31 0.89 1.34 -0.84 -0.52 1.11 4.15
2 0.57 0.04 0.45 0.38 0.51 1.65 0.12 0.45 1.45 2.38
3 0.35 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.33 1.36 0.79 0.82 1.13 1.82
4 0.42 -0.03 -0.04 0.31 0.03 1.77 -0.03 -0.12 1.19 1.76
Big 0.59 0.19 0.15 0.39 0.64 3.12 0.79 0.78 1.25 1.65
            
   b      t(b)   
Small 1.16 1.28 1.20 1.08 0.97 9.08 14.57 16.19 21.56 25.86
2 1.14 1.14 1.12 1.09 1.03 11.75 17.79 17.84 27.56 34.29
3 0.90 1.05 1.07 1.06 1.05 11.15 18.05 29.41 28.91 34.41
4 0.92 1.03 1.07 1.08 1.09 13.58 23.59 30.66 33.76 30.81
Big 0.96 0.95 1.07 1.09 1.11 19.46 23.32 29.26 26.11 28.97
            
   s      t(s)   
Small 1.79 1.39 1.21 0.82 0.26 10.34 11.73 12.08 12.10 5.18
2 1.31 1.19 1.02 0.73 0.13 9.96 13.71 12.04 13.56 3.14
3 1.29 1.08 0.82 0.63 0.28 11.87 13.79 16.65 12.58 6.88
4 1.37 1.04 0.89 0.64 0.19 14.94 17.55 18.81 14.89 3.98
Big 1.28 1.04 0.95 0.67 0.26 19.26 18.84 19.17 11.77 5.09
            
   h      t(h)   
Small 1.10 0.37 -0.01 -0.30 -0.23 4.64 2.25 -0.04 -3.18 -3.25
2 0.41 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.08 2.24 1.53 1.01 1.66 1.42
3 0.41 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.23 2.72 2.22 3.35 2.91 4.13
4 0.56 0.46 0.51 0.31 0.33 4.41 5.70 7.86 5.19 4.99
Big 0.60 0.41 0.53 0.52 0.39 6.59 5.44 7.84 6.72 5.49
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Table 4. (continued) 
 
   c      t(c)   
Small 0.04 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.29  0.22 2.74 6.38 5.01 4.87
2 0.27 0.33 0.40 0.24 0.29  1.78 3.37 4.09 3.89 6.15
3 0.38 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.29  3.02 3.90 6.35 6.65 4.92
4 0.39 0.42 0.34 0.41 0.30  3.64 6.13 6.18 8.23 5.40
Big 0.42 0.36 0.75 0.35 0.32  4.18 6.70 6.54 5.40 7.64
            
    R2         s(e)     
Small 0.78 0.88 0.86 0.82 0.83  7.61 3.96 6.71 4.55 3.42
2 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.76 0.79  5.26 4.81 5.69 3.59 4.72
3 0.82 0.83 0.76 0.68 0.75  5.13 5.43 3.80 8.34 5.42
4 0.86 0.79 0.72 0.71 0.76  2.89 4.98 3.18 6.91 4.22
Big 0.86 0.78 0.73 0.69 0.77  3.23 7.82 4.72 4.55 3.77
 
GRS test:  F value = 3.02, p-value = 0.00 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics on the 27 Size, BE/ME and Corporate Liquidity Sorted Portfolios 
The 27 portfolios are formed from the intersection of three independent sorts of all stocks into three size, three book-to-market equity and three corporate liquidity portfolios. Column 5 
through column 12 describe the characteristics of each portfolio. Average returns are reported in percentage terms. Average firm size is reported in millions of dollars. 
 
 Size BE/ME Corporate Liquidity 
#s of Firm-
months
Average 
Return Size BE/ME 
Corporate 
Liquidity Leverage
Cash 
Flow
CF 
Sigma Beta
1 Small Low Illiquid 24052 1.412 22.123 0.055 0.019 0.684 -0.045 0.724 1.171
2 Small Low Medium 25584 1.492 23.641 0.197 0.078 0.600 -0.026 0.671 1.176
3 Small Low Liquid 33983 1.884 23.911 0.297 0.289 0.409 -0.109 0.528 1.231
4 Small Medium Illiquid 30778 1.025 22.554 0.740 0.020 0.521 0.044 0.385 1.096
5 Small Medium Medium 30626 1.992 22.689 0.742 0.080 0.458 0.051 0.341 1.101
6 Small Medium Liquid 36018 1.472 21.445 0.743 0.293 0.286 0.035 0.399 1.128
7 Small High Illiquid 69681 -0.504 20.512 3.089 0.020 0.476 0.040 0.159 1.078
8 Small High Medium 63396 0.035 19.743 6.443 0.078 0.440 0.042 0.233 1.053
9 Small High Liquid 51481 -0.022 19.292 4.288 0.290 0.312 0.042 0.318 1.054
10 Medium Low Illiquid 22395 2.422 117.614 0.260 0.021 0.566 0.042 0.435 1.152
11 Medium Low Medium 29616 2.524 125.378 0.279 0.080 0.490 0.044 0.615 1.143
12 Medium Low Liquid 60462 2.956 117.223 0.333 0.311 0.294 0.018 0.456 1.128
13 Medium Medium Illiquid 41064 1.761 128.934 0.739 0.021 0.478 0.074 0.202 1.041
14 Medium Medium Medium 44352 1.860 127.538 0.732 0.078 0.421 0.080 0.262 1.060
15 Medium Medium Liquid 48316 1.694 121.778 0.711 0.252 0.322 0.069 0.255 1.074
16 Medium High Illiquid 48741 0.453 110.344 2.166 0.022 0.459 0.058 0.131 1.027
17 Medium High Medium 42817 0.795 112.878 3.195 0.078 0.427 0.063 0.149 1.068
18 Medium High Liquid 28059 -0.022 100.543 1.841 0.230 0.344 0.072 0.147 1.011
19 Big Low Illiquid 44989 2.121 3943.539 0.337 0.021 0.474 0.096 0.311 1.014
20 Big Low Medium 54641 2.383 4631.514 0.336 0.079 0.421 0.101 0.426 1.011
21 Big Low Liquid 70435 2.905 2034.118 0.299 0.251 0.300 0.109 0.458 1.013
22 Big Medium Illiquid 56721 1.267 2040.094 0.709 0.021 0.444 0.080 0.175 0.973
23 Big Medium Medium 50040 1.608 2379.624 0.708 0.075 0.392 0.085 0.164 0.981
24 Big Medium Liquid 28057 1.703 1413.237 0.698 0.216 0.355 0.086 0.197 1.056
25 Big High Illiquid 27654 0.414 1658.489 1.630 0.021 0.430 0.065 0.113 1.029
26 Big High Medium 24849 0.705 1394.633 2.367 0.075 0.390 0.072 0.105 1.004
27 Big High Liquid 9130 0.696 1144.567 2.124 0.221 0.401 0.074 0.120 0.987
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Table 6. The Fama-French Three-Factor Model  
on 27 Size-BE/ME-Corporate Liquidity Portfolios 
Time series regressions of excess stock returns on the excess market returns (MKT), the returns on size (SMB) and 
book-to-market equity (HML) factors: July 1963 to December 2005, 510 months. 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Excess returns on 27 stock portfolios formed on size, book-to-market equity and corporate 
liquidity. 
 
Corporate Liquidity Tertiles - Illiquid 
Book-to-market Equity (BE/ME) Tertiles Size 
Tertiles Low Medium High Low Medium High
  a    t(a)  
Small -0.12 0.11 0.23 -0.35 0.52  1.18 
Medium -0.84 -0.19 -0.24 -2.60 -0.76 -0.69 
Big 0.26 0.07 0.03 1.79 0.43 0.19 
        
  b    t(b)  
Small 1.27 1.01 0.98 12.87 15.18 21.77 
Medium 1.25 1.08 1.04 20.04 27.87 31.27 
Big 1.11 1.10 1.16 28.25 34.07 29.54 
        
  s    t(s)  
Small 1.45 1.15 1.22 11.11 13.15 20.43 
Medium 0.86 0.88 0.77 10.51 17.15 17.45 
Big 0.25 0.31 0.36 4.89 7.29 6.86 
   
  h    t(h)  
Small 0.91 0.54 0.86 6.06 5.30 12.54 
Medium 0.47 0.57 0.73 4.96 9.60 14.45 
Big 0.25 0.52 0.70 4.24 10.61 11.75 
   
  R2    s(e)  
Small 0.73 0.69 0.82 5.76 4.84 3.34 
Medium 0.74 0.64 0.61 4.43 4.71 4.85 
Big 0.82 0.78 0.67 2.07 3.64 3.78 
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Table 6. (continued) 
        
Corporate Liquidity Tertiles -Medium 
Book-to-market Equity (BE/ME) Tertiles Size 
Tertiles Low Medium High Low Medium High
  a    t(a)  
Small -0.29 0.32 0.29 -0.89 1.02 1.28 
Medium -0.56 0.18 -0.34 -1.99 0.68 -1.24 
Big 0.25 -0.15 0.12 1.59 -0.56 0.56 
        
  b    t(b)  
Small 0.97 0.91 1.02 10.70 11.72 19.31 
Medium 1.12 1.10 1.12 15.16 26.29 28.41 
Big 1.02 1.07 1.07 27.67 32.53 25.01 
        
  s    t(s)  
Small 1.60 1.21 1.14 13.42 11.87 16.44 
Medium 0.92 0.78 0.87 9.48 14.28 16.89 
Big 0.26 0.28 0.40 5.28 6.39 7.07 
   
  h    t(h)  
Small 0.58 0.62 0.79 4.22 5.27 9.83 
Medium 0.57 0.47 0.71 5.04 7.39 11.93 
Big 0.05 0.42 0.63 0.84 8.36 9.61 
   
  R2    s(e)  
Small 0.71 0.73 0.73 5.99 4.12 3.25 
Medium 0.72 0.64 0.67 4.34 4.89 3.59 
Big 0.86 0.78 0.70 2.02 3.01 3.67 
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Table 6. (continued) 
        
Corporate Liquidity Tertiles - Liquid 
Book-to-market Equity (BE/ME) Tertiles Size 
Tertiles Low Medium High Low Medium High
  a     t(a)   
Small 0.17 0.29 0.56 0.42 0.69 2.21 
Medium -0.04 0.37 -0.09 -0.23 1.14 -0.39 
Big 0.89 0.51 0.09 3.46 1.91 0.67 
           
  b     t(b)   
Small 1.16 1.10 0.94 11.24 13.57 15.84 
Medium 1.18 1.11 0.92 16.13 21.79 16.33 
Big 0.89 1.07 0.93 13.19 18.22 19.28 
           
  s     t(s)   
Small 1.14 0.95 1.02 8.35 8.92 13.06 
Medium 0.95 0.76 0.84 9.91 11.31 11.34 
Big 0.73 0.34 0.28 8.20 4.44 4.39 
        
  h     t(h)   
Small 0.54 0.63 0.83 3.42 5.11 9.16 
Medium 0.30 0.35 0.67 2.72 4.57 7.80 
Big -0.33 0.18 0.48 -3.21 2.05 6.55 
        
  R2     s(e)   
Small 0.80 0.75 0.77 3.92 4.82 3.80 
Medium 0.76 0.73 0.62 4.77 4.88 4.91 
Big 0.83 0.80 0.61 3.30 3.62 4.91 
 
  GRS test:  F value = 1.43, p-value = 0.09 
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Table 7. The Fama-French Three-Factor + Corporate Liquidity Factor  
on 27 Size-BE/ME-Corporate Liquidity Portfolios 
Time series regressions of excess stock returns on the excess market returns (MKT), the returns on size 
(SMB), book-to-market equity (HML) and the corporate liquidity (LMI) factors: July 1963 to December 
2005, 510 months. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Excess returns on 27 stock portfolios formed on size, book-to-market equity and 
corporate liquidity. 
 
Corporate Liquidity Tertiles - Illiquid 
Book-to-market Equity (BE/ME) Tertiles Size 
Tertiles Low Medium High Low Medium High
  a    t(a)  
Small 0.16 0.31 0.57 0.44 0.93 2.22
Medium -0.05 0.33 0.12 -0.15 1.04 0.41
Big 0.90 0.17 0.17 3.63 0.70 0.54
        
  b    t(b)  
Small 1.26 1.00 0.97 12.84 15.14 22.19
Medium 1.23 1.07 1.03 20.64 28.99 32.79
Big 1.10 1.08 1.15 30.37 36.41 30.70
        
  s    t(s)  
Small 1.54 1.20 1.30 11.63 13.43 21.86
Medium 0.99 0.96 0.85 12.33 19.33 19.89
Big 0.37 0.40 0.44 7.53 9.88 8.75
        
  h    t(h)  
Small 0.58 0.36 0.59 3.19 2.93 7.22
Medium 0.02 0.27 0.46 0.22 3.93 7.88
Big -0.13 0.22 0.41 -1.95 3.96 5.84
        
  c    t(c)  
Small -0.48 -0.26 -0.40 -3.17 -2.49 -5.86
Medium -0.65 -0.44 -0.40 -7.02 -7.58 -8.11
Big -0.56 -0.44 -0.43 -9.99 -9.45 -7.43
        
  R2    s(e)  
Small 0.77 0.69 0.83 5.29 3.91 3.10
Medium 0.72 0.66 0.63 4.37 4.77 3.76
Big 0.83 0.78 0.68 2.08 2.87 3.66
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Table 7. (continued) 
        
Corporate Liquidity Tertiles - Medium 
Book-to-market Equity (BE/ME) Tertiles Size 
Tertiles Low Medium High Low Medium High
  a    t(a)  
Small 0.21 0.17 0.35 0.53 -0.59 1.42
Medium -0.21 -0.20 -0.18 -1.45 0.73 -0.61
Big 0.29 0.14 0.09 1.28 0.70 0.37
        
  b    t(b)  
Small 0.96 0.90 1.01 10.66 11.68 19.54
Medium 1.10 1.08 1.11 15.59 27.36 29.37
Big 1.01 1.07 1.07 28.35 32.88 25.23
        
  s    t(s)  
Small 1.62 1.28 1.23 13.21 12.33 17.56
Medium 1.09 0.88 0.96 11.40 16.41 18.79
Big 0.33 0.32 0.46 6.76 7.36 8.02
        
  h    t(h)  
Small 0.51 0.37 0.51 3.03 2.62 5.30
Medium 0.01 0.15 0.43 0.11 1.99 6.20
Big -0.19 0.27 0.43 -2.82 4.44 5.49
        
  c    t(c)  
Small -0.11 0.28 0.33  -0.75 2.19 3.59
Medium 0.22 -0.15 0.35  1.97 -1.87 4.01
Big 0.34 -0.22 0.29  6.15 -4.41 4.38
        
  R2    s(e)  
Small 0.72 0.73 0.78 5.16 3.82 3.16
Medium 0.75 0.69 0.68 3.84 4.59 4.88
Big 0.87 0.77 0.72 2.06 3.91 4.56
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Table 7. (continued) 
        
Corporate Liquidity Tertiles - Liquid 
Book-to-market Equity (BE/ME) Tertiles Size 
Tertiles Low Medium High Low Medium High
  a    t(a)  
Small -0.47 0.25 0.17 -1.16 0.86 0.82
Medium -0.57 -0.26 -0.36 -1.67 -0.93 -1.35
Big 0.26 0.15 0.08 1.59 0.81 0.36
        
  b    t(b)  
Small 1.16 1.10 0.94 11.18 13.52 15.86
Medium 1.17 1.10 0.91 16.08 21.75 16.38
Big 0.91 1.07 0.92 13.89 18.19 19.51
        
  s    t(s)  
Small 1.18 1.01 1.09 8.44 9.22 13.68
Medium 1.00 0.79 0.91 10.12 11.46 12.12
Big 0.60 0.34 0.35 6.80 4.29 5.56
        
  h    t(h)  
Small 0.39 0.44 0.61 2.03 2.94 5.52
Medium 0.15 0.25 0.43 1.10 2.68 4.18
Big 0.10 0.19 0.22 0.80 1.72 2.56
        
  c    t(c)  
Small 0.22 0.36 0.41  1.34 3.00 5.12
Medium 0.81 0.47 0.42  7.35 7.63 6.97
Big 0.62 -0.01 0.37  6.14 -0.07 5.10
        
  R2    s(e)  
Small 0.82 0.80 0.82 3.89 3.83 3.01
Medium 0.79 0.78 0.69 4.67 4.79 4.41
Big 0.84 0.83 0.64 2.89 3.01 4.98
 
  GRS test:  F value = 1.31, p-value = 0.18 
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Table 8. CAPM and Multifactor Models on 10 Corporate Liquidity Portfolios 
 
This table presents the results of asset pricing models for the 10 corporate liquidity portfolios. Each June, the sample is sorted into 10 portfolios based on the firm’s corporate 
liquidity. Then CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model as well as the four-factor model are estimated for the 10 corporate liquidity portfolios during the period July 1963 to 
December 2005, 510 months. 
 
Panel A. CAPM: itt
ii
t
i
t eMKTbaRFR ++=−  
 
 Illiquid 1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9 Liquid 10 
           
a -0.670 0.377 -0.155 0.470 -0.121 -0.843 -0.063 0.306 -0.325 -0.153 
 (-0.891) (0.601) (-0.248) (0.719) (-0.205) (-1.387) (-0.092) (0.491) (-0.437) (-0.216) 
MKT 1.158 1.217 1.281 1.367 1.327 1.356 1.506 1.532 1.656 1.719 
 (8.231) *** (8.937) *** (8.758) *** (8.121) *** (8.590) *** (9.703) *** (11.442) *** (10.904) *** (9.938) *** (10.825) *** 
R2 0.111 0.184 0.114 0.127 0.199 0.132 0.123 0.152 0.158 0.182 
 GRS test: F statistic = 0.44, p-value = 0.93 
 
 
Panel B. Fama-French Three-Factor Model: itt
i
t
i
t
ii
t
i
t eHMLhSMBsMKTbaRFR ++++=−  
 
 Illiquid 1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9 Liquid 10 
           
a -1.548 0.327 -0.370 0.118 -0.451 -1.240 -0.476 0.219 0.001 -0.053 
 (-2.066) (0.516) (-0.594) (0.178) (-0.768) (-2.025) *** (-0.692) (0.352) (0.002) (-0.075) 
MKT 0.899 1.070 1.146 1.157 1.155 1.209 1.312 1.318 1.359 1.468 
 (5.905) *** (7.041) *** (7.639) *** (6.870) *** (6.424) *** (7.463) *** (7.624) *** (8.487) *** (9.454) *** (8.003) *** 
SMB 1.085 0.852 1.283 0.838 1.075 0.912 1.294 1.174 1.262 1.300 
 (4.493) *** (4.166) *** (6.401) *** (3.931) *** (5.685) *** (4.620) *** (5.838) *** (5.870) *** (5.329) *** (5.740) *** 
HML 1.262 -0.106 0.079 0.414 0.324 0.475 0.416 -0.114 -0.844 -0.464 
 (4.515) *** (-0.450) (0.340) (1.678) (1.478) (2.080) ** (1.624) (-0.491) (-3.080) *** (-1.770) * 
R2 0.166 0.213 0.179 0.154 0.246 0.168 0.177 0.208 0.225 0.241 
 GRS test: F statistic = 1.03, p-value = 0.42 
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Table 8. (continued) 
 
Panel C. Fama-French Three-Factor + LMI: tt
i
t
i
t
i
t
ii
t
i
t eLMIcHMLhSMBsMKTbaRFR +++++=−  
 
 Illiquid 1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9 Liquid 10 
           
a -0.694 0.504 0.439 0.524 0.081 -0.744 -0.568 -0.413 -0.804 -0.243 
 (-0.868) (0.738) (0.662) (0.738) (0.129) (-1.133) (-0.767) (-0.622) (-1.025) (-0.321) 
MKT 0.879 1.086 1.199 1.133 1.159 1.176 1.316 1.314 1.345 1.446 
 (5.820) *** (7.179) *** (7.403) *** (7.572) *** (6.872) *** (6.574) *** (7.642) *** (8.447) *** (9.390) *** (7.934) *** 
SMB 1.253 0.886 1.443 0.918 1.180 1.010 1.276 1.050 1.102 1.262 
 (5.081) *** (4.213) *** (7.062) *** (4.192) *** (6.089) *** (4.988) *** (5.590) *** (5.127) *** (4.555) *** (5.415) *** 
HML 0.697 -0.223 -0.456 0.145 -0.028 0.147 0.477 0.304 -0.311 -0.338 
 (2.056) ** (-0.772) (-1.625) (0.483) (-0.106) (0.528) (1.521) (1.082) (-0.935) (-1.056) 
LMI -0.824 -0.171 -0.781 -0.392 -0.513 -0.479 0.088 0.610 0.778 0.184 
 (-2.904) *** (-0.704) (-3.320) *** (-1.555) (-2.301) ** (-2.056) ** (0.336) (2.589) *** (2.792) *** (0.684) 
R2 0.180 0.213 0.196 0.158 0.254 0.175 0.177 0.218 0.236 0.242 
 GRS test: F statistic = 0.56, p-value = 0.84 
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Table 9. The Fama-French Three-Factor Model on 25 Size -Corporate Liquidity Portfolios 
Time series regressions of excess stock returns on the excess market returns (MKT) and the returns on size (SMB) and 
book-to-market equity (HML) factors: July 1963 to December 2005, 510 months 
tt
i
t
i
t
ii
t
i
t eHMLhSMBsMKTbaRFR ++++=−  
Dependent variable: Excess returns on 25 portfolios subsequently sorted by size and corporate liquidity 
Corporate Liquidity quintiles Size 
quintiles Illiquid 2 3 4 Liquid Illiquid 2 3 4 Liquid
    a         t(a)     
Small -0.49 -0.32 -0.14 0.30 0.79  -5.55 -4.00 -1.86 3.68 6.93 
2 -0.48 -0.28 -0.09 0.40 0.83  -5.63 -3.54 -1.16 4.37 6.71 
3 -0.47 -0.28 -0.03 0.40 0.85  -5.59 -3.56 -0.39 4.30 6.72 
4 -0.49 -0.28 -0.06 0.37 0.87  -5.77 -3.48 -0.81 4.31 7.01 
Big -0.47 -0.34 -0.05 0.30 0.83  -5.51 -4.24 -0.68 3.89 7.36 
            
    b         t(b)     
Small 1.05 1.07 1.06 1.09 1.12  38.68 55.41 50.59 56.73 59.90 
2 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.10 1.11  35.44 49.37 52.13 56.88 59.91 
3 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.09 1.10  34.43 47.96 52.55 56.77 60.54 
4 1.04 1.06 1.07 1.07 1.10  34.75 50.93 52.83 56.40 60.30 
Big 1.06 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.08  37.92 56.18 52.03 57.18 62.79 
            
    s         t(s)     
Small 0.89 0.85 0.88 0.93 1.11  31.35 33.15 36.51 35.90 30.23 
2 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.98 1.15  31.88 33.53 36.09 33.35 28.83 
3 0.88 0.86 0.92 1.00 1.18  32.18 33.56 38.24 33.50 29.14 
4 0.88 0.85 0.92 1.00 1.20  32.32 33.12 38.32 36.20 30.14 
Big 0.88 0.86 0.91 0.98 1.16  31.97 33.62 40.54 40.05 32.04 
            
    h         t(h)     
Small 0.54 0.46 0.36 0.10 -0.31  16.42 15.51 12.89 3.41 -7.39 
2 0.53 0.45 0.30 0.04 -0.37  16.77 15.27 10.63 1.03 -8.05 
3 0.53 0.45 0.25 -0.03 -0.40  16.88 15.26 8.86 -0.95 -8.46 
4 0.54 0.45 0.28 -0.02 -0.40  17.07 15.20 9.97 -0.66 -8.74 
Big 0.54 0.45 0.31 0.06 -0.32  17.13 15.26 12.09 2.02 -7.64 
            
    R2         s(e)     
Small 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.89  1.95 1.78 1.67 1.79 2.53 
2 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.88  1.90 1.77 1.69 2.03 2.75 
3 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.88  1.89 1.77 1.67 2.07 2.80 
4 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.88  1.88 1.78 1.65 1.91 2.75 
Big 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.89  1.90 1.76 1.55 1.70 2.51 
       
     GRS test:  F value = 7.34, p-value < 0.0001 
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Table 10. The Fama-French Three-Factor Model  
on 25 BE/ME-Corporate Liquidity Portfolios 
Time series regressions of excess stock returns on the excess market returns (MKT) and the returns on size (SMB) and book-to-
market equity (HML) factors: July 1963 to December 2005, 510 months. 
tt
i
t
i
t
ii
t
i
t eHMLhSMBsMKTbaRFR ++++=−  
Dependent variable: Excess returns on 25 portfolios subsequently sorted by BE/ME and corporate liquidity 
Corporate Liquidity quintiles BE/ME 
quintiles Illiquid 2 3 4 Liquid Illiquid 2 3 4 Liquid
    a         t(a)     
Low -0.44 -0.12 0.26 0.65 1.03  -5.39 -1.78 3.30 6.31 6.89 
2 -0.46 -0.24 0.05 0.47 0.90  -5.56 -3.20 0.69 5.16 6.93 
3 -0.48 -0.31 -0.13 0.22 0.79  -5.62 -3.83 -1.80 2.75 6.92 
4 -0.49 -0.34 -0.16 0.14 0.71  -5.63 -4.14 -2.07 1.82 6.53 
High -0.49 -0.36 -0.18 0.07 0.69  -5.64 -4.32 -2.34 0.93 6.77 
            
    b         t(b)     
Low 1.03 1.06 1.09 1.08 1.08  27.98 64.28 55.41 42.19 54.77 
2 1.04 1.07 1.09 1.08 1.09  32.81 59.53 59.40 47.42 53.51 
3 1.07 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.11  38.26 55.81 60.64 54.34 51.89 
4 1.08 1.10 1.09 1.11 1.11  40.49 55.27 57.35 56.55 50.91 
High 1.08 1.11 1.08 1.10 1.11  43.36 54.87 57.07 60.09 50.32 
            
    s         t(s)     
Low 0.87 0.96 1.00 1.07 1.30  33.29 43.20 39.26 32.16 26.81 
2 0.87 0.92 0.98 1.04 1.23  32.56 37.91 40.95 35.05 29.46 
3 0.88 0.85 0.89 0.96 1.13  32.05 32.62 37.02 36.29 30.60 
4 0.89 0.83 0.86 0.89 1.10  31.59 31.65 34.03 34.65 31.10 
High 0.89 0.84 0.86 0.86 1.05  31.34 31.41 33.98 35.29 32.06 
            
    h         t(h)     
Low 0.51 0.32 0.06 -0.21 -0.51  16.89 12.55 1.90 -5.35 -9.16 
2 0.52 0.41 0.18 -0.07 -0.44  16.85 14.62 6.35 -2.10 -9.07 
3 0.54 0.47 0.34 0.09 -0.32  17.08 15.35 12.42 2.79 -7.58 
4 0.54 0.47 0.41 0.17 -0.25  16.72 15.39 13.85 5.77 -6.07 
High 0.54 0.48 0.42 0.24 -0.21  16.46 15.52 14.30 8.37 -5.46 
            
    R2         s(e)     
Low 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.85  1.82 1.53 1.77 2.29 3.34 
2 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.91 0.87  1.85 1.67 1.65 2.05 2.89 
3 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.89  1.90 1.81 1.66 1.82 2.55 
4 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.90  1.94 1.82 1.75 1.77 2.43 
High 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.90  1.95 1.85 1.75 1.68 2.27 
             
       GRS test:  F value = 5.59, p-value < 0.0001 
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Table 11. The Fama-French Three-Factor + Corporate Liquidity Factor 
on 25 Size-Corporate Liquidity Portfolios 
Time series regressions of excess stock returns on the excess market returns (MKT), the returns on size (SMB), book-to-
market equity (HML) and the corporate liquidity (LMI) factors: July 1963 to December 2005, 510 months. 
tt
i
t
i
t
i
t
ii
t
i
t eLMIcHMLhSMBsMKTbaRFR +++++=−  
Dependent variable: Excess returns on 25 stock portfolios formed on size and corporate liquidity  
 
Corporate Liquidity quintiles Size 
quintiles Illiquid 2 3 4 Liquid Illiquid 2 3 4 Liquid
    a         t(a)     
Small -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.57 0.57 0.32 0.48 0.34 
2 -0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.55 0.85 -0.28 -0.07 -0.29 
3 -0.05 0.06 -0.05 -0.08 -0.05 -0.66 0.86 -0.66 -0.98 -0.54 
4 -0.06 0.07 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.85 0.97 0.04 -0.63 -0.51 
Big -0.04 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.56 0.33 0.81 0.20 0.10 
            
   b      t(b)   
Small 1.07 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 60.21 64.90 61.40 59.49 58.30 
2 1.08 1.09 1.11 1.11 1.10 62.59 64.21 59.99 57.06 55.87 
3 1.08 1.08 1.11 1.11 1.10 62.29 64.20 60.50 58.96 56.37 
4 1.08 1.07 1.09 1.08 1.10 62.73 63.90 60.37 61.00 60.45 
Big 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.10 61.73 65.48 63.43 61.85 65.38 
            
   s      t(s)   
Small 0.97 0.93 0.92 0.88 0.96 40.29 40.32 37.89 35.23 37.65 
2 0.96 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.98 41.34 40.06 35.73 34.12 36.96 
3 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.91 1.01 41.04 40.18 36.96 35.88 38.68 
4 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.92 1.02 41.29 39.79 37.89 38.31 42.47 
Big 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.93 1.00 40.84 40.88 40.87 40.19 45.32 
            
   h      t(h)   
Small 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.19 7.36 7.05 7.59 7.95 5.42 
2 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.19 7.60 7.05 7.47 8.35 5.32 
3 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.19 7.87 7.02 7.71 8.19 5.39 
4 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.20 8.04 6.92 6.95 7.78 5.94 
Big 0.26 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.22 8.10 6.80 7.78 7.68 7.37 
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Table 11. (continued) 
 
   c      t(c)   
Small -0.43 -0.35 -0.16 0.25 0.73 -15.36 -13.25 -5.73 8.65 25.06 
2 -0.42 -0.33 -0.06 0.39 0.82 -15.80 -12.51 -2.20 12.85 27.02 
3 -0.41 -0.34 0.02 0.46 0.86 -15.14 -12.61 0.80 15.90 28.74 
4 -0.41 -0.34 -0.06 0.41 0.87 -15.23 -12.72 -2.16 14.67 31.60 
Big -0.41 -0.35 -0.10 0.27 0.80 -15.20 -13.29 -3.94 10.23 31.25 
            
    R2         s(e)     
Small 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.95  1.62 1.54 1.62 1.68 1.71 
2 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.95  1.56 1.55 1.68 1.77 1.78 
3 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.95  1.58 1.55 1.67 1.70 1.75 
4 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.96  1.56 1.56 1.65 1.61 1.61 
Big 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.96  1.58 1.53 1.53 1.55 1.48 
 
GRS test:  F value = 4.21, p-value < 0.0001 
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Table 12. The Fama-French Three-Factor + Corporate Liquidity Factor 
on 25 BE/ME-Corporate Liquidity Portfolios 
Time series regressions of excess stock returns on the excess market returns (MKT), the returns on size (SMB), book-to-market 
equity (HML) and the corporate liquidity (LMI) factors: July 1963 to December 2005, 510 months. 
tt
i
t
i
t
i
t
ii
t
i
t eLMIcHMLhSMBsMKTbaRFR +++++=−  
Dependent variable: Excess returns on 25 stock portfolios formed on book-to-market equity and corporate liquidity 
 
Corporate Liquidity quintiles BE/ME 
quintiles Illiquid 2 3 4 Liquid Illiquid 2 3 4 Liquid
    a         t(a)     
Low -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.05 -0.49 -0.18 -0.83 -0.01 -0.47
2 -0.05 0.03 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.66 0.34 -1.05 -0.55 -0.70
3 -0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.60 0.77 0.24 -0.77 -0.05
4 -0.04 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.58 0.54 1.14 0.01 -0.03
High -0.05 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.05 -0.65 0.37 1.33 0.53 0.64
            
   b      t(b)   
Low 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.06 1.08 64.69 65.02 62.49 59.77 47.24
2 1.08 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.08 63.31 64.17 60.69 61.15 57.67
3 1.08 1.10 1.10 1.09 1.09 61.97 63.90 61.94 59.24 60.91
4 1.08 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.11 60.95 63.66 60.89 57.81 59.63
High 1.07 1.10 1.09 1.10 1.11 59.98 63.34 61.84 60.06 60.98
            
   s      t(s)   
Low 0.95 0.98 0.94 0.94 1.08 42.12 43.58 40.01 38.39 35.84
2 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.94 1.04 41.38 42.28 39.48 39.16 41.68
3 0.97 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.97 41.26 39.78 38.16 35.97 40.03
4 0.98 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.95 40.87 38.98 37.40 33.24 38.15
High 0.97 0.92 0.92 0.85 0.93 40.37 38.82 38.42 34.08 38.03
            
   h      t(h)   
Low 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.20 7.93 8.07 8.40 6.70 4.85
2 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.19 7.86 7.42 7.96 8.22 5.61
3 0.26 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.20 7.97 6.89 7.37 8.00 6.11
4 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.23 7.58 6.83 7.13 7.50 6.60
High 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.22 7.38 6.92 7.00 7.36 6.44
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Table 12. (continued) 
 
   c      t(c)   
Low -0.39 -0.11 0.31 0.63 1.04 -14.94 -4.11 11.60 22.33 29.95
2 -0.40 -0.26 0.13 0.50 0.92 -15.03 -9.72 4.63 18.13 32.03
3 -0.42 -0.36 -0.15 0.28 0.77 -15.53 -13.30 -5.32 9.62 27.55
4 -0.43 -0.37 -0.24 0.14 0.69 -15.66 -13.63 -8.69 4.66 24.04
High -0.43 -0.37 -0.28 0.03 0.62 -15.45 -13.74 -10.07 0.89 22.02
            
    R2         s(e)     
Low 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.94  1.52 1.50 1.58 1.64 2.03
2 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.96  1.55 1.54 1.62 1.61 1.68
3 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.96  1.58 1.57 1.61 1.68 1.63
4 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.95  1.60 1.57 1.64 1.74 1.68
High 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.95  1.62 1.58 1.61 1.68 1.63
 
 GRS test:  F value = 2.48, p-value = 0.0001 
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Table 13. Time Series Regression of Corporate Liquidity Factor  
on Changes in Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Time series regression of corporate liquidity on changes in macroeconomic variables. The dependent 
variable LMI is the aggregate corporate liquidity factor. Independent variables are current and two forward 
values of macroeconomic variables: ΔGDP, ΔIP, ΔCPI, ΔFFR, or NBER recession dummy. The time series 
regression is performed during the period 1962:2005. 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Δ GDPt -1.044 - - - - 
 (-1.312) - - - - 
Δ GDPt+1 1.567 - - - - 
 (1.487) - - - - 
Δ GDPt+2 -0.819 - - - - 
 (-1.029) - - - - 
Δ Industrial Productiont - -0.142 - - - 
 - (-0.650) - - - 
Δ Industrial Productiont+1 - 0.027 - - - 
 - (0.120) - - - 
Δ Industrial Productiont+2 - 0.148 - - - 
 - (0.679) - - - 
Δ CPIt - - 0.151 - - 
 - - (0.275) - - 
Δ CPIt+1 - - -1.168 - - 
 - - (-1.990) ** - - 
Δ CPIt+2 - - 0.943 - - 
 - - (1.736) * - - 
Δ FFR t - - - -0.221 - 
 - - - (-0.793) - 
Δ FFR t+1 - - - 0.103 - 
 - - - (0.340) - 
Δ FFR t+2 - - - 0.012 - 
 - - - (0.044) - 
Δ Recessiont - - - - -0.077 
 - - - - (-0.076) 
Δ Recessiont+1 - - - - 0.713 
 - - - - (0.516) 
Δ Recessiont+2 - - - - -0.592 
 - - - - (-0.591) 
      
R2 0.056 0.061 0.072 0.045 0.047 
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Table 14. Performance on Macroeconomic Changes for Liquid and Illiquid Firms 
 
Time series regression of firm performance on macroeconomic changes for liquid and illiquid firms during the 
period 1962:2005. Every year all firms are sorted into liquid and illiquid portfolios where liquid firms are defined as 
firms whose cash holdings fall into the top 30 percentile, while illiquid firms are those with the bottom 30 percentile 
cash holdings. Performance is measured by median growth rate of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT, 
COMPUSTAT item 14 + item 18), sales (item 12) and investment (item 128). MacroCondition include (1) 
aggregate demand, proxied by GDP – gross domestic production; (2) aggregate production, proxied by IP – 
industrial production index; (3) an NBER recession dummy variable, and (4) federal funds rate (FFR), a proxy for 
monetary policy. Federal funds rate is included in the bivariate regression with GDP to control for the monetary 
policy changes that can coincide with macroeconomic changes. In addition, the recession dummy variable takes a 
value of -1 for the year under recession in order to conveniently compare its regression coefficient with other 
macroeconomic changes. 
 
 
 Macroeconomic Variables 
 GDP 
(Univariate) 
Industrial 
Production Recession  
GDP 
(Bivariate) 
Sales Growth     
      Liquid Firms 1.511 0.918 6.497 0.512 
 (3.531) *** (4.920) *** (2.818) *** (1.340) 
      R2 0.278 0.412 0.208 0.343 
     
      Illiquid Firms 1.857 0.997 9.010 0.602 
 (7.046) *** (9.352) *** (6.220) *** (2.936) *** 
      R2 0.596 0.717 0.539 0.721 
     
EBIT Growth     
      Liquid Firms 4.214 2.491 16.892 1.241 
 (4.325) *** (6.065) *** (3.111) *** (1.557) 
      R2 0.363 0.515 0.221 0.514 
     
      Illiquid Firms 4.364 2.480 18.441 1.779 
 (5.658) *** (8.044) *** (4.128) *** (3.450) *** 
      R2 0.483 0.646 -.345 0.737 
     
Investment Growth     
      Liquid Firms 2.322 1.091 8.731 0.876 
 (4.164) *** (4.003) *** (2.771) *** (1.491) 
      R2 0.496 0.484 0.392 0.361 
     
      Illiquid Firms 3.078 1.542 15.363 1.985 
 (7.279) *** (7.966) *** (6.796) *** (5.152) *** 
      R2 0.598 0.639 0.566 0.619 
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Table 15. Time Series Regression of Corporate Liquidity Beta 
on Changes in Macroeconomic Conditions for Liquid and Illiquid Firms 
 
            This table presents the result of the second step, a time series regression, of a two-step regression approach for the period 1962:2005. In the first step, time 
series regressions are estimated for liquidity beta on a rolling basis for the liquid and illiquid portfolio separately every month using the previous 36 
months data points, in which portfolios’ excess returns are regressed on the factors LMI, MKT, SMB and HML. The coefficients on the corporate liquidity 
factor LMI are collected and “stacked” into the vector θt, which is then regressed on changes in the various macroeconomic variables, including current 
and two lagged ΔGDP, contemporaneous LogCPI, changes in the federal funds rate LogFFR, and a time trend.  
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Liquid  Illiquid  Liquid  Illiquid  Liquid  Illiquid  
ΔGDPt -1.023 -0.995 -11.658 -10.473 -8.840 -8.012 
 (-16.682) *** (-18.347) *** (-3.980) *** (-4.269) *** (-2.346) *** (-2.044) ** 
ΔGDPt-1 - - 10.137 9.699 4.441 3.356 
 - - (3.378) *** (3.522) *** (0.627) (0.437) 
ΔGDPt-2 - - - - 3.660 2.801 
 - - - - (-0.868) (0.720) 
       
R2 0.704 0.695 0.721 0.699 0.737 0.714 
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Table 16. Time Series Regression of Corporate Liquidity Beta 
on Changes in Macroeconomic Conditions for Constrained and Unconstrained Firms 
 
This table presents the results of the second step time series regression of a two-step regression approach for the period 1962:2005. Each year , the sample is 
split into constrained and unconstrained firms based on the following criteria: firm size, payout ratio and a KZ index. Constrained firms are defined as those 
who are ranked below the bottom 30 percentile according to firm size, payout ratio, and above the top 30 percentile KZ index; unconstrained firms are defined 
as those who are ranked above the top 30 percentile according to firm size, payout ratio, and below the bottom 30 percentile KZ index. In the first step, a cross 
sectional regression is estimated across the firms that belong to the constrained and unconstrained portfolio separately for each year, in which firms’ or 
portfolios’ excess returns are regressed on the corporate liquidity, firm size, market to book, leverage and other firm characteristics. The coefficients on 
corporate liquidity are collected and “stacked” into the vector θt, which is then regressed on various variables that describe macroeconomic changes, including 
current and two lagged GDP changes, and contemporaneous LogCPI, changes in federal funds rate LogFFR and a time trend.  
 
 
 
1. Total Assets 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
GDPInnovationt -0.129 -0.014 -0.120 0.023 -0.110 0.024 
 (-2.404) ** (-0.273) (-2.617) *** (0.320) (-2.545) ** (0.253) 
GDPInnovationt-1 - - -0.111 0.046 -0.104 0.078 
 - - (-2.431) ** (0.320) (-2.373) ** (0.871) 
GDPInnovationt-2 - - - - 0.040 -0.014 
 - - - - (0.938) (-0.197) 
       
R2 0.159 0.050 0.413 0.067 0.419 0.082 
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Table 16. (continued) 
 
2. Payout ratio 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
GDPInnovationt -0.082 -0.007 -0.162 0.001 -0.111 -0.038 
 (-1.334) (-0.232) (-1.880) * (0.019) (-1.244) (-0.718) 
GDPInnovationt-1 - - -0.029 0.037 -0.037 0.046 
 - - (-0.395) (1.044) (-0.435) (0.933) 
GDPInnovationt-2 - - - - 0.063 -0.002 
 - - - - (0.978) (-0.056) 
       
R2 0.155 0.061 0.201 0.093 0.144 0.108 
 
 
 
3. KZ index 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
GDPInnovationt -0.090 -0.006 -0.169 0.002 -0.104 -0.036 
 (-1.378) (-0.174) (-1.866) * (0.052) (-1.088) (-0.593) 
GDPInnovationt-1 - - -0.030 0.031 -0.055 0.036 
 - - (-0.388) (0.767) (-0.612) (0.633) 
GDPInnovationt-2 - - - - 0.041 -0.007 
 - - - - (0.601) (-0.002) 
       
R2 0.154 0.057 0.207 0.088 0.167 0.120 
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Table A1. The Fama-French Three-Factor + Corporate Liquidity Factor (LMImed_low) 
on 27 Size-BE/ME-Corporate Liquidity Portfolios 
Time series regressions of excess stock returns on the excess market returns (MKT), the returns on size 
(SMB), book-to-market equity (HML) and the corporate liquidity (LMImed_low) factors: July 1963 to 
December 2005, 510 months. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Excess returns on 27 stock portfolios formed on size, book-to-market equity and 
corporate liquidity. 
Corporate Liquidity Tertiles - Illiquid 
Book-to-market Equity (BE/ME) Tertiles 
Size Tertiles Low Medium High Low Medium High
  a    t(a)  
Small 0.12 0.13 -0.25 0.32 0.35 -1.26
Medium -0.44 -0.19 -0.14 -2.04 -0.45 -0.13
Big 0.39 0.26 0.05 1.95 0.77 0.87
        
  b    t(b)  
Small 1.27 1.01 0.99 13.00 15.22 22.41
Medium 1.25 1.08 1.04 20.76 29.08 32.71
Big 1.11 1.10 1.16 30.34 35.81 30.57
        
  s    t(s)  
Small 1.50 1.17 1.26 11.54 13.31 21.55
Medium 0.92 0.92 0.80 11.55 18.58 18.96
Big 0.31 0.34 0.39 6.29 8.50 7.78
        
  h    t(h)  
Small 0.64 0.43 0.66 3.77 3.78 8.64
Medium 0.16 0.36 0.55 1.55 5.53 9.91
Big -0.02 0.33 0.51 -0.28 6.24 7.74
        
  c    t(c)  
Small -1.19 -0.45 -0.90 -3.37 -1.87 -5.64
Medium -1.35 -0.92 -0.81 -6.21 -6.85 -7.05
Big -1.19 -0.82 -0.85 -8.98 -7.44 -6.15
        
  R2    s(e)  
Small 0.74 0.75 0.79 4.41 3.23 3.22
Medium 0.76 0.69 0.68 3.75 3.98 3.43
Big 0.81 0.82 0.62 2.54 2.61 3.74
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Table A1. (continued) 
        
Corporate Liquidity Tertiles - Medium 
Book-to-market Equity (BE/ME) Tertiles 
Size Tertiles Low Medium High Low Medium High
  a    t(a)  
Small -0.39 0.22 0.23 -1.06 1.13 1.31
Medium 0.43 -0.19 -0.22 1.81 -0.67 -1.32
Big -0.43 0.23 0.10 1.86 0.54 0.46
        
  b    t(b)  
Small 0.97 0.91 1.02 10.70 11.75 19.45
Medium 1.12 1.10 1.12 15.43 26.70 28.83
Big 1.02 1.07 1.07 27.94 32.71 25.08
        
  s    t(s)  
Small 1.59 1.23 1.17 13.23 12.02 16.79
Medium 0.97 0.81 0.90 10.11 14.88 17.50
Big 0.28 0.29 0.41 5.69 6.69 7.29
        
  h    t(h)  
Small 0.63 0.51 0.66 4.03 3.78 7.31
Medium 0.30 0.33 0.59 2.41 4.63 8.71
Big -0.05 0.35 0.56 -0.84 6.16 7.50
        
  c    t(c)  
Small 0.57 -0.14 0.24  0.88 -0.34 1.09
Medium -0.15 -0.16 -0.34  -0.29 -0.45 -0.98
Big -0.12 -0.32 0.45  -0.39 -0.43 0.63
        
  R2    s(e)  
Small 0.72 0.70 0.76 5.29 4.34 3.09
Medium 0.77 0.68 0.64 4.15 4.56 3.98
Big 0.82 0.72 0.74 2.25 3.88 3.34
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Table A1. (continued) 
        
Corporate Liquidity Tertiles - Liquid 
Book-to-market Equity (BE/ME) Tertiles 
Size Tertiles Low Medium High Low Medium High
  a    t(a)  
Small 0.22 0.33 0.49 0.45 1.09 1.97
Medium -0.06 0.28 0.38 -0.11 0.98 1.59
Big 0.90 0.34 0.05 3.45 1.89 0.76
        
  b    t(b)  
Small 1.16 1.10 0.94 11.27 13.59 16.03
Medium 1.18 1.11 0.92 16.20 21.79 16.44
Big 0.89 1.07 0.93 13.49 18.21 19.51
        
  s    t(s)  
Small 1.17 0.97 1.06 8.56 9.03 13.55
Medium 0.98 0.77 0.86 10.15 11.35 11.67
Big 0.67 0.34 0.31 7.72 4.35 4.84
        
  h    t(h)  
Small 0.37 0.54 0.66 2.05 3.83 6.41
Medium 0.16 0.31 0.54 1.30 3.54 5.54
Big -0.05 0.20 0.34 -0.47 1.99 4.09
        
  c    t(c)  
Small -0.57 0.49 0.56 -0.94 0.85 1.36
Medium -0.15 -0.38 -0.62 -0.23 -0.69 -1.29
Big 0.29 0.12 0.98 0.66 0.23 1.83
        
  R2    s(e)  
Small 0.82 0.79 0.75 4.06 4.77 3.98
Medium 0.79 0.69 0.68 4.59 4.99 5.01
Big 0.82 0.77 0.65 3.87 4.86 5.10
 
           GRS test:  F value = 1.38, p-value = 0.11 
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Table A2. The Fama-French Three-Factor + Corporate Liquidity Factor (LMIhigh_med) 
on 27 Size-BE/ME-Corporate Liquidity Portfolios 
Time series regressions of excess stock returns on the excess market returns (MKT), the returns on size (SMB), 
book-to-market equity (HML) and the corporate liquidity (LMIhigh_med) factors: July 1963 to December 2005, 
510 months. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Excess returns on 27 stock portfolios formed on size, book-to-market equity and 
corporate liquidity. 
Corporate Liquidity Tertiles - Illiquid 
Book-to-market Equity (BE/ME) Tertiles 
Size Tertiles Low Medium High Low Medium High
  a    t(a)  
Small 0.19 0.12 0.28 0.36 0.51 0.78
Medium -0.86 -0.29 -0.33 -2.18 -0.98 -1.05
Big 0.49 -0.32 0.19 2.99 -0.82 0.58
        
  b    t(b)  
Small 1.26 1.00 0.97 12.76 15.07 21.91
Medium 1.23 1.07 1.03 20.28 28.43 32.22
Big 1.09 1.08 1.15 29.39 35.75 30.31
        
  s    t(s)  
Small 1.54 1.20 1.30 11.42 13.28 21.44
Medium 1.00 0.96 0.85 12.05 18.81 19.51
Big 0.37 0.41 0.45 7.22 9.83 8.74
        
  h    t(h)  
Small 0.66 0.39 0.64 3.66 3.21 7.85
Medium 0.10 0.33 0.50 0.94 4.74 8.55
Big -0.06 0.25 0.44 -0.81 4.59 6.35
        
  c    t(c)  
Small -0.32 0.02 0.55 -1.95 0.13 0.59
Medium 0.15 0.10 0.17 0.95 1.03 1.53
Big -0.21 -0.08 0.09 -2.91 -1.37 0.98
        
  R2    s(e)  
Small 0.72 0.73 0.78 5.48 3.79 3.06
Medium 0.75 0.66 0.62 4.34 4.23 4.84
Big 0.84 0.72 0.69 2.55 3.14 3.66
        
ttmedhigh
i
t
i
t
i
t
ii
t
i
t eLMIcHMLhSMBsMKTbaRFR +++++=− _
 136 
 
 
Table A2. (continued) 
        
Corporate Liquidity Tertiles - Medium 
Book-to-market Equity (BE/ME) Tertiles 
Size Tertiles Low Medium High Low Medium High
  a    t(a)  
Small -0.24 -0.59 0.23  -0.65 -2.11 1.35
Medium 0.26 -0.28 0.38  0.84 -0.68 1.45
Big 0.22 -0.47 0.19  0.76 -1.43 0.67
        
  b    t(b)  
Small 0.96 0.89 1.00 10.60 11.61 19.47
Medium 1.09 1.08 1.10 15.47 27.40 29.36
Big 1.01 1.06 1.06 28.33 32.80 25.22
        
  s    t(s)  
Small 1.65 1.30 1.25 13.37 12.39 17.78
Medium 1.13 0.91 0.98 11.71 16.91 19.14
Big 0.35 0.33 0.48 7.11 7.53 8.33
        
  h    t(h)  
Small 0.43 0.37 0.50 2.58 2.62 5.27
Medium 0.02 0.13 0.43 0.13 1.84 6.20
Big -0.20 0.27 0.41 -3.00 4.49 5.34
        
  c    t(c)  
Small -0.11 0.03 0.15  -0.72 0.27 1.67
Medium 0.12 0.27 0.26  1.10 1.87 1.64
Big -0.06 -0.18 0.06  -0.94 -2.30 0.69
        
  R2    s(e)  
Small 0.71 0.70 0.77 5.29 4.63 3.34
Medium 0.75 0.66 0.65 4.33 4.88 4.24
Big 0.84 0.76 0.72 2.41 3.45 3.87
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Table A2. (continued) 
        
Corporate Liquidity Tertiles - Liquid 
Book-to-market Equity (BE/ME) Tertiles 
Size Tertiles Low Medium High Low Medium High
  a    t(a)  
Small -0.12 -0.97 0.19  -0.36 -3.13 0.89
Medium -0.29 -0.44 -0.07  -0.94 -1.40 -0.28
Big -0.16 -0.49 -0.02  -0.62 -1.96 -0.04
        
  b    t(b)  
Small 1.16 1.09 0.93 11.18 13.46 15.74
Medium 1.17 1.10 0.90 16.03 21.69 16.30
Big 0.91 1.07 0.91 13.85 18.16 19.37
        
  s    t(s)  
Small 1.16 1.03 1.09  8.17 9.26 13.40
Medium 0.99 0.79 0.93  9.88 11.43 12.23
Big 0.59 0.35 0.37  6.60 4.32 5.69
        
  h    t(h)  
Small 0.48 0.44 0.66 2.54 2.95 6.09
Medium 0.21 0.25 0.43 1.55 2.73 4.22
Big 0.04 0.17 0.24 0.30 1.59 2.75
        
  c    t(c)  
Small 0.32 0.66 0.68 2.35 5.58 8.25
Medium 0.91 0.64 0.71 8.50 5.32 6.98
Big 0.69 0.57 0.27 8.98 6.61 1.85
        
  R2    s(e)  
Small 0.83 0.80 0.82 3.71 3.80 3.45
Medium 0.84 0.79 0.65 3.22 4.76 3.98
Big 0.88 0.81 0.64 2.64 3.23 4.43
 
         GRS test:  F value = 1.43, p-value = 0.09 
 
 
 
 
 138 
Table A3. The Fama-French Three-Factor + Corporate Liquidity Factors  
(LMImed_low and LMIhigh_med) on 27 Size-BE/ME-Corporate Liquidity Portfolios 
Time series regressions of excess stock returns on the excess market returns (MKT), the returns on size (SMB), 
book-to-market equity (HML) and the Corporate liquidity (LMImed_low, LMIhigh_med) factors: July 1963 to December 
2005, 510 months. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Excess returns on 25 stock portfolios formed on size, book-to-market equity and corporate 
liquidity. 
 
Corporate Liquidity Tertiles - Illiquid 
Book-to-market Equity (BE/ME) Tertiles 
Size Tertiles Low Medium High  Low Medium High 
  a    t(a)  
Small 0.37 -0.15 0.41  0.89 -0.45 1.45 
Medium -0.78 -0.24 0.17  -2.28 -0.67 0.53 
Big 0.62 -0.22 0.25  3.13 -1.18 0.97 
        
  b    t(b)  
Small 1.27 1.00 0.98  12.90 15.09 22.27 
Medium 1.23 1.07 1.03  20.65 29.02 32.79 
Big 1.10 1.08 1.15  30.41 36.27 30.65 
        
  s    t(s)  
Small 1.53 1.20 1.29  11.38 13.23 21.54 
Medium 0.99 0.96 0.85  12.06 18.94 19.62 
Big 0.36 0.40 0.45  7.22 9.81 8.70 
        
  h    t(h)  
Small 0.58 0.37 0.59  3.19 3.00 7.18 
Medium 0.03 0.27 0.46  0.28 3.99 7.83 
Big -0.12 0.22 0.40  -1.81 3.93 5.75 
        
  c1    t(c1)  
Small -3.14 -0.45 -1.76  -4.46 -1.08 -4.87 
Medium -1.28 -1.18 -1.26  -3.26 -2.56 -2.87 
Big -0.81 -0.89 -1.06  -2.95 -2.65 -2.56 
        
  c2    t(c2)  
Small -0.32 0.01 0.01  -2.27 0.05 0.25 
Medium 0.02 0.12 0.10  0.79 1.09 1.08 
Big 0.24 -0.09 -0.16  2.12 -1.22 -1.72 
        
  R2    s(e)  
Small 0.76 0.73 0.80  4.37 4.56 2.86 
Medium 0.75 0.67 0.62  4.56 4.88 5.25 
Big 0.81 0.77 0.68  2.04 2.60 5.72 
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Table A3. (continued) 
        
Corporate Liquidity Tertiles - Medium 
Book-to-market Equity (BE/ME) Tertiles 
Size Tertiles Low Medium High  Low Medium High 
  a    t(a)  
Small -0.31 0.23 0.12  -0.75 0.84 0.49 
Medium -0.34 -0.36 -0.32  -1.99 -1.28 -1.07 
Big 0.38 0.34 0.14  1.89 1.43 0.56 
        
  b    t(b)  
Small 0.95 0.89 1.00  10.54 11.59 19.44 
Medium 1.09 1.08 1.10  15.47 27.35 29.31 
Big 1.01 1.06 1.06  28.27 32.75 25.16 
        
  s    t(s)  
Small 1.66 1.30 1.25  13.46 12.36 17.75 
Medium 1.12 0.91 0.98  11.67 16.88 19.10 
Big 0.35 0.33 0.48  7.11 7.51 8.35 
        
  h    t(h)  
Small 0.48 0.37 0.50  2.87 2.55 5.18 
Medium 0.00 0.13 0.42  0.02 1.84 6.05 
Big -0.19 0.26 0.42  -2.92 4.38 5.38 
        
  c1    t(c1)  
Small 0.28 -0.09 0.37  1.05 -0.12 1.46 
Medium -0.11 -0.13 -0.44  -0.19 -0.32 -0.98 
Big -0.14 -0.27 0.19  -0.45 -0.45 0.48 
        
  c2    t(c2)  
Small -0.09 0.03 0.11  -0.65 0.26 1.28 
Medium 0.21 0.06 0.16  1.89 0.65 1.57 
Big -0.08 -0.18 -0.05  -1.06 -2.31 -0.62 
        
  R2    s(e)  
Small 0.71 0.70 0.72  5.31 3.62 3.18 
Medium 0.72 0.63 0.68  4.20 4.04 3.52 
Big 0.85 0.73 0.69  2.24 2.90 3.12 
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Table A3. (continued) 
        
Corporate Liquidity Tertiles - Liquid 
Book-to-market Equity (BE/ME) Tertiles 
Size Tertiles Low Medium High  Low Medium High 
  a    t(a)  
Small -0.12 -0.28 -0.23  -0.78 -1.01 -0.95 
Medium -0.96 -0.36 -0.49  -2.96 -1.22 -1.66 
Big 0.19 -0.09 0.08  0.91 -0.44 0.25 
        
  b    t(b)  
Small 1.17 1.09 0.94  11.29 13.45 15.91 
Medium 1.18 1.10 0.91  16.14 21.65 16.31 
Big 0.90 1.07 0.92  13.81 18.11 19.41 
        
  s    t(s)  
Small 1.15 1.03 1.08  8.12 9.24 13.37 
Medium 0.98 0.79 0.92  9.83 11.41 12.19 
Big 0.60 0.35 0.36  6.72 4.33 5.65 
        
  h    t(h)  
Small 0.41 0.43 0.61  2.14 2.86 5.57 
Medium 0.16 0.25 0.42  1.19 2.68 4.01 
Big 0.09 0.18 0.22  0.76 1.66 2.50 
        
  c1    t(c1)  
Small -0.53 0.76 0.34  -0.79 2.02 1.06 
Medium 0.07 -0.22 -0.48  0.15 -0.43 -1.17 
Big -0.12 0.19 -0.89  -0.34 0.49 -1.78 
        
  c2    t(c2)  
Small 0.32 0.59 0.76  2.16 5.76 9.55 
Medium 0.83 0.79 0.64  7.52 7.28 6.92 
Big 0.68 0.54 0.19  8.84 6.56 1.87 
        
  R2    s(e)  
Small 0.84 0.79 0.82  3.54 4.34 3.96 
Medium 0.83 0.86 0.64  3.78 3.14 4.87 
Big 0.87 0.81 0.66  2.92 3.98 4.12 
 
          GRS test:  F value = 1.45, p-value = 0.09 
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Table B. Returns on Zero-investment Portfolios Sorted by Size and BE/ME 
 
Panel A. Long Liquid Firms and Short Illiquid Firms 
In each June and December, the entire sample is sorted into 9 size-BE/ME portfolios. Within each portfolio, all the 
stocks are further sorted into 2 portfolios: liquid portfolio, which includes firms whose corporate liquidity is ranked 
beyond top 30 percentiles; and illiquid portfolio, which includes firms whose corporate liquidity is ranked below bottom 
30 percentiles. The 9 zero-investment portfolios are constructed as long the liquid firms and short the illiquid firms. 
Monthly portfolio returns are calculated as equally weighted average of individual stock returns. Finally geometric 
averages of cumulative portfolio returns for the 6 months following the month when the portfolios are formed 
(excluding the immediate subsequent month) are calculated. 
   low medium high 
 small 1.45 0.21 0.55 
                     (3.51) *** (0.41) (1.64) 
 medium 0.38 -0.21 -0.43 
   (0.75) (-0.46) (-1.14) 
 big 0.40 -0.37 -0.44 
   (0.76) (-1.00) (-0.92) 
 
Panel B. Long Medium Liquid Firms and Short Illiquid Firms 
In each June and December, the entire sample is sorted into 9 size-BE/ME portfolios. Within each portfolio, all the 
stocks are further sorted into 2 portfolios: medium liquid portfolio, which includes firms whose corporate liquidity is 
ranked as medium percentiles (40-70 percentiles); and illiquid portfolio, which includes firms whose corporate liquidity 
is ranked below bottom 30 percentiles. The 9 zero-investment portfolios are constructed as long the medium liquid 
firms and short the illiquid firms. Monthly portfolio returns are calculated as equally weighted average of individual 
stock returns. Finally geometric averages of accumulative portfolio returns for the 6 months following the month when 
the portfolios are formed (excluding the immediate subsequent month) are calculated. 
  low medium high 
 small 0.94 0.08 0.60 
      (2.15) ** (0.29)       (3.69) *** 
 medium 0.47 0.17 0.20 
  (1.28) (0.99) (1.20) 
 big 0.44 0.03 0.25 
  (1.60) (0.20) (1.40) 
 
Panel C. Long Liquid Firms and Short Medium Liquid Firms 
In each June and December, the entire sample is sorted into 9 size-BE/ME portfolios. Within each portfolio, all the 
stocks are further sorted into 2 portfolios: liquid portfolio, which includes firms whose corporate liquidity is ranked 
above top 30 percentiles; and medium liquid portfolio, which includes firms whose corporate liquidity is ranked as 
medium percentiles (40-70 percentiles). The 9 zero-investment portfolios are constructed as long the liquid firms and 
short the medium liquid firms. Monthly portfolio returns are calculated as equally weighted average of individual stock 
returns. Finally geometric averages of accumulative portfolio returns for the 6 months following the month when the 
portfolios are formed (excluding the immediate subsequent month) are calculated. 
  low medium high 
 small 0.51 0.13 -0.05 
  (1.18) (0.32) (-0.20) 
 medium -0.09 -0.37 -0.63 
  (-0.32) (-1.13)     (-2.08) ** 
 big -0.04 -0.40 -0.68 
  (-0.13) (-1.32)    (-1.71) * 
* 90% significance level   ** 95% significance level   *** 99% significance level 
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Chapter 3 
Residual Cash, Firm Value and Financial Distress 
 
I. Introduction 
The first two chapters link the cash holding level as a measure of the corporate liquidity 
to the equity returns, and examine whether corporate liquidity is an idiosyncratic risk or a 
systematic risk factor. According to tradeoff theory, firms that aim to maximize 
shareholders’ wealth should maintain the cash holding at an optimal level where the 
marginal benefit of keeping financial slack should equal the marginal cost. Any deviation 
from the target level of cash holding will lower the value of the firm. However, in the real 
business world, firms tend to hold more or less cash than the “target” or “normal” level. It 
is tempting to look at the “residual cash” or “excess cash” – deviation from the target 
cash level and relate it to future equity returns, growth and investment opportunities, 
operating performance and the probability of financial distress and bankruptcy. 
    Most previous papers studying cash holding deviating from an “optimal” or “normal” 
level focus on the positive portion of residual cash. Since excessively high liquidity is 
associated with agency problems19, the literature addresses the positive residual cash 
issue together with firm control and corporate governance. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (1999) investigate the expenditure pattern for both positive and negative 
residual cash firms and they find that firms with positive residual cash conduct higher 
capital expenditure than negative residual cash firms, which can be interpreted as due to a 
financial constraint for negative residual cash firms. They do not find evidence to support 
the agency theory. Faleye (2004) looks at the take-over market and finds that proxy-fight 
targets keep more cash than non-target firms. He also shows that cash holdings decline 
substantially after the proxy contest. Sibilkov (2005) finds that constrained firms hold 
negative residual cash because they are financially constrained, not because of the agency 
                                                 
19 Myers and Rajan (1998) argue that corporate liquidity can be a source of agency problems. Dittmar, 
Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003) claim that agency problems are an important determinant of corporate 
cash holdings, and find that corporations in countries with poor shareholder protections hold more cash 
than countries where shareholder rights are well protected. Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2005) use 
cross country data to test the agency theory. They find that minority shareholders value cash holdings less 
in countries where investor protection is poor than in other countries, which provides supportive evidence 
for the argument that agency problems play an important role in firm valuation across countries.  
 143 
problems. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) show that corporate governance impacts the 
firm value substantially through the channel of cash. They find that excess cash is more 
valuable for firms with good corporate governance than poorly governed firms. They also 
find that poorly governed companies dissipate cash quickly and in a value-destroying 
manner. Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) estimate the market value of cash held by 
firms. They find that cash is more valuable for firms with good growth options while is 
less valuable in firms with stable investment programs, easier access to capital and those 
nearer financial distress.  
Previous related literature finds that firms with positive excess cash tend to undertake 
more capital expenditure than negative residual cash companies. Moreover, positive 
excess cash will increase the firm’s market value only under sound corporate governance. 
Managers tend to squander free cash flows due to the agency problem, therefore, firms 
with good corporate governance tend to invest cash in a more efficient manner and 
increase shareholders’ value. As such, positive excess cash holding might increase future 
equity returns if the firm have good growth opportunities and good corporate governance. 
Managers of poorly governed firms are more likely to squander cash in some negative 
NPV projects if there are no profitable investment projects. One common proxy for future 
growth opportunities is the market-to-book ratio. We would expect that positive residual 
cash holding firms with a higher market-to-book ratio have higher future stock returns 
compared to similar firms but with lower market-to-book ratios. 
On the other side, negative residual cash holding companies are more likely to be 
financially constrained (Sibilkov (2005)). Negative residual cash could be the result of 
bad recent performance, or of management strategy. If a firm has negative residual cash 
temporarily but has a high market-to-book ratio, the future market value of the firm can 
be increased based on better performance. On the contrary, if the firm’s negative cash is 
persistent, and if it does not have good investment opportunities to improve its 
performance, negative cash might be a predictor of default or bankruptcy. 
This chapter examines the role of residual cash on affecting companies’ market value, 
especially the negative part of the residual cash. The empirical results show that firms 
with positive excess cash holdings have positive excess returns on assets, equity and 
investment as well as cash flows on average while firms with negative residual cash 
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holdings have excess negative return on assets, equity and investment. If the poor 
performance of the negative residual cash firms continues over time and if this is the 
reason that these firms actually have a consistently lower level of corporate liquidity 
compared to the “normal” level, the market value of these firms will be dampened. In 
addition, compared to those with positive excess cash, firms with negative residual cash 
tend to be smaller, spend more in research and development, distribute less to 
shareholders and lack good governance. Furthermore, it can be shown that the average 
net financing is much greater for negative residual cash firms while the average interest 
coverage ratio is substantially higher for positive excess cash firms than negative residual 
cash firms, which indicates a higher default risk for the latter group. As such, we can 
project that the negative residual cash might be useful as an indicator of financial default 
risk and bankruptcy.  
I also investigate the ability of corporate liquidity and negative residual cash to predict 
bankruptcy. In addition, whether the residual cash contributes to the various default 
probability measures developed by previous literature is studied. Logistic regression 
results indicate that negative residual cash is an important predictor variable to forecast 
bankruptcy. Firms with negative residual cash are more likely to go bankruptcy in the 
future.  Negative residual cash also contributes to different default probability measures 
estimated in previous literature, including Altman’s Z-score, Vassalou and Xing’s default 
likelihood indicator (DLI) and Chava and Jarrow’s default probability.  
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the hypothesis 
to be tested. Section III introduces the dataset and variables used in the empirical 
estimation. Section IV discusses the approach that is used to estimate the normal cash and 
residual cash. Section V describes the empirical results from the value regression and the 
logistic regression. Section VI concludes. 
 
 
II. Hypotheses 
Previous literature has intensively studied the role of corporate cash holding, the 
relationship between cash holding and various firm characteristics. According to tradeoff 
theory, holding liquid asset brings benefits to firms, and these benefits also serve as 
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motives for holding cash; however, maintaining asset liquidity incurs costs as well. There 
should be an optimal level of liquid asset holdings on a corporate balance sheet that can 
maximize the stockholder’s value (Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) and Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999)). Any deviation from the optimal level will 
reduce the market value of the company. On the other hand, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) 
find that high cash holding companies tend to invest more and grow faster in assets. Their 
empirical results show that conservative financial policies actually support investment 
and do not hinder performance. Sibilkov (2005) argues that the reason why firms keep 
cash reserves below the normal level is because they are financially constrained. In other 
words, compared to negative residual cash holding companies, companies that maintain 
corporate liquidity above the normal level are not subject to a financial constraint and are 
more likely to invest and improve operating performance. If firms accumulate cash more 
than necessary for normal business operation because they are better managed, they have 
shown higher profits and better performance, the market price of the stocks for positive 
excess cash holding firms will incorporate this information and their market value will be 
higher than those with corporate liquidity lower than the normal level.  
 
Hypothesis 1a: According to the tradeoff theory, there exists an optimal level of 
cash which can maximize shareholders’ value. Hence, the market value of equity 
decreases as the absolute value of residual cash increases. 
Hypothesis 1b: Market value of equity falls less as the absolute value of 
residual cash increases, if the residual cash is positive.  
 
The above hypothesis suggests two variables in the empirical value regression: the 
absolute value of residual cash and a dummy variable for negative residual. Both positive 
and negative deviation from optimal or normal cash level can be value destroying, 
however the destructive effect of positive residual cash will be smaller. This asymmetric 
nonlinear relationship between residual cash and the market value of equity can be 
illustrated by the graph below: 
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    The second hypothesis deals with the firms with corporate liquidity less than the 
“normal” cash level. Negative residual cash holding firms are more likely to be subject to 
financial distress risk if this situation persists for a relatively long period of time. Altman 
(1968) uses working capital as one of the variables in the discriminant function to predict 
bankruptcy. Zmijewski (1984) includes the current ratio as an explanatory variable in the 
bankruptcy prediction model. Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) show that firms holding a 
lower level of liquidity tend to have a higher probability of financial distress. Campbell, 
Hilscher and Szilagyi (2005) find that corporate cash is an important variable when 
predicting corporate bankruptcies and failures. Furthermore, Sibilkov (2005) find that 
firms with negative residual cash are more likely to be financially constrained, which 
indicates that these firms have higher default risk if they have high financial leverage or 
volatile cash flows, or macroeconomic conditions are weak. Firms holding negative 
residual cash while performing poorly over time have a higher probability of default and 
bankruptcy. Such firms keep a lower level of corporate liquidity compared to normal not 
because of management strategy, but due to the poor management. 
 
    Hypothesis 2: Firms with more negative residual cash holdings are more likely 
subject to financial distress risk and have a higher bankruptcy probability.  
 
Hypothesis 1 is tested in part V-1 and hypothesis 2 is tested in part V.2 and V.3. 
 
 
– Residual cash       0       + Residual cash 
Market Value 
of Equity 
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III. Data 
The sample consists of all US publicly traded firms from 1950 to 2004 where the 
necessary data items are available. Financial statement data are derived from the 
COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual Research files and the stock and indices databases from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The CRSP returns cover NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. I exclude financial firms with Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6999 because they usually hold substantial 
inventories of marketable securities, which are included in cash. Transportation and 
public utility firms with SIC codes between 4000 and 4999 are excluded as well because 
cash holdings of these firms are subject to regulatory supervision.  
As the risk free interest rate for the asset pricing model, I use monthly observations of 
the one year Treasury bill rate obtained from Kenneth French’s webpage. 20  Market 
excess returns are downloaded from Kenneth French’s webpage as well.  
    Following Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998), I measure corporate liquidity (CL) as the 
ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets: 
it
it
it AssetsTotal
CashCL =
, 
where Cashit refers to cash and cash equivalents including: bank drafts, cash, checks 
(cashiers or certified), demand certificates of deposit, demand deposits, letters of credit 
and money orders. It also includes government and other marketable securities and time 
deposits, which are usually considered as cash equivalents. A firm with a high cash-to-
asset ratio has more liquid assets to serve interest payments, and can therefore postpone 
bankruptcy and reduce financial distress; or has more freedom to invest in profitable 
projects without incurring transaction costs. Alternatively, corporate liquidity is measured 
by the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to net assets, where net assets equal total assets 
less cash and cash equivalents (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003), Faleye (2004), 
etc.). I also follow Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2005) and measure liquidity as cash, 
marketable securities and short term investment divided by total assets, since short term 
investment is often quite liquid as well. Empirical results are similar when the two 
alternative measures of corporate liquidity are used. 
                                                 
20 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french 
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To reduce the impact of outliers, firm specific characteristics and other dependent 
variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent tails of the entire sample. Firms 
with negative total assets, book value and market value of equity are deleted from the 
sample.  
Several default probability measures from the literature are used in the current study. 
The first measure is Altman’s Z-score which is a widely accepted classic measure of 
financial distress. Altman (1968) 21 uses accounting variables to predict the probability of 
bankruptcy. The second measure is the default likelihood indicator (DLI) created by 
Vassalou and Xing (2005), which measures the default probability that a firm’s total 
assets are less than its total liabilities. This dataset is made available by Maria Vassalou 
on her website22. Third, I use the bankruptcy hazard rate constructed by Chava and 
Jarrow (2004). They calculate the bankruptcy probability based on Shumway (2001)’s 
hazard rate model, but using a comprehensive bankruptcy database which consists of all 
bankruptcy filings reported in the Wall Street Journal Index (1962 -1980), the SDC 
Database (Reorganization module 1980 – 1999), SEC filings (1978 – 1999) and the CCH 
Capital Changes Reporter. 
For the actual bankruptcy and liquidation data, I collect the events over the sample 
period from the COMPUSTAT Research file and footnotes and CRSP delisting codes. 
Firms with a CRSP bankruptcy delisting code 400-490 (liquidations), 572 (liquidations) 
and 574 (bankruptcy) and firms with COMPUSTAT footnote 35 having code 02 (filing 
for Chapter 11) or 03 (Chapter 7) are considered as failing and will be included in the 
bankruptcy sub sample. There are 874 delistings and around 94695 firm years in the 
sample.  
    Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) point out that COMPUSTAT has the “back-filling” 
problem, which creates the survivor bias. Specifically, when COMPUSTAT adds a firm 
to its data file, it often "back-fills" data for several previous years. For example, if a firm 
                                                 
21 Altman’s Z-score is calculated as follows: Z=.012X1+.014X2+.033X3+.006X4+.999X5, 
              where X1=Working capital/Total assets 
                        X2=Retained earnings/Total assets 
                        X3=Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets 
                        X4=Market value equity/Book value of total debt 
                        X5=Sales/Total assets 
                          Z=Over all index 
22 http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/mvassalou/data.html 
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is added in 1985, COMPUSTAT might fill in data for the firm back to 1980. In this way, 
COMPUSTAT is more likely to include distressed firms that ultimately survive and to 
exclude distressed firms that fail. However, Fama and French (1996) argue that the 
problem of survivor bias in merged data from COMPUSTAT and CRSP is only of minor 
importance.  
    In order to minimize the impact of the “back-filling” problem La Porta, Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), firms with less than 5 years of COMPUSTAT data available 
are eliminated from the sample. Moreover, since my sample is generated by merging 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP, the survivor bias problem is of less concern. 
 
 
IV. Estimation of Residual Cash 
    As in the previous literature (Faleye (2004), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007)), excess 
cash is defined as the portion of cash kept above the “optimal” level of cash, and is not 
necessary to maintain normal operations or investment. Furthermore, I also define the 
negative residual cash as the shortage of cash needed to keep the “optimal” or “target” 
level. Optimal cash level can be estimated using a regression of cash holdings on a group 
of variables that proxy theoretically justified reasons for holding cash: transaction costs, 
investment opportunities, riskiness of cash flows, access to external financing, etc. Based 
on Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), 
I estimate the “normal” or “optimal” cash holdings by the following equation: 
ti
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The variables (COMPUSTAT item number in parentheses) in the above equation are: 
Corporate Liquidity measured as cash and marketable securities (1) to total assets (6); 
real size (Assets), measured by total assets deflated to 2000 dollars using the GDP 
deflator; cash flow (CF), measured as earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (13) 
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minus taxes (16) minus interest (15), divided by total assets; net working capital (NWC) 
measured as current assets (4) minus cash and cash equivalents (1) current liabilities (5), 
divided by total assets; the market to book ratio (MKTtoBK) measured as the fiscal year 
end market price (CRSP data) times the number of shares outstanding (CRSP data) plus 
total liabilities (181), divided by book value of total assets; capital expenses 
(CapitalExpense) measured by capital expenditure (128) by total assets; R&D 23 , 
measured by research and development expenses (46) divided by sales (12);  Leverage, 
measured by the ratio of long term debt (9) plus short term debt (34) divided by total 
assets; Dividend, a dummy variable equal to one if the firm pays dividends (127); Bond 
Rating, the S&P long term bond rating with the lower score representing better 
creditability (280); G-Index, the Gompers et al. (2003) corporate governance index that 
measures the degree of managerial entrenchment due to takeover protection24 . Year 
Dummies are included in the regression to control for the time-varying macroeconomic 
factors that can affect the firms’ decision of cash holding. Finally, firm fixed effects are 
included to control for idiosyncratic reasons due to which some firms hold a high level of 
liquid assets such as Chrysler, Ford and Microsoft. Industry effect is not controlled when 
estimating the residual cash since it might be more of an individual firm issue, not widely 
exists in certain industries.  
    Residual cash is calculated as the difference between the actual cash held by the firms 
and the “optimal” or “normal” cash holdings predicted by the above regression equation. 
Faleye (2004), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) look only at the positive excess cash, as 
their primary goal is to examine the impact of corporate governance on the value and/or 
quantity of excess cash holdings. I would like to investigate the negative part of excess 
cash, which can be related to financial distress, and even future bankruptcy. Based on the 
models estimated by Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004), Campbell, Hilscher 
and Szilagyi (2005) employ a relatively atheoretical logistic model to predict the 
probability that a firm goes bankruptcy or fails. The independent variables used to predict 
corporate failure are cash holdings, leverage, profitability, market to book ratio, market 
                                                 
23 R&D is set to zero where the values are missing. 
24 Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) create the corporate governance index using the data from the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which measures the number of anti-takeover provisions in 
a firm’s charter and in the legal code of the state where the firm is incorporated. The index has a value 
range between 0 and 24, with more anti-takeover provisions indicating poorer corporate governance. 
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capitalization, past stock returns, and past return volatility. They find that low cash 
holding companies are more likely to file for bankruptcy. Since high level of cash 
holdings are more closely related to corporate governance issue due to the agency 
problem, it is the low cash holding situation, namely, negative residual cash holdings 
relative to the normal level, that should more precisely predict bankruptcy. 
Column 1 of Table 1 displays the results of a reduced form regression of the residual 
cash estimation. Larger firms hold significantly less cash, which is consistent with an 
economy of scale explanation. Furthermore, firm size is often used as a proxy for the 
ability to get access to external capital market. The result shows that on average, larger 
firms can relatively easily raise external funds and therefore hold less financial slack. 
Firms accumulate cash from cash flows, and hence we can observe a positive relationship 
between cash holding and cash flow. Net working capital is considered as a substitute for 
cash and cash equivalents. The regression results show that firm with higher net working 
capital as an alternative source of funds do not maintain a high level of corporate 
liquidity. Growth opportunities are proxied by the market-to-book ratio. Firms with 
greater investment opportunities tend to hold more cash for speculative reasons.  
Column 2 includes two additional variables. The bond rating is used to account for 
access to the external financial market. Firms with a better long term bond rating (lower 
score in the S&P bond rating) hold more cash. Recent research finds that corporate 
governance affects companies’ decisions to hold financial liquidity (Dittmar, Mahrt-
Smith and Servaes (2003), and Harford, Mansi and Maxwell (2005)), I therefore include 
the G-Index in the normal cash regression to account for this effect. It turns out firms 
under good corporate governance (a lower score on the G-Index) keep a lower level of 
cash, which is consistent with the previous literature. Following the specification of 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), I further include capital expenditure, R&D expenses, 
leverage and dividend payments in the estimation of normal cash holding. A great 
amount of capital expenditure draws down current corporate liquidity, as can be seen 
from the negative coefficient on capital expenses. Firms with substantial research and 
development expenses are more subject to an information asymmetry problem, with 
hence higher external capital cost, and therefore a need to keep more liquid assets. 
Leverage is negatively associated with corporate liquidity, which is consistent with the 
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pecking order or financial hierarchy theory according to which firms accumulate cash to 
pay back their debt when it comes due. In general, cash rich companies tend to distribute 
more dividends to their shareholders, as is confirmed by the negative sign on the 
coefficient of the dividend variable.  
Alternatively, excess cash can be estimated by subtracting some benchmark cash 
holding level from individual corporate liquidity. One benchmark can be the industry-size 
average cash holding since previous literature shows corporate liquidity varies depending 
on industry and size. First, all the firms are categorized into 10 industry portfolios defined 
by Fama and French; then within each industry portfolio, firms are subsequently sorted 
into 5 size sub portfolios based on market equity. Next, the industry-size corporate 
liquidity norm is calculated each period by taking the average of cash holdings of all 
firms falling into a certain industry-size portfolio. 
 
 
V. Empirical Results 
Panel A of Table 2 compares the summary statistics for firms with positive and negative 
residual cash, which are residuals from the normal cash regressions. Contemporaneous 
annual equity returns are similar for positive and negative residual cash firms, but 
positive excess cash firms have higher one-year future equity returns. On average, firms 
with positive excess cash are smaller in terms of real assets. Firms with cash holdings 
lower than the “normal” level have higher market-to-book ratios and substantially greater 
research and development expenditures. This implies that the negative residual cash firms 
have more growth opportunities, which is consistent with Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 
(2007). The possible interpretation is that growth firms spend a substantial amount of 
cash to finance investment and end up with a lower level of corporate liquidity. However 
the fact that their value is more dependent on growth opportunities and intangible assets 
makes them more likely to suffer a severe asymmetric information problem and be 
financially constrained (Myers and Majluf (1984)). Net working capital for positive 
excess cash companies is significantly more abundant than for negative residual cash 
companies, with net working capital as a proportion of total assets equal to 9.8 percent 
and 0.8 percent respectively. 
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The current cash flow over total assets ratio is 0.102 for positive excess cash firms but 
-0.062 for negative residual cash firms. The previous cash flow over total assets ratio is 
0.103 and -0.206 for positive and negative residual cash companies respectively. The 1 
year future cash flow – total asset ratio for positive excess cash firms is slightly higher at 
0.118, while cash flow for negative residual cash firms increases substantially to 0.054. 
This indicates that firms with positive excess cash typically generate stable profit streams 
as well as cash flows, while negative residual cash companies may have investment 
opportunities but their operating performance is not stable, and their cash flows are 
relatively more volatile, which, may affect their solvency. The return on assets is 0.042 
and -0.105 for firms that have higher- and lower-than-normal cash level respectively.  
Similarly, the return on equity and the return on investment are positive for positive 
excess cash firms while they are negative for negative residual cash firms. It seems that 
the negative residual cash firms have very low profit and this is probably the reason they 
have low financial slack for the current period. 
Negative residual cash firms raise more external capital than their positive excess cash 
counterparts, with the net finance equal to 10.3 percent compared to 1.8 percent of total 
assets. However their ability to make interest payments is quite low, as the interest 
coverage ratio for negative residual cash firms is only -1.033 while positive excess cash 
companies have a much stronger ability to pay back their debt.  
For the dividend paid to shareholders, it can be shown that the payout ratio of negative 
residual cash firms is less than half of the positive excess cash firms. In addition, 
distribution to shareholders25 shows the same pattern. Previous literature uses the payout 
ratio as one of the financial constraint measures. It can be argued that firms without 
sufficient cash to maintain normal needs are subject to financial constraints, which is 
consistent with Sibilkov (2005). 
Panel B of Table 2 shows the summary statistics of firm characteristics of positive and 
negative residual cash holding companies using industry and firm size as benchmarks.  
The results are similar to Panel A.  
Figure 1a displays the time series of the mean and median of normal cash holdings and 
excess cash holdings derived from the regression approach. It can be shown that average 
                                                 
25 Distribution to shareholders is calculated as dividend plus stock repurchase divided by total assets. 
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normal cash holdings are relatively stable through 1999, while showing an upward trend 
after that, with peaks in 2000 and 2004 slightly higher than 15 percent and 17 percent 
respectively. The cross sectional mean of excess cash is around zero throughout the 
sample period, with a spike of 3 percent in 1997. Median normal cash and median excess 
cash are lower than the means, which indicates that the distributions of both normal and 
excess cash are right skewed. 
Figure 1b shows the mean and median of normal and excess cash holding estimated 
subtracting industry-size portfolio average from individual corporate liquidity. The 
sample size is much larger for this method because we do not use variables like G-index 
which have limited availability. The time series exhibition covers the period from 1950 to 
2004. The level of normal cash holding derived using the industry-size portfolio approach 
is higher than that derived from the regression method. It can be shown that there is peak 
in cash holding around 1954 followed by a sharp drop after that. The normal cash holding 
is relatively stable after 1958 with the bottom equal to 8.5 percent in 1974. After 1991, 
the normal cash holdings increase sharply on average and reaches 24.3 percent at the end 
of 2004. The mean excess cash is relatively stable over time around zero while the 
median excess cash is declining steadily. 
 
V.1. The Impact of Residual Cash on Firm Value 
One important question related to the corporate liquidity deviating from the normal level 
is: whether and how does excess cash affect the market value of firms’ equity? Following 
the literature (Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), etc.), I 
employ a valuation regression similar to the model developed by Fama and French 
(1998). Lagged corporate liquidity and changes in corporate liquidity are included as 
additional variables to identify the impact of corporate liquidity on firm value. The 
baseline specification of the value regression is as follows: 
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(2) 
where Xt (COMPUSTAT item number in parenthesis) indicates the level of the variable X 
at time t and ΔXt indicates the changes in the variable X from time t-1 to t. MV is the 
market value of total assets, measured as the fiscal year end market price (CRSP data) 
times the number of shares outstanding (CRSP data) plus total liabilities (181). E is the 
earnings before extraordinary items (18+15+50+51). NA is net assets, measured as total 
assets (6) minus cash and cash equivalents (1). R&D is research and development 
expenditure (46), which is set to zero wherever the value is missing. INT is the interest 
expenses (15). Dividend is dividend distributed to common shareholders (21). Leverage 
is calculated as the ratio of total liabilities (9+34) to total assets. NF is the net financing, 
measured as total equity issuance (108) minus stock repurchases (115) plus debt issuance 
(111) minus debt redemption (114). Table 3 shows the results of the baseline regression 
and several variants. Year dummies and fixed firm effects are controlled. 
Column 1 presents the empirical results of the baseline value regression. It can be 
shown that a higher level of corporate liquidity significantly increases the firm’s market 
value on average. The change in the level of cash holding over the last period is 
negatively associated with the firm’s value. 
In order to further examine the role of excess cash, several more value regressions with 
additional variables are estimated and the results are presented in column 2 through 
column 6 in Table 3. The regression in column 2 includes the interaction term Corporate 
Liquidityt-1 * Positive Dummy t-1, which tries to capture the additional value effect imposed 
by holding corporate liquidity beyond the “normal” level. Positive Dummy is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the residual cash estimated from equation (1) is positive and zero 
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otherwise. It turns out that holding positive excess cash will further increase the firm’s 
market value significantly.  
To decompose the role of normal cash holding and excess cash holding in affecting the 
firm’s market value, instead of regressing on the level of corporate liquidity, normal cash 
holding and absolute value of residual cash holding enter the value regression separately. 
According to tradeoff theory, there should be an “optimal” level of cash holding where 
the shareholders’ wealth can be maximized. Column 3 tests this hypothesis by including 
the absolute value of excess cash holding to the regression. The coefficient of the 
absolute excess cash should be negative since any deviation from the optimal level will 
be harmful for the firm’s value. The result supports the tradeoff theory. Column 4 adds 
the squared absolute excess cash as an additional variable. The impact of residual cash on 
firm value is quadratic. 
Furthermore, in order to test the Hypothesis 1b, which asks whether positive and 
negative residual cash affects the market value of a firm differently, a negative residual 
cash dummy variable and an interaction term of the absolute value of residual cash and a 
negative dummy are included in the value regression. Column 5 and column 6 show the 
empirical results. It turns out that both the coefficients on the positive dummy and the 
interaction term are significant and positive. Given the fact that residual cash will reduce 
the market value of a firm, positive residual cash reduces the firm value less than 
negative residual cash.  
 
V.2. Negative Residual Cash and the Probability of Bankruptcy 
In order to examine the relationship between negative residual cash and the probability of 
bankruptcy and failure, I follow Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004) and 
Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2005) and estimate a logit model. 
 
                                                                                                  , 
where yit is an bankruptcy indicator that equals 1 if the firm bankrupts or fails during year 
t and xit includes standard variables used in bankruptcy prediction models: net income 
(NI/TA), total liabilities to total assets (Leverage), excess stock returns (ExRet), stock 
return volatility (SIGMA), relative size (RSIZE) defined as the logarithm of firms’ market 
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equity value to the market capitalization of the S&P 500 index, the market to book ratio 
(MKTtoBK), stock price (PRICE) and cash holding to total assets (C_TA). In order to 
examine the predictive power of residual cash, I add the interaction term of C_TA and a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if residual cash is below zero.  
    Furthermore, the overall cash holding position is decomposed into normal cash and 
residual cash to investigate their roles in predicting future bankruptcy and failure 
respectively. It is particularly interesting to see the how the absolute value of residual 
cash and negative cash holding can affect the bankruptcy probability. Specifically, if 
tradeoff theory is correct, and there is an optimal cash level at which shareholders’ value 
is maximized, then any deviation from this optimal level will decrease the firm’s value 
and therefore increase the probability of failure. In addition, to examine whether firms 
with positive residual cash are less likely subject to default risk, a negative residual cash 
dummy and an interaction term of absolute value of residual cash and negative residual 
cash dummy are included in the logistic regression. All predictors are lagged one period, 
so that they are known at the beginning of the period during which bankruptcy or failure 
occurs. According to the logistic regression, a higher value of (α + βxi,t-1) contributes to a 
higher probability of bankruptcy or failure. If negative residual cash helps forecast 
bankruptcy of firms, we would expect that the coefficient on the negative residual cash 
dummy as well as the coefficient on the interaction term should be significantly positive.  
    Table 4 presents the number of bankruptcies and failures, the total number of active 
firms and the percentage of bankruptcies each year during the sample period 1950 – 2005. 
There are a total of 874 bankruptcies in the sample, which includes all bankruptcy filings 
as reported in the COMPUSTAT and CRSP datasets. Firms with a CRSP bankruptcy 
delisting code 400-490 (liquidations), 572 (liquidations) and 574 (bankruptcy), and firms 
with COMPUSTAT footnote 35 having code 02 (Chapter 11) or 03 (Chapter 7) are 
considered as failing and will be included in the bankruptcy sub sample. Furthermore, 
Figure 2 shows the number of bankruptcies per year over the sample period and Figure 3 
exhibits the bankruptcies as a percentage of active firms by year. As can be seen, there 
was no bankruptcy or failure before 1966. The bankruptcy filings increase substantially 
over the 1970s, the late 1980s and the second half of 1990s. The early 1990s and 2000s 
observe the dramatically decreased bankruptcies. 
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Table 5 presents the logistic regression estimation for various model specifications 
using data from 1950 - 2005. The estimated coefficients, a chi-square value of each 
coefficient and measures of model fit are reported. The standard predictor variables enter 
the logit model with correct sign and substantial significance. For instance, a lower level 
of net income implies a higher probability of bankruptcy, while a greater market 
capitalization relative to the S&P 500 market value will reduce the chance of going 
bankruptcy. If a firm relies on heavily borrowing, or its stock returns are highly volatile, 
or the excess equity returns are lower during the previous year, the likelihood of 
bankruptcy or failure increases.  
Model 3 includes cash holding as an additional predictor in the logit model. Similar to 
Campell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2005), the coefficient is significantly negative, which 
implies that keeping a higher level of corporate liquidity helps reduce the probability of 
the bankruptcy or at least postpone it. Model 4 uses the two parts of decomposed cash 
holding: normal cash and absolute value of residual cash as two separate prediction 
variables. It turns out the forecast ability of cash concentrates in the residual cash, which 
has a negative coefficient, and is highly significant at the 1 percent level. On the other 
hand, the normal part of corporate liquidity enters the logistic model insignificantly. 
Furthermore, the coefficient on the negative dummy is positive and significant, indicating 
that firms with negative residual cash has a higher bankruptcy risk. Model 5 shows that 
the interaction term of absolute value of residual cash and the negative residual cash 
dummy has a positive sign. Given the corporate liquidity position, holding a less-than-
normal-level of cash will increase the chance to go bankrupt. 
To better interpret the impact of residual cash on the possibility of bankruptcy, I 
compute the marginal effects for several independent variables at the sample mean. It 
turns out that normal cash holdings have a marginal effect of -0.064, while the marginal 
effect of the absolute value of residual cash on the bankruptcy possibility is 0.078. Higher 
normal corporate liquidity helps reduce the probability of going bankrupt; however, a 
deviation from this normal level in either direction will increase the chance of bankruptcy 
on average. In particular, a one percent increase in the absolute value of residual cash will 
increase the probability of bankruptcy by 7.8 percent at the margin. In addition, the 
negative residual cash dummy imposes a positive marginal impact equal to 0.026 on the 
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bankruptcy probability, implying that firms with corporate liquidity lower than the target 
level are three percent more likely to file for bankruptcy.  Finally, the marginal effect of 
the interaction term of the absolute value of residual cash and the negative residual cash 
dummy is calculated to be equal to 0.019, which indicates that, given a constant level of 
the absolute value of residual cash, negative residual cash holdings increase the 
probability of bankruptcy at the margin by 0.2 percent. 
 
V.3. Negative Residual Cash and Financial Distress 
The main purpose of this chapter is to address the issue whether negative residual cash 
can be used as an indicator to predict future financial distress and bankruptcy. We have 
seen in section V-2 that negative residual cash can help predict bankruptcy. In this 
section, I investigate the relationship between negative residual cash and the possibility 
of financial distress using various measures of default probability. 
I perform various regressions of the probability of financial default and bankruptcy on 
firm characteristics including lagged negative residual cash to investigate whether 
negative residual cash plays a role in forecasting bankruptcy. The three default 
probability measures are Altman’s Z-score, Vassalou and Xing’s default likelihood 
indicator (DLI), and Chava and Jarrow’s default probability. Altman’ Z-score is a 
bankruptcy predictor that determines the likelihood of a firm going bankrupt by a 
multivariate formula combining five common business ratios, with a weighting system 
calculated by Altman. Studies show that the Z-score is usually accurate in predicting 
bankruptcy. However, such models using only accounting data are considered backward 
looking because accounting information only provides summary of a company’s past 
performance rather than the future prospects. Vassalou and Xing (2004) use Black and 
Scholes (1973) contingent claims methodology and Merton’s (1974) option pricing 
model to calculate the default measure Default Likelihood Indicator (DLI) using equity 
data. They find that DLI contains very different information from the aggregate default 
spreads between BAA corporate bonds and U.S. Treasury bonds, and it well predicts 
actual defaults. The last default likelihood measure is the bankruptcy probability 
constructed by Chava and Jarrow (2004). They use the bankruptcy hazard rate model and 
an expanded bankruptcy database to estimate the probability of bankruptcy and failure. 
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The firm characteristics used as independent variables include: net income (NI/TA), 
total liabilities to total assets (Leverage), excess stock returns (ExRet), stock return’s 
volatility (SIGMA), relative size (RSIZE) defined as the logarithm of firms’ market equity 
value to the market capitalization of S&P 500 index, market to book ratio (MKTtoBK), 
stock price (PRICE) and cash holding to total assets (C_TA), normal cash holding, 
absolute value of residual cash holding, and the interaction term between absolute value 
of residual cash holding or negative residual cash dummy.  
The empirical results are presented in Table 6. Panel A shows the regression estimation 
with Altman’s Z-score as the dependent variable. All the firm characteristics enter the 
regression model with a significant coefficient. Consistent with other literature, a higher 
earning, lower leverage, higher excess stock return, lower equity return volatility, larger 
size  and more corporate liquidity help reduce the default probability. Given the corporate 
liquidity level, holding negative residual cash tend to increase the chance of default, as 
we observe either the negative dummy or the interaction term between absolute value of 
residual corporate liquidity and the negative residual cash dummy has a negative sign. 
Panel B uses Vassalou and Xing’s default likelihood indicator as the dependent variable. 
The estimation shows that the coefficient on cash holding is positive but not significant; 
in addition, holding less-than-normal cash increases the default likelihood, given the 
corporate liquidity level. When the cash holding is decomposed into normal and residual 
part, it turns out that the normal cash remains insignificant while the coefficient of 
absolute value of residual cash is positive and highly significant, which implies that firms 
should stick to the optimal level of cash to reduce distress risk. Finally, compared to 
holding positive excess cash, firms with negative residual cash tend to have higher 
probability of default, everything else equal, as we can see from the negative coefficient 
on the negative dummy and interaction term of absolute value of residual cash and 
negative dummy. Panel C summarizes the results for Chava and Jarrow’s default 
probability, and the results are similar to that of DLI.  
 
V.4. Forecasting Regression of Residual cash 
If residual cash of time t contains some information about the firm’s near future, it is 
possible that residual cash can predict the returns, cash flows, investment, profitability 
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and probability of financial distress or bankruptcy for the period t+1 but not for further 
period t+2. Similarly, residual cash of time t+1 can provide some information to predict 
firm returns, cash flows and other variables for the period t+2 but not for from period t+3 
on. However, variables like equity returns, cash flows, profitability at a specific point of 
time are fairly noisy, which can be affected by a lot of factors other than residual cash. 
For this reason, current residual cash may not forecast stock returns and other firm 
characteristics accurately for the immediate future. If residual cash is persistent, then 
residual cash in period t is closed related to residual cash in period t+1, and has some 
predictive power for the stock returns in period t+2. This implies that residual cash 
holding for period t can provide a much better prediction for future stock returns, cash 
flows, investment, profitability, etc. at a longer time horizon if the firm’s stock is held for 
a longer period because in the long run, noises in stock returns and other firm 
characteristics are diversified and averaged out.  
The forecasting ability of residual cash can be estimated using the following two 
regressions for various holding horizons: 
tt2t1htthtt εDummyNegativeβ|Cash|ResidualβαXX +++=− ++ ,,
ttt2t1htthtt εDummyNegative|Cash|Residualβ|Cash|ResidualβαXX +×++=− ++ ,, , 
where Xt,t+h is the variable to be predicted over the holding period from t to t+h, and 
httX +,  is the benchmark of Xt,t+h. Xt,t+h to be forecasted here includes: Rt,t+h, cumulative 
stock returns over the holding period from t to t+h; ROAt,t+h, average return on assets 
over the period t to t+h; Residual casht,t+h, average residual cash different from the 
normal cash holding level estimated by equation (1) during period t to t+h; R&Dt,t+h,  
average research and development expenditure in period t to t+h; CFt,t+h, average cash 
flows during period t to t+h; and Capital Expenset,t+h, average capital investment over 
period t to t+h.  
Benchmark value httX +,  is measured as the industry-size average of Xt,t+h. First, in each 
period, all the firms are categorized into industry portfolios according to SIC code; then 
within each industry portfolio, firms are subsequently sorted into 5 size sub portfolios. 
Next, the industry-size norm of the variable Xt,t+h is calculated each period by taking the 
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average of X of all firms falling into a certain industry-size portfolio over the period t to 
t+h. 
The results of the above regressions are presented in Table 7. It turns out that residual 
cash indeed contains some information to predict the firm characteristics. A change in 
residual cash from the optimal level predicts that the stock return as well as the net 
income and cash flows will drop over the next 2 – 3 years. Compared to those with 
negative residual cash, the future returns, net income and cash flows of firms with 
positive residual cash fall less. Furthermore, an increase in residual cash is related to an 
increase in research and development expenses and capital expenditure over the next 
several years, implying that firms are piling up an extra amount of liquid assets for 
investment purposes. Moreover, residual cash tends to be highly persistent over time, 
which indicates that managers tend to keep a relatively stable cash and working capital 
policy 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This chapter examines the role of residual cash, especially the negative part of the 
residual cash, on affecting companies’ market value, financial distress and bankruptcy 
probability. Normal cash and residual cash are estimated using a regression approach and 
a portfolio approach. Firm characteristics are studied for positive and negative residual 
cash portfolios respectively. The empirical results show that deviation from the target or 
optimal cash is value destructive, which provides support to the tradeoff theory. However, 
market value of equity falls less as the absolute value of residual cash increases, if the 
residual cash is positive. Compared to those with positive residual cash, firms with 
negative residual cash tend to be smaller, generate lower cash flows and profits, borrow 
more external capital, have weaker ability to pay off debt, spend more on research and 
development, distribute less amount to shareholders and lack good governance.  
I also investigate the capability of corporate liquidity and negative residual cash to 
forecast the bankruptcy. Logistic regression results indicate that negative residual cash 
serves as an important predictor variable to forecast bankruptcy. Firms with negative 
residual cash are more likely to go bankrupt in the future. In addition, the issue whether 
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the residual cash contributes to the various default probability measures developed by 
previous literature has been studied. It can be shown that negative residual cash increases 
the default probability as measured by Altman’s Z-score, Vassalou and Xing’s default 
likelihood indicator and Chava and Jarrow’s default probability. Finally, by regressing 
the residual cash on various firm characteristics, we can see that residual cash indeed 
contains information to predict firm characteristics over the future years. 
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Table 1. Predicting the Normal Level of Cash 
 
This table displays the regression results for the normal level of cash. The dependent variable is 
Corporate Liquidity, measured as the ratio of cash divided by total assets. The independent variables 
include: real size (Assets), measured by total assets deflated to 2000 dollars using the GDP deflator; 
cash flow (CF), measured as earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation minus taxes minus 
interest, divided by total assets; net working capital (NWC) measured as current assets minus current 
liabilities, divided by total assets; market to book ratio (MKTtoBK) measured as the fiscal year end 
market price times the number of shares outstanding plus the total liabilities, divided by book value of 
total assets; capital expenses measured by capital expenditure by total assets; R&D, measured by 
research and development expenses divided by sales;  leverage, measured by the ratio of long term 
debt plus short term debt divided by total assets; Dividend, a dummy variable equal to one if the firm 
pays dividends; Bond Rating, measured as a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a corporate 
bond rating; G-Index, the Gompers et al. (2003) corporate governance index that measures the degree 
of managerial entrenchment due to takeover protection. All ratios are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
tails. All models are estimated as OLS regression with Year dummies and firm fixed effects. t-
statistics are included in the parenthesis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.154 0.278 0.336 
 (140.89) *** (53.13) *** (28.78) *** 
Assetst -0.224 -0.131 -0.249 
 (-20.43) *** (-7.66) *** (-6.20) *** 
CFt/Assetst 0.016 0.326 0.161 
 (10.66) *** (27.44) *** (10.98) *** 
NWCt/Assetst -0.056 -0.273 -0.307 
 (-21.50) *** (-30.94) *** (-27.59) *** 
MKTtoBKt 0.013 0.018 0.010 
 (55.12) *** (33.39) *** (19.52) *** 
CapitalExpenset/Assetst - - -0.693 
 - - (-19.27) *** 
R&D/Assetst - - 0.476 
 - - (18.14) *** 
Leveraget - - -0.243 
 - - (-27.27) *** 
Dividendt - - -0.055 
 - - (-15.29) *** 
Bond Ratingt - 0.009 0.008 
 - (58.43) *** (58.12) *** 
G-Indext - -0.008 -0.06 
 - (-14.26) *** (-13.86) *** 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.30 0.54 
    
* 90% significance level   ** 95% significance level   *** 99% significance level 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Firms with Positive and Negative  
Residual Cash Holdings 
 
Panel A 
This table compares the summary statistics of characteristics of firms with positive residual cash and 
negative residual cash.  Positive and negative residual cash is calculated as the positive part and negative 
part of the residuals from the normal cash regression. The variables are: contemporaneous equity returns 
(Returnst), expected equity returns (Returnst+1), estimated normal cash (Normal Cash), estimated residual 
cash (Residual cash), real assets (Real Assets), market-to-book ratio (MKTtoBK), ratio of capital expense 
to assets (CapitalExpense/Assets), ratio of research to sales (R&D/Sales), leverage (Leverage), corporate 
liquidity for previous period (Corporate Liquidityt-1), current period (Corporate Liquidityt), and next 
period (Corporate Liquidityt+1),  ratio of cash flow over assets (CF/Assets), book-to-market ratio 
(BE/ME), ratio of net working capital to assets (NWC/Assets), return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE), return on investment (ROI), amount of net finance raised in current period (Net Finance), interest 
coverage (INT Coverage), payout ratio (Payout Ratio), distribution to shareholders (Distribution to 
Shareholdert), and Gompers et al. index (G-Indext). All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% tails. 
 
 Mean Median 
 Positive 
Residual cash 
Negative 
residual cash 
Positive 
Residual cash 
Negative 
residual cash 
Returnst 0.177 0.173 0.058 0.054 
 (0.829) (0.904)   
Returnst+1 0.209 0.172 0.069 0.054 
 (0.975) (0.902)   
Normal Casht 0.123 0.087 0.103 0.067 
 (0.102) (0.072)   
Residual casht 0.078 -0.047 0.052 -0.037 
 (0.124) (0.043)   
Real Assetst 58.052 10.009 20.852 0.745 
 (124.338) (61.427)   
MKTtoBKt 2.033 2.369 1.661 1.327 
 (1.266) (13.230)   
CapitalExpense/Assetst 0.068 0.075 0.052 0.048 
 (0.060) (0.159)   
R&D/Salest 0.036 0.801 0.002 0 
 (0.123) (16.991)   
Leveraget 0.299 0.304 0.266 0.202 
 (0.212) (3.197)   
Corporate Liquidityt-1 0.172 0.085 0.089 0.077 
 (0.134) (0.120)   
Corporate Liquidityt 0.201 0.040 0.104 0.053 
 (0.147) (0.117)   
Corporate Liquidityt+1 0.212 0.069 0.097 0.067 
 (0.146) (0.111)   
CF/Assetst-1 0.103 -0.206 0.083 0.058 
 (0.082) (16.721)   
CF/Assetst 0.102 -0.062 0.103 0.067 
 (0.084) (2.566)   
CF/Assetst+1 0.118 0.054 0.112 0.076 
 (0.095) (2.389)   
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Table 2. Panel A (continued) 
   
 Mean Median 
 Positive 
Residual cash 
Negative 
residual cash 
Positive 
Residual cash 
Negative 
residual cash 
BE/MEt 0.425 0.648 0.376 0.557 
 (0.571) (43.295)   
NWC/Assetst 0.098 0.008 0.082 0.110 
 (0.138) (3.113)   
ROAt 0.042 -0.105 0.042 0.027 
 (0.067) (2.771)   
ROEt 0.354 -0.068 0.138 0.046 
 (3.826) (21.580)   
ROIt 0.118 -0.003 0.116 0.092 
 (0.191) (7.687)   
Net Financet 0.018 0.103 0 0.005 
 (0.117) (0.662)   
INT Coveraget 8.595 -1.033 3.897 2.345 
 (28.245) (389.738)   
Payout Ratiot 0.524 0.209 0.170 0 
 (5.206) (8.764)   
Distribution to 
Shareholderst 
0.050 0.021 0.025 0 
 (0.183) (0.095)   
G-Indext 8.677 9.922 10.000 9.000 
 (2.72) (2.56)   
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Table 2. (continued) 
 
Panel B 
 
This table compares the summary statistics of characteristics of firms with positive residual cash and 
negative residual cash.  Positive and negative residual cash is calculated as the positive part and negative 
part of the difference between the individual firm’s cash holding and the average industry-size portfolio 
cash holdings. The variables are: contemporaneous equity returns (Returnst), expected equity returns 
(Returnst+1), estimated normal cash (Normal Cash), estimated residual cash (Residual cash), real assets 
(Real Assets), market-to-book ratio (MKTtoBK), ratio of capital expense to assets 
(CapitalExpense/Assets), ratio of research to sales (R&D/Sales), leverage (Leverage), corporate liquidity 
for previous period (Corporate Liquidityt-1), current period (Corporate Liquidityt), and next period 
(Corporate Liquidityt+1),  ratio of cash flow over assets (CF/Assets), book-to-market ratio (BE/ME), ratio 
of net working capital to assets (NWC/Assets), return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on 
investment (ROI), amount of net finance raised in current period (Net Finance), interest coverage (INT 
Coverage), payout ratio (Payout Ratio), distribution to shareholders (Distribution to Shareholdert), and 
Gompers et al. index (G-Indext). All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% tails. 
 
 Mean Median 
 Positive 
Residual cash 
Negative 
residual cash 
Positive 
Residual cash 
Negative 
residual cash 
Returnst 0.177 0.165 0.051 0.054 
 (0.841) (0.991)   
Returnst+1 0.169 0.177 0.050 0.060 
 (0.809) (1.103)   
Normal Casht 0.180 0.157 0.136 0.122 
 (0.105) (0.091)   
Residual casht 0.173 -0.099 0.123 -0.080 
 (0.156) (0.073)   
Real Assetst 6.914 12.907 5.260 7.589 
 (48.827)  (123.625)   
MKTtoBKt 3.009 1.926 1.667 1.231 
 (16.173) (10.068)   
CapitalExpense/Assetst 0.071 0.078 0.045 0.051 
 (0.239) (0.093)   
R&D/Salest 0.052 0.206 0.043 0.101 
 (0.250) (2.658)   
Leveraget 0.156 0.367 0.057 0.270 
 (0.516) (2.155)   
Corporate Liquidityt-1 0.251 0.602 0.197 0.038 
 (0.282) (1.265)   
Corporate Liquidityt 0.354 0.059 0.299 0.037 
 (0.220) (0.528)   
Corporate Liquidityt+1 0.365 0.082 0.255 0.043 
 (0.235) (0.952)   
CF/Assetst-1 0.070 -0.056 0.052 0.010 
 (0.532) (1.260)   
CF/Assetst 0.075 -0.036 0.065 0.034 
 (1.265) (2.102)   
CF/Assetst+1 0.131 0.038 0.073 0.070 
 (1.250) (1.265)   
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Table 2. Panel B (continued) 
   
 Mean Median 
 Positive 
Residual cash 
Negative 
residual cash 
Positive 
Residual cash 
Negative 
residual cash 
BE/MEt 0.517 0.742 0.458 0.614 
 (1.321) (2.562)   
NWC/Assetst 0.034 0.032 0.069 0.071 
 (0.816) (2.912)   
ROAt 0.115 -0.085 0.085 0.020 
 (0.125) (1.205)   
ROEt 0.231 -0.021 0.156 0.051 
 (2.131) (2.897)   
ROIt 0.090 0.049 0.088 0.034 
 (1.202) (1.103)   
Net Financet 0.159 0.063 0.105 0.040 
 (0.773) (0.539)   
INT Coveraget 8.069 2.917 3.857 2.160 
 (22.592) (15.481)   
Payout Ratiot 0.140 0.260 0.132 0 
 (2.508) (5.695)   
Distribution to 
Shareholdert 
0.026 0.020 0.022 0 
 (0.108) (0.086)   
G-Indext 8.225 9.180 8.000 9.000 
 (2.589) (2.734)   
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Table 3. The Impact of Normal and Residual Cash on Firm Value 
This table shows the results of value regressions. The dependent variable is the market to book ratio. The independent variables include: 1 year 
lagged corporate liquidity (Corporate Liquidityt-1), 1 year change in corporate liquidity (Δ Corporate Liquidityt), the interaction between corporate 
liquidity and positive residual cash dummy (Corporate Liquidityt-1 * Positive Dummy t-1), 1 year lagged normal cash holding, calculated as the 
predicted value from regression (3) in Table 1 divided by total assets (Normal Cash/Assets), 1 year lagged residual cash holding, calculated as the 
residual from regression (3) in Table 1 divided by total assets (Residual Cash/Assets), the interaction term between residual cash  and positive 
residual cash dummy (Residual Cash Holdingt-1 * Positive Dummy t), the absolute value of residual cash (|Residual Cash Holdingt-1|), the squared 
absolute value of residualcash (|Residual Cash Holdingt-1|2), 1 year change in net assets (Δ Net Assetst), current realizations and 1 year change in 
earnings (E), research and development expenses (R&D), interest expenses (Interest) and dividend (Dividend) over assets, 1 year change of 
market to book ratio (Δ MKTtoBKt+1), current leverage (Leveraget) and net finance (Net Financet). All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% 
tails. All models are estimated as fixed effects regressions and include year dummies. t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 1.280 1.244 1.565 0.907 0.741 0.292 
 (3.43) *** (3.33) *** (4.01) *** (10.87) *** (3.84) *** (4.10) *** 
Corporate Liquidityt-1 2.603 2.609 - - - - 
 (12.24) *** (12.23) *** - - - - 
Δ Corporate Liquidityt -0.066 - - - - - 
 (-5.14) *** - - - - - 
Corporate Liquidityt-1 × 
Positive Dummy t-1 
- 2.630 - - - - 
 - (2.12) *** - - - - 
Normal Cash Holdingt-1 - - 10.498 11.114 12.232 12.216 
 - - (18.66) *** (19.61) *** (34.36) *** (34.21) *** 
|Residual Cash Holdingt-1| - - -0.927 -5.586 -1.776 -3.122 
 - - (-1.96) *** (-5.10) *** (-6.32) *** (-7.04) *** 
|Residual Cash Holdingt-1|  
× Positive Dummy t-1 
- - - - - 1.918 
 - - - - - (4.91) *** 
Δ Residual Cash Holding t - - - - -2.918 -2.612 
 - - - - (-9.53) *** (-8.80) *** 
Positive Dummy t-1 - - - - 0.161 - 
 - - - - (5.48) *** - 
|Residual Cash Holdingt-1|2 - - - 17.458 - - 
 - - - (5.82) *** - - 
Δ MKTtoBKt+1 0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.0002 0.021 0.019 
 (5.51) *** (5.96) *** (2.67) *** (0.015) (1.26) (1.14) 
Δ Net Assetst -0.017 -0.021 -0.042 -0.034 -0.492 -0.493 
 (0.38) (-0.46) (-0.21) (-0.16) (-4.08) *** (-4.09) *** 
E t /Assetst -5.896 -5.963 11.519 11.286 10.469 10.535 
 (-47.31) *** (-48.01) *** (19.12) *** (18.58) *** (34.38) *** (34.62) *** 
Δ E t /Assetst  -0.070 -0.072 -5.581 -7.038 -3.641 -3.651 
 (-2.10) *** (-2.18) *** (-9.47) *** (-11.58) *** (-15.09) *** (-15.12) *** 
R&D t /Assetst 0.249 0.252 -1.817 -2.479 -2.852 -2.645 
 (0.89) (0.90) (-1.63) (-2.47) *** (-4.71) *** (-4.38) *** 
Δ R&D t /Assetst 0.144 -0.002 -0.176 0.573 4.066 4.008 
 (4.90) *** (-0.23) (-1.56) (21.38) *** (3.99) *** (3.93) *** 
Interest t /Assetst -9.113 -9.019 1.792 5.067 -15.511 -15.362 
 (-37.58) *** (-37.29) *** (0.51) (1.54) (-8.26) *** (-8.16) *** 
Δ Interest t /Assetst 0.234 0.099 0.232 0.314 1.798 1.709 
 (7.87) *** (7.07) *** (12.35) *** (23.27) *** (0.81) (0.77) 
Dividend t /Assetst 5.303 5.252 2.944 3.128 10.368 10.371 
 (7.24) *** (7.17) *** (4.87) *** (5.06) *** (15.37) *** (15.36) *** 
Δ Dividend t /Assetst -0.209 -0.144 -0.563 -0.840 -1.730 -1.735 
 (-9.89) *** (-8.50) *** (-10.67) *** (-26.05) *** (-4.33) *** (-4.34) *** 
Leveraget 1.280 1.260 -0.320 -0.493 2.509 2.493 
 (11.05) *** (10.87) *** (-0.88) (-1.43) (14.67) *** (14.56) *** 
Net Financet 1.968 1.955 0.854 1.122 -1.248 -1.216 
 (13.38) *** (13.29) *** (2.78) *** (3.66) *** (-6.41) *** (-6.24) *** 
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.25 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.86 
* 90% significance level   ** 95% significance level   *** 99% significance level 
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Table 4. Bankruptcies and Failures as Percentage of Active Firms 
 
This table presents the number of bankruptcies and failures, total number of active firms and the percentage of 
bankruptcies each year during the sample period of 1950 – 2005. The bankruptcy sample includes all 
bankruptcy filings as reported in the COMPUSTAT and CRSP datasets. Firms with a CRSP bankruptcy 
delisting code 400-490 (liquidations), 572 (liquidations) and 574 (bankruptcy), and firms with COMPUSTAT 
footnote 35 having code 02 (Chapter 11) or 03 (Chapter 7) are considered as failing and will be included in the 
bankruptcy sub sample. There are a total of 874 bankruptcies in the sample. 
 
Year 
# of 
Bankrupt 
Firms 
# of 
Active 
Firms 
% of Bankrupt 
to Active 
Firms Year 
# of 
Bankrupt 
Firms 
# of 
Active 
Firms 
% of Bankrupt 
to Active 
Firms 
1950 0 425 0.00% 1978 22 4223 0.52% 
1951 0 440 0.00% 1979 21 4187 0.50% 
1952 0 447 0.00% 1980 33 4296 0.77% 
1953 0 453 0.00% 1981 21 4562 0.46% 
1954 0 466 0.00% 1982 31 4619 0.67% 
1955 0 474 0.00% 1983 26 5099 0.51% 
1956 0 486 0.00% 1984 25 5293 0.47% 
1957 0 511 0.00% 1985 25 5347 0.47% 
1958 0 521 0.00% 1986 53 5663 0.94% 
1959 0 543 0.00% 1987 18 5793 0.31% 
1960 0 573 0.00% 1988 40 5770 0.69% 
1961 0 604 0.00% 1989 39 5573 0.70% 
1962 0 1070 0.00% 1990 33 5412 0.61% 
1963 0 1136 0.00% 1991 61 5430 1.12% 
1964 0 1211 0.00% 1992 34 5620 0.60% 
1965 0 1290 0.00% 1993 19 6100 0.31% 
1966 1 1365 0.07% 1994 6 6429 0.09% 
1967 0 1555 0.00% 1995 17 6603 0.26% 
1968 1 1700 0.06% 1996 13 6932 0.19% 
1969 1 1861 0.05% 1997 16 6975 0.23% 
1970 4 1985 0.20% 1998 25 6835 0.37% 
1971 6 1965 0.31% 1999 22 6567 0.34% 
1972 5 4215 0.12% 2000 33 6268 0.53% 
1973 12 4328 0.28% 2001 45 5788 0.78% 
1974 13 4211 0.31% 2002 43 5297 0.81% 
1975 14 4172 0.34% 2003 25 5023 0.50% 
1976 15 4221 0.36% 2004 19 4852 0.39% 
1977 18 4217 0.43% 2005 19 4739 0.40% 
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Table 5. Logistic Regression of on Firm Characteristics as Bankruptcy Predictors 
 
This table reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy and failure indicator on firm 
characteristics that can serve as predictor variables. The value of the predictors is known at the beginning 
of the period during which bankruptcy or failure occurs.  
Chi-square values are in parenthesis. The chi-square of the likelihood ratio test for the model fit is reported 
in the model fit row. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Constant 7.24 6.50 5.24 5.41 5.37 
 (2207.25)*** (719.53) *** (366.06) *** (390.24) *** (377.43) *** 
NI/TA t-1 -0.22 -0.41 -0.20 -0.32 -0.29 
 (10.19) *** (14.11) *** (6.34) *** (9.28) *** (8.34) *** 
Leverage t-1 0.38 1.26 0.44 0.64 0.56 
 (13.78) *** (62.77) *** (10.58) *** (10.34) *** (9.34) *** 
ExRet t-1 -0.91 -1.13 -0.63 -0.71 -0.79 
 (29.22) *** (28.22) *** (17.62) *** (20.34) *** (19.89) *** 
SIGMA t-1 2.07 2.30 1.17 1.65 1.89 
 (30.84) *** (31.98) *** (8.59) *** (18.45) *** (20.34) *** 
RSIZE t-1 -0.36 -0.24 -0.09 -0.08 -0.14 
 (72.22) *** (23.68) *** (3.02) * (8.87) *** (9.84) *** 
MktToBk t-1 - 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.06 
 - (5.16) ** (0.94) (2.32) (2.39) 
PRICE t-1 - -0.44 -0.58 -0.45 -0.48 
 - (20.06) *** (59.69) *** (34.43) *** (24.36) *** 
C_TA t-1 - - -1.16 - - 
 - - (6.64) *** - - 
Normal Cash Holding t-1 - - - -0.86 -0.77 
 - - - (-2.56) (-2.14) 
Residual Cash Holding t-1 - - - - - 
 - - - - - 
|Residual Cash Holdingt-1| - - - 1.05 1.12 
 - - - (6.12) *** (6.34) *** 
|Residual Cash Holdingt-1| × 
Negative Dummy t-1 
- - - - 0.45 
 - - - - (5.48) *** 
Δ Residual Cash Holding t - - - -0.63 -0.56 
 - - - (5.34) *** (5.04) ** 
Negative Dummy t-1 - - - 0.35 - 
 - - - (5.09) ** - 
      
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.17 
Model Fit 216.56*** 416.03 *** 405.12*** 446.43*** 436.54*** 
# of Failures 741 721 712 689 689 
# of Firm-Year Observations 94695 93859 90874 93854 93854 
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Table 6. Regression of Default Probability Measures on Firm Characteristics 
 
This table presents the results of various regressions of firm characteristics on different default probability measures. 
The independent variables include: Altman’s Z-score, Vassalou and Xing’s Default Likelihood Indicator (DLI) and 
Chava and Jarrow’s bankruptcy probability. Altman’ Z-score is a bankruptcy predictor that determines the likelihood of 
a firm going bankrupt by a multivariate formula combining five common business ratios. Z-score is calculated as 
follows: Z=.012X1+.014X2+.033X3+.006X4+.999X5, where X1=Working capital/Total assets, X2=Retained earnings 
/Total assets, X3=Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets, X4=Market value equity/Book value of total debt, 
X5=Sales/Total assets, and Z=Over all index.  Vassalou and Xing (2004)’s Default Likelihood Indicator (DLI) is 
calculated based on Black and Scholes (1973) contingent claims methodology and Merton’s (1974) option pricing 
model using equity data. The bankruptcy probability is constructed by Chava and Jarrow (2004). They use the 
bankruptcy hazard rate model and an expanded bankruptcy database to estimate the probability of bankruptcy and 
failure. The regressions cover the sample period where the above default probabilities are available. t-statistics are in 
parenthesis. 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable – Z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Constant 1.53 1.43 1.62 1.53 1.07 1.01 
 (30.43) *** (28.21) *** (62.36) *** (31.71) *** (25.35) *** (22.21) *** 
NI/TA t-1 0.36 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.39 0.40 
 (10.84) *** (12.06) *** (8.54) *** (8.88) *** (3.02) *** (3.13) *** 
Leverage t-1 -0.20 -0.10 -0.54 -0.54 -0.60 -0.59 
 (-6.04) *** (-4.39) *** (-21.65) *** (-21.30) *** (-8.58) *** (-8.50) *** 
ExRet t-1 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
 (5.50) *** (8.15) *** (7.25) *** (6.48) *** (2.79) *** (2.82) *** 
SIGMA t-1 -0.86 -0.97 -0.57 -0.59 -0.25 -0.22 
 (-10.18) *** (-16.02) *** (-9.46) *** (-9.70) *** (-1.18) (-1.03) 
RSIZE t-1 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 
 (21.29) *** (17.39) *** (19.33) *** (19.34) *** (5.55) *** (5.15) *** 
MktToBk t-1 - -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 
 - (-6.62) *** (-2.84) *** (-4.94) *** (-7.11) *** (-8.43) *** 
PRICE t-1 - 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 
 - (3.27) *** (3.04) *** (3.00) *** (-2.18) ** (3.28) *** 
C_TA t-1 - - 1.37 1.98 - - 
 - - (32.28) *** (7.44) *** - - 
C_TA t-1 × Negative 
Dummy t-1 
- - - -0.44 - - 
 - - - (-2.25) ** - - 
Normal Cash Holding t-1 - - - - -2.08 -2.21 
 - - - - (-9.99) *** (-10.44) *** 
|Residual Cash Holdingt-1| - - - - -0.17 -0.83 
 - - - - (-0.85) (-2.54) ** 
|Residual Cash Holdingt-1| 
× Negative Dummy t-1 
- - - - - -1.20 
 - - - - - (-4.20) *** 
Negative Dummy t-1 - - - - -0.06 - 
 - - - - (-2.64) *** - 
       
R2 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.15 
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Table 6. (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable – DLI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Constant -0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.00 
 (-42.59) *** (4.88) *** (5.44) *** (-2.54) *** (3.50) *** (0.44) 
NI/TA t-1 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 
 (-13.16) *** (-14.29) *** (-12.42) *** (-16.54) *** (-3.59) *** (-3.37) *** 
Leverage t-1 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.03 0.04 
 (84.13) *** (55.66) *** (70.65) *** (57.60) *** (2.65) *** (3.25) *** 
ExRet t-1 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-53.26) *** (-32.00) *** (-37.16) *** (-42.42) *** (-5.39) *** (-6.23) *** 
SIGMA t-1 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.33 0.04 0.07 
 (29.68) *** (19.16) *** (19.98) *** (29.64) *** (0.89) (1.69) * 
RSIZE t-1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-47.72) *** (-14.16) *** (-14.04) *** (-37.99) *** (-10.30) *** (-4.20) *** 
MktToBk t-1 - 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 - (4.22) *** (2.00) *** (3.02) *** (2.12) ** (0.94) 
PRICE t-1 - -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 - (-19.85) *** (-23.37) *** (24.48) *** (-3.40) *** (-2.14) ** 
C_TA t-1 - - 0.01 0.002 - - 
 - - (1.42)  (1.18)  - - 
C_TA t-1 × Negative 
Dummy t-1 
- - - 0.01 - - 
 - - - (2.82) *** - - 
Normal Cash Holding t-1 - - - - 0.01 0.02 
 - - - - (0.31) (0.43) 
|Residual Cash Holdingt-1| - - - - 0.09 0.18 
 - - - - (2.47) ** (3.04) *** 
|Residual Cash Holdingt-1| 
×Negative Dummy t-1 
- - - - - 0.12 
 - - - - - (2.28) ** 
Negative Dummy t-1 - - - - 0.01 - 
 - - - - (1.99) ** - 
       
R2 0.25 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.34 
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Table 6. (continued) 
 
 
Panel C: Independent Variable – Default Probability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Constant 0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.003 
 (2.80) *** (7.55) *** (-1.13) (6.85) *** (-0.50) (-1.43) 
NI/TA t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
 (-0.98) (-0.76) (-1.90) * (-0.86) (-2.09) ** (-1.29) 
Leverage t-1 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 
 (4.28) *** (2.70) *** (4.79) *** (3.57) *** (6.24) *** (5.90) *** 
ExRet t-1 -0.01 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (-1.87) * (0.75) (-2.25) *** (0.56) (2.91) *** (2.78) *** 
SIGMA t-1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (7.77) *** (4.72) *** (7.24) *** (4.17) *** (4.53) *** (4.45) *** 
RSIZE t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-14.74) *** (-7.03) *** (-12.81) *** (-6.59) *** (-3.23) *** (-7.54) *** 
MktToBk t-1 - 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 - (2.50) *** (2.28) *** (2.33) *** (-0.99) (1.77) 
PRICE t-1 - -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 - (-7.80) *** (1.27) (-7.59) *** (-2.10) *** (-1.95) * 
C_TA t-1 - - 0.004 0.001 - - 
 - - (4.31) *** (0.79) - - 
C_TA t-1 × Negative 
Dummy t-1 
- - - 0.004 - - 
 - - - (2.45) ** - - 
Normal Cash Holding t-1 - - - - 0.002 -0.01 
 - - - - (0.79) (-1.52) 
|Residual Cash Holdingt-1| - - - - 0.01 0.01 
 - - - - (2.78) *** (2.96) *** 
|Residual Cash Holdingt-1| 
×Negative Dummy t-1 
- - - - - 0.01 
 - - - - - (2.37) ** 
Negative Dummy t-1 - - - - 0.01 - 
 - - - - (1.87) * - 
       
R2 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.25 
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Table 7. Forecast Regression of Residual Cash 
 
This table shows the result of the forecasting regression of residual cash can be estimated using the following two regressions for various holding horizons: 
tt2t1htthtt εDummyNegativeβ|Cash|ResidualβαXX +++=− ++ ,,  
ttt2t1htthtt εDummyNegative|Cash|Residualβ|Cash|ResidualβαXX +×++=− ++ ,, , 
where Xt,t+h is the variable to be predicted over the holding period from t to t+h, and 
httX +,  is the benchmark of Xt,t+h. Xt,t+h to be forecasted here includes: Rt,t+h, cumulative stock returns over the holding 
period from t to t+h; ROAt,t+h, average return on assets over the period t to t+h; Residual casht,t+h, average residual cash different from the normal cash holding level estimated by equation (1) during 
period t to t+h; R&Dt,t+h,  average research and development expenditure in period t to t+h; CFt,t+h, average cash flows during period t to t+h; and Capital Expenset,t+h, average capital investment over 
period t to t+h. Benchmark value 
httX +,  is measured as the industry-size average of Xt,t+h. First, in each period, all the firms are categorized into industry portfolios according to SIC code; then within 
each industry portfolio, firms are subsequently sorted into 5 size sub portfolios. Next, the industry-size norm of the variable Xt,t+h is calculated each period by taking the average of X of all firms falling 
into a certain industry-size portfolio over the period t to t+h. t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
 
Panel A. tt2t1htthtt εDummyNegativeβ|Cash|ResidualβαXX +++=− ++ ,,  
  RET ROA Residual Cash R&D Cash Flow 
Capital Expense    
/Assets 
1,1, ++ − tttt XX  |Residual Cash Holding t| -0.45 -0.01 0.33 0.07 -0.08 -0.02 
  (-2.85) *** (-0.58) (19.99) *** (9.52) *** (-5.46) *** (-2.39) ** 
 Negative Dummy t -0.02 -0.004 -0.07 -0.002 -0.01 -0.01 
  (-0.75) (-2.33) ** (-35.88) *** (-1.80) * (-3.63) *** (-5.64) *** 
 R2 0.05 0.01 0.30 0.06 0.03 0.02 
        
2,2, ++ − tttt XX  |Residual Cash Holding t| -0.51 -0.003 0.28 0.07 -0.09 -0.02 
  (-3.75) *** (-0.21) (15.52) *** (7.53) *** (-5.12) *** (-2.29) ** 
 Negative Dummy t -0.03 -0.002 -0.07 -0.001 -0.003 -0.01 
  (-1.45) (-0.90) (-31.78) *** (-1.35) (-1.41) (-6.27) *** 
 R2 0.04 0.01 0.26 0.05 0.02 0.03 
        
3,3, ++ − tttt XX  |Residual Cash Holding t| -0.37 -0.01 0.21 0.05 -0.10 -0.02 
  (-2.92) *** (-0.52) (10.94) *** (5.19) *** (-5.10) *** (-1.63) 
 Negative Dummy t -0.04 -0.002 -0.06 -0.002 -0.004 -0.01 
  (-2.23) ** (-0.84) (-27.33) *** (-1.61) (-1.77) * (-6.23) *** 
 R2 0.03 0.01 0.21 0.03 0.02 0.03 
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Table 7. (continued) 
 
Panel B. ttt2t1htht εDummyNegative|Cash|Residualβ|Cash|ResidualβαXX +×++=− ++  
  RET ROA Residual Cash R&D Cash Flow 
Capital Expense 
/Assets 
1,1, ++ − tttt XX  |Residual Cash Holding t| -0.90 -0.01 -0.62 0.06 -0.02 -0.06 
  (-3.42) *** (-0.23) (-27.26) *** (4.63) *** (-0.93) (-3.46) *** 
 |Residual Cash Holding t| × 
Negative Dummy t -0.58 -0.004 -1.34 -0.02 -0.06 -0.05 
  (-2.21) ** (-0.15) (-58.38) *** (-1.62) (-2.49) ** (-3.23) *** 
 R2 0.03 0.01 0.49 0.06 0.03 0.02 
        
2,2, ++ − tttt XX  |Residual Cash Holding t| -1.13 0.02 -0.52 0.05 -0.01 -0.06 
  (-5.13) *** (0.78) (-21.81) *** (3.29) *** (-0.28) (-3.58) *** 
 |Residual Cash Holding t| × 
Negative Dummy t 
-0.82 0.03 -1.19 -0.03 -0.09 -0.06 
  (-3.73) *** (1.03) (-48.60) *** (-2.00) ** (-3.42) *** (-3.53) *** 
 R2 0.04 0.01 0.42 0.04 0.03 0.02 
        
3,3, ++ − tttt XX  |Residual Cash Holding t| -1.10 -0.01 -0.42 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 
  (-5.54) *** (-0.18) (-16.56) *** (1.99) ** (-1.27) (-3.40) *** 
 |Residual Cash Holding t| × 
Negative Dummy t 
-1.01 0.002 -1.03 (-0.03) -0.07 -0.07 
  (-4.99) *** (0.08) (-38.12) *** (-2.03) ** (-2.20) ** (-3.79) *** 
 R2 0.05 0.01 0.33 0.02 0.03 0.02 
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Figure 1. Time Series of Normal Cash and Residual Cash 
 
Figure 1a  Time Series of Normal Cash and Residual Cash 
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Figure 1a displays the time series of mean and median of normal cash holding and residual cash 
holding derived from using the following the regression model: 
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Normal cash holding is the predicted value and the residual cash holding is the difference between 
the actual cash held by the firms and the “optimal” or “normal” cash holdings predicted by the 
above regression equation.  
 
 
Figure 1b Time Series of Normal and Residual Cash 
Using Industry-Size Portfolio Approach
-0.100
-0.050
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
0.250
0.300
195
0
195
5
196
0
196
5
197
0
197
5
198
0
198
5
199
0
199
5
200
0
200
5
Year
Mean Normal Cash
Median Normal Cash
Mean Residual Cash
Median Residual Cash
C
as
h/
To
ta
l A
ss
et
s
 
Figure 1b shows the mean and median of normal and residual cash holding estimated using 
industry-size portfolio average approach. First, each period, all the firms are categorized into 10 
industry portfolios defined by Fama and French; then within each industry portfolio, firms are 
subsequently sorted into 5 size sub portfolios based on firms’ market equity. Next, the industry-size 
corporate liquidity norm is calculated each period by taking the average of cash holdings of all 
firms falling into a certain industry-size portfolio. The normal cash holding of an individual firm is 
the corporate liquidity of the industry-size portfolio which the firm belongs to during a specific 
period. The residual cash holding is the difference between actual corporate liquidity and the 
normal cash holding for a specific period. 
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Figure 2. Bankruptcies and Failures by Year 
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Figure 2 shows the number of bankruptcies per year over the sample period of 1950 -2005. The 
bankruptcy sample includes all bankruptcy filings as reported in the COMPUSTAT and CRSP 
datasets. Firms with a CRSP bankruptcy delisting code 400-490 (liquidations), 572 (liquidations) 
and 574 (bankruptcy), and firms with COMPUSTAT footnote 35 having code 02 (Chapter 11) or 
03 (Chapter 7) are considered as failing and will be included in the bankruptcy sub sample. There 
are a total of 874 bankruptcies in the sample. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Bankruptcies and Failures as Percentage of Active Firms 
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Figure 3 shows bankruptcies as percentage of all the active firms per year over the sample period of 
1950 -2005. The bankruptcy sample includes all bankruptcy filings as reported in the 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP datasets. Firms with a CRSP bankruptcy delisting code 400-490 
(liquidations), 572 (liquidations) and 574 (bankruptcy), and firms with COMPUSTAT footnote 35 
having code 02 (Chapter 11) or 03 (Chapter 7) are considered as failing and will be included in the 
bankruptcy sub sample. There are a total of 874 bankruptcies in the sample. 
 
